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This thesis examines the constitutional performance of Hong Kong’s Court of Final 
Appeal (the CFA or the Court), and explores the appropriate role it should play in 
Hong Kong’s new constitutional order defined by China’s “one country, two systems” 
principle. It includes a wider discussion of China’s political and constitutional 
structure within which the Court’s operational context is defined, a consideration of 
the legitimate role of senior courts, and an investigation of relevant UK and EU 
constitutional practices. It evaluates the Court’s part, inter alia, in constitutional 
judicial review, the interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law, human rights 
protection, and the resulting constitutional and political implications. 
 
The Court’s role mirrors questions in relation not only to the internal political and 
legal order of Hong Kong itself but also to the broader constitutional order as to the 
central-regional relationship in China. It is the only institutional connection between 
Hong Kong’s common law legal system and Mainland China’s communist civil law 
system. When exercising its power of constitutional review and Basic Law 
interpretation, the Court faces dilemmas and sensitive situations, in which it has to 
handle with care the relationships between individual freedoms and collective good, 
judicial independence and executive efficiency, judicial scrutiny and legislative 
authority, regional interests and national concerns, the region’s autonomy and the 
centre’s power. A tendency of judicial supremacy emerges in post- handover Hong 
Kong, with profound implications for Hong Kong’s political life. While playing a 
significant role in human rights protection, the maintenance of good governance, and 
the achievements in constitutionalism and the rule of law in Hong Kong, the Court 
may also make some positive contributions to Mainland China’s own development in 
these areas. It is suggested that the Court adopt a modest and restrained approach in 
deciding politically sensitive constitutional questions, defining itself not only as a 
regional supreme court safeguarding Hong Kong’s autonomy but also as a national 
court protecting sovereign interests. A relationship of coordination, reciprocity, 
mutual trust and mutual respect between Hong Kong and the Central Government, 
and between Hong Kong courts (the CFA in particular) and other Hong Kong 
institutions should be built. 
Wanli Wang 
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11:59pm, 30 Pth P June 1997. 
 
Fifth Floor Hall, Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre’s New Wing. The Handover 
Ceremony of Hong Kong. 
 
The British union flag and the Hong Kong colonial banner were being lowered. 
 
00:00:00am, 1Pst P July 1997. 
 
As the Chinese National Anthem being played, the flags of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR, the SAR, or the Region) 
were simultaneously being raised to the tops of their poles. Hong Kong is now peacefully 
returned to “its original and rightful owner”TPF1FPT after having been under British colonial rule for 
156 years. This signifies, from the Chinese perspective, that “from now on, Hong Kong 
compatriots have become true masters of this Chinese land and that Hong Kong has now 
entered a new era of development”.TPF 2 FPT In this era, Hong Kong would become a special 
administrative region of China under the “one country, two systems” arrangement. According 
to that arrangement, the basic principle that “the Hong Kong people administering Hong 
Kong” and “a high degree of autonomy” would now be put in practice. 
 
1:30am, 1Pst P July 1997. 
 
Seventh Floor, Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre’ New Wing. Ceremony of the 
Establishment of the HKSAR. 
 
The Chinese President, His Excellency Mr Jiang Zemin declared to the world that “Now, the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China is formally 
established”. Subsequently, a swearing-in ceremony was held for the Chief Executive and 
various HKSAR officials, including members of the Executive Council, members of the 
Provisional Legislative Council, and senior judges. 
 
1:46am, 1Pst P July 1997. 
 
Led by the Chief Justice Andrew Li, the permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA 
or the Court) and judges of the High Court swore in front of the Chief Executive Tung Chee-
Hwa, declaiming solemnly,  
 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Sze Yuen Chung, Hong Kong’s Journey to Reunification: Memoirs of Sze-yuen Chung (Chinese University 
Press, 2001), p273 
TP
2
PT Jiang Zeming, “Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Ceremony for the 
Handover of Hong Kong Held by the Chinese and British Governments (01/07/1997)”, available at the official 
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24924.htm 
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“I swear that, in the Office of a Judge of the Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, I will uphold the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, bear allegiance 
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, serve the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region conscientiously, dutifully, in full accordance with 
the law, honestly and with integrity, safeguard the law and administer justice without fear or 
favour, self-interest or deceit.”TPF3FPT 
 
Here and now, our main character, the CFA, represented by its Chief Justice and permanent 
judges, appeared for the first time in the spotlight.  
 
The CFA is a major representation of the unique feature of China’s “one country, two 
systems” principle and is an important indication of the HKSAR’s high degree of autonomy, 
for even in a federal country its member states usually do not have their own court of final 
appeal exercising the “power of final adjudication”TPF4FPT, especially in the area of constitutional 
disputes. That power is usually grasped by the supreme judiciary at the central level rather 
than the member states’ courts. Allowing Hong Kong to have its own CFA, in a sense, is 
unthinkable to such a country as China, which boasts such a long history of practising the 
unitary system and where centralism has been firmly embedded in its political and legal 
culture. 
 
What would be the fate of Hong Kong in its “new era of development” under the “one 
country, two systems” settlement? Could a capitalist Hong Kong survive and thrive within a 
communist China? Would its residents continue to enjoy a reasonable level of freedom 
safeguarded by the rule of law, while their compatriots in the Mainland China are still under 
strict government control and the rule of man? Perhaps these questions were haunting every 
guest attending the ceremonies, and the audience watching televisions all over the world. 
 
Although many voices had expressed optimism on these questions in and before 1997 
especially from Chinese officials, claiming that Hong Kong would have “a splendid future” 
with the maintenance of “its long-term prosperity and stability”,TPF5 FPT there was considerable 
scepticism or even trepidation. Perhaps this was best represented by a famous Fortune article, 
which was simply entitled “The death of Hong Kong” and stated bluntly that “The naked 
truth about Hong Kong can be summed up in two words: It’s over.”TPF6FPT One major concern of 
those pessimists was the fate of judicial independence, common law, and the rule of law,TPF7FPT 
which had been conceived as fundamental to Hong Kong’s success not only to its economic 
prosperity, but also to the freedoms its residents had enjoyed. The CFA, as the supreme court 
of the HKSAR, is an important symbol of the rule of law and a manifestation of the high 
degree of autonomy in the Region, and was the cause of particular worries. As one 
commentator indicated, “The CFA issue directly affects the future existence of the rule of law 
                                                 
TP
3
PT Oaths and Declaration Ordinance (Cap.11), Schedule 2, Part V 
TP
4
PT A term used by the Hong Kong Basic Law. See art.2, 82 of that law. 
TP
5
PT Jiang Zeming, “Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Ceremony for the 
Handover of Hong Kong Held by the Chinese and British Governments (01/07/1997)”, available at the official 








PT Edward A. Gargan, “Hong Kong Fears Unraveling of Rule of Law”, The New York Times, 7 May 1997, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/07/world/hong-kong-fears-unraveling-of-rule-of-
law.html?pagewanted=1 
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in Hong Kong, which is determinative of Hong Kong’s continued prosperity after 1997.”TPF8FPT It 
was doubted that the CFA’s constitutional power of final adjudicationTPF9FPT would be really and 
truly exercised by the Court itself without any intervention from Beijing.TPF 10 FPT Nonetheless, 
Hong Kong residents did have great expectations for the CFA, hoping it would play a 
significant role in safeguarding the rule of law, human rights, and autonomy in the HKSAR.TPF11FPT 
 
Time flies. More than 12 years have already elapsed since Hong Kong’s reversion to China 
and existence as a SAR under the “one country, two systems” formula. Unexpectedly for 
those pessimists, Hong Kong is not “dead”. What the Fortune article anticipated and feared 
has not come about. Today, “the consensus is that Hong Kong’s decade as an SAR has, on 
the whole, been successful, despite some big challenges”;TPF 12 FPT “there has come to be a 
recognition that there is the beginning of a real government, a turn to a viable economy, and a 
real society in Hong Kong”.TPF13FPT Most notably, Hong Kong stands now as one of the world’s 
most open, transparent and successful economies.TPF 14 FPT Politically, significant progress in 
democratisation has been made, although elections by universal suffrage of the Chief 
Executive and Legislative Council will not be adopted until 2017 and 2020 respectively. 
Human rights are generally respected by the government.TPF15FPT The freedom of the press is still 
strong. The rule of law remains a treasure of the region. Even the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office repeatedly concludes in its six-monthly reports on Hong Kong that the 
“one country, two systems” principle has worked well and the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the Joint DeclarationTPF16FPT and the Basic LawTPF17FPT have been respected.TPF18FPT In a word, 
the capitalist Hong Kong is still alive and full of vigour under China’s communist 
sovereignty. 
 
In Hong Kong’s story of continuous success after 1997, what contributions has the CFA – the 
most prominent representative of Hong Kong’s judiciary and the rule of law, been making? 
How has the CFA’s performance been as a newly established highest court of the Region 
replacing the previous role of the Privy Council in London? What lessons can be drawn from 
                                                 
TP
8
PT See Jared Leung, “Concerns over the rule of law and the court of final appeal in Hong Kong”, (1997) 3 ILSA 
Journal of Int’l & Comparative Law, p851. 
TP
9
PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art.82 
TP
10
PT Alison W. Conner, “Legal Institutions in Transitional Hong Kong” in Ming K. Chan (eds), The Challenges of 
Hong Kong’s Reintegration with China (Hong Kong University Press, 1997), pp85-112 
TP
11
PT This can be, to some extent, reflected by Hong Kong pro-democrats’ struggle for a better settlement of the 
establishment of the CFA in 1990s. See James V. Feinerman, “Hong Kong Faces 1997: Legal and 
Constitutional Issues” in Warren I. Cohen and Li Zhao (eds), Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: the Economic 
and Political Implications of Reversion (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp79-84 
TP
12
PT Kerry Brown, “Hong Kong Ten Years On: An Assessment of the Special Administrative Region”, Chatham 




PT Janet W. Salaff and Arent Greve, “A Decade of Responses in North America to the Handover” in Yue-man 
Yeung (eds), The First Decade: The Hong Kong SAR in Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives (Chinese 
University Press, 2008), p43 
TP
14
PT Kerry Brown, “Hong Kong Ten Years On: An Assessment of the Special Administrative Region”, Chatham 




PT U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macao), 
February 25, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm#hong_kong 
TP
16
PT The Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong 
TP
17
PT The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
TP
18
PT Foreign and Commonwealth Office of UK, Six-monthly Reports On Hong Kong, available at 
http://ukinhongkong.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-hong-kong/britains-commitment/six-monthly-reports 
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its experience? Is there any improvement that could be made in its future work? In short, 
what role has the CFA been playing and should it play as a regional or sub-state supreme 
court under China’s “one country, two systems” policy and Hong Kong’s new constitutional 
order defined by that policy? These are questions well worth the effort of rigorous and 
penetrating scrutiny, for they are of great significance not only to the autonomy of the 
HKSAR itself, but also to the unity and harmony of the constitutional and legal order of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a whole. However, although there have been numerous 
articles trying to provide assessments of Hong Kong’s performance in economic, political, 
and legal and constitutional areas, no scholar has addressed solely the operations of the CFA 
so far. Therefore, it is precisely the aim of this thesis to launch such a full scale investigation 
of these questions. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first thorough exploration 
centring on Hong Kong’s CFA. Admittedly, due to time and space limitations, it is 
impossible to scrutinise all the activities of the Court. My focus will be placed on issues 
which are of great constitutional significance. 
 
The discussion of the CFA’s role would serve as a mirror reflecting questions in relation not 
only to the internal political and legal order of the HKSAR itself but also to the broader 
constitutional order as to the central-regional relationship in China. The CFA is located at a 
very special position within the PRC’s constitutional framework and lies at the intersection of 
two different legal systems and legal cultures. One is Hong Kong’s common law tradition 
and the other is mainland China’s communist legal regime which possesses civil law features. 
These factors make it difficult to define the role of the CFA properly. A primary theme of this 
thesis is to challenge both, on the one hand, the view of those extreme autonomists who hold 
that the sole constitutional role of the CFA should be safeguarding the autonomy of Hong 
Kong from central control in Beijing and, on the other hand, the opinion of those centralists 
who insist that the CFA should be deferential to Beijing’s will and subject to national 
sovereign interests unconditionally. Instead, this thesis will argue that a balance should be 
struck between the two approaches, and the CFA should provide constitutional protection not 
only for Hong Kong’s regional interests but also for Beijing’s sovereign concerns. Moreover, 
I will try to demonstrate that to build a relationship of coordination, reciprocity, mutual trust 
and mutual respect between Hong Kong (with the CFA in particular) and the Central 
Government in Beijing, as well as between Hong Kong’s courts of law (again the CFA in 
particular) and other institutions of the HKSAR, is more appropriate to the “one country, two 
systems” practice. 
 
It should be noted that my examination will not be narrowly limited to the performance of the 
CFA itself. Instead, the analysis will be placed in a wider discussion of the Court’s 
operational context, such as the historical background, China’s constitutional order and its 
“one country, two systems” settlement. These aspects constitute the conditions for the Court’s 
performance. There will also be some mentioning of the examples in the European Union 
(EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) whose courts operate under constitutional frameworks 
which, although very different in many ways, have certain similar features to China’s “one 
country, two systems” arrangement in terms of their plural elements. Study their experience 
can provide insights into the analysis of the CFA’s constitutional role and may offer some 
lessons to the CFA or HKSAR in their constitutional practice in the future. Besides, some 
western scholars’ theories about the legitimacy of adjudication with judicial constitutional 
review in a democratic polity in particular, will be discussed in an attempt to deepen our 
appreciation of the role of the CFA, whose democratic legitimacy has not yet been doubted 
by commentators in Hong Kong and China, but might be questioned due to the further 
progress in democratisation, especially when universal suffrage has been realised. Moreover, 
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my investigation will not see things in a static way nor will I analyse them in an isolated and 
rigid way; in contrast, dynamic elements and interaction aspects will be highlighted. By 
applying these approaches in the exploration, a better understanding not only of the CFA’s 
constitutional role but also of China’s “one country, two systems” policy and Hong Kong’s 
new constitutional order, may be achieved. 
 
Perhaps a further explanation should be made here about the relevance of the examination of 
the western’s analysis as to the legitimacy of judicial review/adjudication. As already 
mentioned, Hong Kong is still on its way to full democracy. This may make it doubtful that 
the western scholars’ exploration of the democratic legitimacy of courts in a real democracy 
could actually add useful analysis to the project and be appropriately translated into the 
context of this thesis as well as to the concept of legitimacy in the Hong Kong and Chinese 
contexts more specifically. However, in western scholars’ work there could be valuable 
insights that may be of help in considering the question of Hong Kong and China, given that 
both of them are indeed in the process of transition to a more democratic and constitutional 
society; especially for Hong Kong since it will soon realise universal suffrage in elections of 
its Chief Executive and Legislative Council and that may raise concern over the CFA’s 
democratic legitimacy. In Ng Ka LingTPF19 FPT the CFA has claimed unequivocally Hong Kong 
courts’ jurisdiction of constitutional review over not only regional legislation, but also 
national legislative acts.TPF 20 FPT Since the latter claim conflicted strongly with China’s most 
fundamental constitutional and political principle – the principle of congressional supremacy, 
the CFA encountered severe criticism and great pressure and had to retreat.TPF21FPT However, the 
jurisdiction which would ensure Hong Kong courts’ power of scrutinising and invalidating 
laws enacted by the Legislative Council of the HKSAR faced little challenge. It has been 
firmly established, frequently exercised and well developed by the courts. The CFA based its 
justification for that practice primarily on the courts’ interpretative power of the Basic Law,TPF22FPT 
which serves as Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. However, the question of democratic 
legitimacy remains: what could justify those unelected judges’ striking down statutes passed 
by democratically elected legislators? Moreover, what could justify the courts’ constitutional 
rule making through their constitutional interpretative power? This problem, described as the 
“mighty problem” in Mauro Cappelletti’s termTPF23FPT or the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” in 
Alexander Bickel’s words,TPF 24 FPT has been discussed by western political scientists and 
constitutional lawyers for many years. Their analysis could improve our awareness of the 
limits of the role of the Hong Kong courts, particularly of the CFA, in constitutional judicial 
review; and more importantly, it could offer useful arguments to defend that role. Thanks to 
their works, we do not need to construct our defence by starting from a clean state. What we 
need to do is to examine selectively some typical theories and try to fit their ideas into the 
Hong Kong and China’s specific setting or develop our own explanation based on their 
thoughts. In other words, a discussion of western scholars’ doctrines could give us a new 
angle to see and appreciate the constitutional role of the courts of the HKSAR, particularly of 
the CFA, under the “one country, two systems” principle. It may also provide us some clues 
for suggesting appropriate adjustments and improvements to that role. 
 
                                                 
TP
19
PT Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (FACV14/1998) 
TP
20
PT Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (FACV14/1998), para.61 
TP
21
PT Ng Ka Ling.v. Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 579-580 
TP
22
PT Ng Ka Ling v.Director of Immigration (FACV14/1998), para.61 
TP
23
PT Mauro Cappelletti, “The Mighty Problem of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis”, 
(1979) 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. p.409 
TP
24
PT Alexander M. Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962), p.16 
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The thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 will look at the constitutional context of the HKSAR within the PRC, which 
provides a setting and a basis for the operation of Hong Kong’s CFA. The CFA role is largely 
defined, confined, and underpinned by that setting and basis. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the present constitutional order of the HKSAR, I will first briefly recall the 
history of the British acquisition of Hong Kong and China’s recovery of the region. Then I 
will introduce the main elements of the “one country, two systems” policy proposed by China 
and Hong Kong’s Basic Law (the Basic Law) which embodies, enshrines and 
constitutionalises that policy. As the core of the “one country, two systems” concept is that 
the HKSAR would remain a system distinctive from those practised in the mainland China. 
Thirdly, I will carry out an investigation into the uniqueness of Hong Kong’s political, legal, 
economic, and cultural systems compared to that of the communist Mainland. Fourthly, I will 
talk about the PRC’s constitutional structure and its systems, for they are the framework and 
foundation of the HKSAR’s autonomy, being crucial to understand the “one country” aspect 
in the “one country, two systems” formula. The “one country, two systems” policy does not 
mean an absolute separation of the HKSAR from the Mainland; actually, there are important 
connections and active interactions between the two sides, and these are what we will talk 
about finally. In order to gain a clearer and deeper understanding of Hong Kong’s 
constitutional status within China, this chapter will also make a comparative discussion of 
UK and EU’s constitutional arrangement as to the centre-region relationship. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine some typical western theories on the democratic legitimacy of 
judicial role so as to provide some comparative theoretical standards for the investigation and 
assessment of the specific CFA issues under Hong Kong’s new constitutional order. Due to 
the huge amount of literature in this area, the discussion will be highly selective, that I will 
focus primarily on those doctrines which appear relevant and valuable to the analysis on the 
Hong Kong topic. I will begin with an examination of Professor Alexander Bickel’s concern 
about the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” and Robert Martin’s sharp critique of the 
Canadian Supreme Court: the former presents an early exploration while the latter typifies the 
contemporary inquiry. It will be followed by a discussion of some ideas which attempt to 
justify the courts’ judicial review and certain approaches which are suggested by some jurists 
for courts to adopt to ensure and enhance their legitimacy. It will also involve Cass R. 
Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism and his analysis of incompletely theorised 
agreements, and John Hart Ely’s famous assertion of a participation-oriented, representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review. Finally, the theory of “dialogue” – another innovative 
explanation of courts’ judicial scrutiny and primarily indicated in Professor Barry Friedman’s 
work, will be discussed. 
 
An institution’s role is largely determined by its competence. To examine a court’s 
competence or jurisdiction and power which are of constitutional importance is itself a way 
of indicating its constitutional role. This is what Chapter 4 of this thesis will be discussing. 
The chapter will explore some important jurisdictional issues of Hong Kong’s CFA which 
have been controversial and hotly debated. The first one is about Hong Kong courts’ 
competence in relation to constitutional review. Although there is no provision in the Basic 
Law that explicitly granting Hong Kong courts that particular power, the CFA asserted it in 
Ng Ka Ling by firmly stating that Hong Kong courts have a constitutional duty to scrutinise 
the compatibility of both the Hong Kong regional law and the national legislative acts with 
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the Basic Law and strike down those found inconsistency.TPF25FPT A critique of the Court’s claim 
will be made, centring primarily on the question: do HKSAR courts really have competence 
to review laws enacted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of 
China or its Standing Committee (NPCSC)? At the same time, the Hong Kong courts’ 
capability and constraints of reviewing regional legislation and executive actions as well as 
the consequent impact on Hong Kong’s constitutional and political order will be examined. 
We will also look back into Hong Kong courts’ previous practice of judicial review before 
1997 so as to provide a historical background for our analysis of its new development after 
the handover. The second topic concerns the Court’s role in interpreting the Basic Law. 
According to article 158 of the Basic Law, both Hong Kong courts and the NPCSC have 
competence to interpret that law with the NPCSC having the last word, and issues involving 
elements beyond Hong Kong’s autonomy must be referred by the CFA to the NPCSC for 
interpretation. Our examination will concentrate on some important principles and 
approaches that have been established and developed by the CFA to direct Hong Kong 
courts’ interpretative behaviours. Particular attention will be awarded to the CFA’s duty of 
referring issues to the NPCSC for interpretation, which serves as one of the most important 
interface bridging the legal system of Hong Kong and that of the Mainland and is a 
manifestation of the dialectic nature of the “one country, two systems” policy. In this respect, 
what lessons Hong Kong could learn from the EU’s practice of preliminary reference 
procedure will be considered. The third concern of this chapter is the concept of “acts of 
state”, which is used to exclude Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, from exercising 
jurisdiction over some behaviour of the state. The key question will be addressed in the part 
is: “can the Chinese version of ‘acts of state’ be reconciled with the common law doctrine of 
‘act of state’?” By answering this question, the limitations on the Court and its relationship 
with the Central Government will become clearer. 
 
Human rights protection and promotion is a key part of constitutional judicial review and also 
an important justification for it. Chapter 5 will look at the CFA’s performance in this area. 
First, the legal and constitutional framework of individual rights and freedoms in Hong Kong 
set up by the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and the Bill of Rights Ordinance, 
will be considered. Following the analysis, two most prominent tests developed by the Court, 
namely the generous interpretation and the comparative approach, will be discussed, for they 
are indicative of the Court’s attitude and philosophy with regard to how to deal with human 
rights issues. Furthermore, some leading decisions of the CFA concerning issues such as 
freedom of demonstration, of expression, and rights to equality and non-discrimination will 
be commented. In analysing these cases, attention will be awarded to the Court’s stance as to 
how to deal with the subtle and sensitive relationship between the guarantee of individual 
freedoms and the concerns of public order as well as national interests. 
 
Chapter 6 will explore the Court’s political role. Judicial independence does not mean 
isolation or being static. On the contrary, there could be dynamic interaction or dialogue 
between the courts, the society, and other institutions. In this chapter I will investigate what 
role the CFA could play in Hong Kong and in the mainland China’s politics, primarily by 
examining its influence on the political environments of the two different systems. The 
counter-influence on the Court exerted by the political situation of Hong Kong and the 
Mainland China will be discussed as well. At the Hong Kong level, I will examine the tension 
between the executive and the legislature, and the accompanying ideological conflict between 
the principle of executive-led government and the tendency of legislative dominance. The 
                                                 
TP
25
PT Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (FACV14/1998), para.61 
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implications of these confrontations for the Court and the Court’s possible impact on the 
legislative-executive relationship will be highlighted. Moreover and more specifically, I will 
consider the Court’s role in Hong Kong’s public policy formation and the course of 
constitutional reform. The desirability of judicial modesty will be argued at this point. As far 
as the interaction with the mainland China is concerned, the following questions will be 
explored: what factors might lead to the Central Authorities’ intervention? What strategies 
should the Court adopt to respond to Central Government’s concerns? Could Hong Kong in 
general and the Court in particular positively make some contributions to the mainland 
China’s transition to democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism? 
 
Finally, some conclusions will be drawn in Chapter 7. 
 
Before formally starting our exploration, I would like to make a brief introduction to our 
main character, the CFA, by providing some general information about its history of 
establishment, legal foundation, jurisdiction, powers, and composition so as to form an 
outline picture of it. 
 
Under British colonial rule, Hong Kong’s legal system was part of the whole British imperial 
legal system. It was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London that 
served as the final appellate tribunal for the region. Hong Kong courts were bound by 
decisions of the JCPC and, on questions of English law applicable in the territory, by 
decisions of the House of Lords.TPF26FPT 
 
In the 1980s, Britain and China began to negotiate the arrangement of the future of Hong 
Kong. A Joint Declaration was signed in 1984. According to the Joint Declaration, Britain 
agreed to return Hong Kong to China in 1997 and China would enforce the “one country, two 
systems” policy in the region. This arrangement means Hong Kong would become a Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, being vested with executive, 
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.TPF 27 FPT It was 
elaborated by the Chinese government in the Annex I of the Joint Declaration that the power 
of final judgment of the HKSAR would be vested in the Court of Final Appeal in the SAR.TPF28FPT 
In 1990, the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China enacted The Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (the Basic Law) to 
enshrine its basic policies regarding Hong Kong proclaimed in the Joint Declaration. It 
stipulates that the NPC authorises the HKSAR to exercise a high degree of autonomy and 
enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final 
adjudication; the power of final adjudication of the HKSAR would be vested in the CFA, 
which, together with other courts at different levels that would be established in the SAR; the 
judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong would be maintained except for those 
                                                 
TP
26
PT The House of Lords was not part of the hierarchy of Hong Kong courts. Its decisions could not therefore have 
been binding on the Hong Kong courts on the basis of any structural relationship. Hong Kong judges followed 
its decisions because of the following considerations: (1) the House of Lords was the supreme tribunal for the 
identification of English common law which applied in Hong Kong; (2) the judges who sat in the House of 
Lords also, for the most part, sat in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and were likely to decide the 
same way; (3) in an appeal from Hong Kong in 1985 (Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. 
[1986] AC 80) the Judicial Committee stated that it was itself bound by the House of Lords on a matter of 




PT Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984, para.3 (3) 
TP
28
PT Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984, Part III in the annex I 
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changes consequent upon the establishment of the CFA.TPF29FPT While the Joint Declaration, an 
international treaty registered in the United Nations, framed a legal basis at international level 
for the establishment of Hong Kong’s CFA, the Basic Law provided at national level a 
constitutional foundation for the form and function of the Court. In 1995, the CFA Ordinance 
was passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, which formed a detailed reginal legal 
arrangement for the formation and function of the CFA. However, as agreed by Britain and 
China, the Ordinance “shall not come into operation on or before 30 June 1997 and the 
following day shall be the day for the coming into operation of the Ordinance, which shall be 
amended as necessary to ensure that it is in full conformity with the Basic Law” (s.1(2)). 
 
According to the Basic Law, the courts in the HKSAR have jurisdiction over all cases in the 
Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and 
principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained; but they have no 
competence to deal with cases concerning acts of state, such as defence and foreign affairs.TPF30FPT 
Accordingly, the CFA Ordinance sets out the Court’s jurisdiction and powers in detail. It 
provides that the CFA shall have the jurisdiction conferred on it under the Ordinance and by 
any other law, and reiterates that the Court shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state.TPF31FPT The 
CFA hears appeals on civil and criminal matters from the High Court, which consists of the 
Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. Particularly, the following cases can be 
decided by the CFA. Firstly, for civil matters, an appeal shall lie to the Court (1) as of right 
from any final judgment of the Court of Appeal, where the matter in dispute amounts to or is 
worth $1 million Hong Kong dollars or more or (2) at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or 
the CFA in any other civil matter if, in the opinion of either court, the question involved in 
the appeal is one which, because of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought 
to be submitted to the CFA for decision.TPF32FPT Appeals relating to Chief Executive Elections are 
also within the CFA’s jurisdiction.TPF33FPT Secondly, in terms of criminal matters, those can be 
dealt with by the CFA are appeals at the discretion of the CFA from any final decision of the 
Court of Appeal or any final decision of the Court of First Instance (not being a verdict or 
finding of a jury) from which no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.TPF34FPT However, it is worth 
noting that the CFA has defined its criminal jurisdiction as concerned primarily with 
establishing general principles of criminal justice rather than being a general appeal court on 
criminal cases.TPF35 FPT The CFA’s controversial jurisdiction of interpreting the Basic Law and 
constitutional judicial review will be discussed in Chapter 4. It should be noted that leave to 
appeal is required. 
 
The CFA is headed by the Chief Justice and comprises three permanent judges and a panel of 
non-permanent judges.TPF36FPT They are appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation 
                                                 
TP
29
PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art.81, 82 
TP
30
PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art.19, 82. 
TP
31
PT Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap.484), s.4. 
TP
32






PT The Ordinance, s.31 
TP
35
PT HKSAR v Zeng Liang Xin [1997] HKLRD 1204 
TP
36
PT The first Chief Justice is Mr Justice Andrew LI Kwok-nang, who will retire on 31 August, 2010. The present 
permanent judges are Mr Justice Bokhary, Mr Justice Chan, and Mr Justice Ribeiro. There are 16 non-
permanent judges, including Mr William James Silke, Mr Kutlu Tekin Fuad, Sir Noel Plunkett Power, GBS, Mr 
Gerald Paul Nazareth, GBS, Mr John Barry Mortimer, GBS, the Hon Henry Denis Litton, GBM, the Hon Sir 
Anthony Mason, the Rt Hon the Lord Hoffmann, the Hon Sir Gerard Brennan, the Rt Hon Sir Thomas 
Eichelbaum, the Rt Hon the Lord Millett, the Rt Hon the Lord Woolf of Barnes, the Rt Hon the Lord Scott of 
Foscote, the Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson, Mr Michael McHugh, and the Rt Hon Thomas Munro Gault 
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of an independent commission. TPF37FPT Notably, the appointment or removal of them shall obtain 
the endorsement from the Legislative Council and be reported to the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress in Beijing for the record.TPF38FPT Judges from other common law 
jurisdiction may be invited to sit on the CFA.TPF39FPT In terms of nationality, the Chief Justice must 
be a Chinese citizen who is a permanent resident of the HKSAR with no right of abode in any 
foreign country.TPF40FPT In hearing and determining an appeal, the Court consists of five judges, 
and the Court may invite a non-permanent Hong Kong judge or a non-permanent judge from 
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PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art.88 
TP
38
PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art. 90 
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PT Hong Kong Basic Law, art.82 
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The Constitutional Context of the HKSAR within China: 





This chapter attempts to outline the broad constitutional framework within which the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and its Court of Final Appeal (CFA) are 
situated and operate. Firstly, a historical background as to China’s loss and recovery 
(Britain’s acquisition and returning) of Hong Kong will be introduced. Secondly, I will 
outline China’s “one country, two systems” (OCTS) policy as enshrined in The Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (the Basic 
Law) and how it is being applied in Hong Kong after its reversion. Thirdly, I will investigate 
Hong Kong’s distictiveness and uniqueness within a communist China by looking primarily 
at its political structure, rule of law, economy and cultural systems. I will also explore (the 
mainland) China’s constitutional structure and systems, which provide the framework and 
foundation for Hong Kong’s autonomy. Fourthly, I will find that despite the separation of 
Hong Kong from the mainland China under the OCTS principle, there are still various 
interfaces and interactions between the two parts in which they could both be benefited under 
the OCTS policy. Finally, a comparative discussion on similar constitutional practices in the 
EU and the UK in terms of centre-region relationship will be made in order to form a better 
understanding of Hong Kong’s status under China’s OCTS arrangements. 
 
2 A Brief History of Britain’s Acquisition and China’s Recovery of Hong Kong 
 
Long-term memory and its accompanying emotion play a crucial role in orienting one’s 
decision making.TPF 42 FPT The sentiment of humiliation and oppression by the imperialists 
experienced by China in its modern history, which began exactly from Britain’s occupation 
of the Hong Kong Island TPF43 FPT in 1840, have been firmly embedded into the memory of the 
Chinese people and have been heavily influencing China’s contemporary politics. A recall of 
China’s loss and recovery of Hong Kong and the accompanying sense of humiliation and 
pride respectively could facilitate our understanding of China’s Hong Kong policies, of 
which the sovereign interest is always a great concern (perhaps the most important concern) 
from Beijing’s point of view. 
 
Hong Kong, consisting of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon peninsula, the New Territories, 
and over 200 offshore islands, has been part of China’s territory since ancient times. It was 
occupied by Britain step by step after the Opium War in 1840 through three unfair treaties 
with the Qing Dynasty authorities, the monarchical administration of China at the time. China 
remained the world’s wealthiest country in the early 19PthP century,TP F44FPT but it still practised a 
                                                 
TP
42
PT Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister, George Loewenstein, Do Emotions Help or Hurt Decision Making? 
(Russell Sage Foundation, 2007); Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How 
Government Prioritizes Problems (University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
TP
43
PT Hong Kong Island is an island in the southern part of the Hong Kong region.  
TP
44
PT In 1820, 20 years before the Opium War, China’s GDP accounted for 30% of the world GDP. See Yan 
Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes”, (2001) 10 Journal of Contemporary China, p3; Shi Tao and 
Mao Yangguang, “The minutes of the Seminar about the Reappraisal of China’s Traditional Economy (zhong 
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traditional self-sufficient agricultural economy and was ruled by a feudal regime – the Qing 
Dynasty. A closed-door policy was adopted by the imperial regime in which foreign trade 
was strictly restricted.TPF45FPT However, during the same period, great changes were dramatically 
occurring on the other side of the earth in western countries. The Industrial Revolution was 
launched in Britain in the late 18Pth P century and quickly spread throughout Western Europe 
and North America during the 19Pth P century that, economies dominated by industries and the 
manufacturing of machinery were replacing previous economies which based on manual 
labours. As a result, trade expanded drastically and production capacity increased rapidly. 
The outcome of this revolution was that the capitalist economy boomed considerably.TPF46FPT The 
newly industrialised countries enthusiastically undertook exploitations of the world market by 
expanding their colonies globally, and made huge amounts of profit by snatching raw 
materials from and dumping products to these overseas colonies over time.TPF 47 FPT Britain 
developed into a world super power during that period. Against this background, China 
naturally became one of the most ideal targets for those western predators as the country was 
weak but wealthy with a huge market potential for profits. Among the predators, Britain 
played a leading role as the most influential hegemonic power of the day. 
 
Britain had a growing trade deficit with China in early 19Pth P century.TPF48 FPT To improve trade 
balance, Britain began to smuggle opium to China from British India. China was speedily 
filled with opium addicts. The effects were devastating and the Qing government decided to 
ban opium trade thoroughly within its territory.TPF49FPT As a response, Britain chose to use military 
force and as a result, the first Opium War broke out in 1839 where the Qing army was 
defeated. Hong Kong Island was occupied by Britain in 1840. Finally, the Qing Government 
was forced to agree an ignominious peace under the Nanking Treaty with Britain in 1842. 
The first Opium War marked the beginning of China’s modern history of humiliation TPF50FPT and 
the Nanking Treaty was the first unequal treaty signed by the Chinese under the force of 
western powers. TPF51FPT Thereafter, China transformed from an independent feudal society into “a 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial society”,TPF52FPT entering an era of being carved up by imperialists. 
Hong Kong was lost in the tide. 
 
Britain seized the entire Hong Kong area by virtue of three treaties. As already mentioned, 
the first one was the Treaty of Nanking 1842TPF53 FPT which ceded the Hong Kong Island. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
guo chuan tong jing ji zai pin jia yan tao hui ji yao”, (2002) 1 The Studies of China’s Economy History (zhong 
guo jing ji li shi yan jiu), pp154-157. (in Chinese). Also see Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical 
Statistics (OECD Publishing, 2003), p249 
TP
45
PT Han Zongying, “The Exploration of the Reasons of Failure in Opium War”, (2002) 21 Journal of Zhenzhou 
Institute of Aeronautical Management (Social Science Edition), p37 (in Chinese) 
TP
46
PT Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Wilder Publications, 2007), p12 
TP
47
PT Ibid, p11  
TP
48
PT By 1817 it was estimated that China had received £150 million worth of bullion from European traders. See 
Edgar Holt, The Opium Wars in China (Putnam, 1964), p37. 
TP
49
PT Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (Hutchison, 1975), pp63-93. 
TP
50










PT The Treaty was signed on 29 August 1842 aboard the British warship in Nanking and the Ratifications were 
exchanged at Hong Kong on 26 June 1843. In the Treaty the Qing government was forced to open more ports 
for foreign trade with low tariffs, compensate Britain 21 million ounce, give it most favoured nation status, 
permit extraterritoriality for British Citizens on Chinese soil and cede the Hong Kong Island to Britain. The full 
text in English of the Treaty of Nanking 1842 can be found in Appendix One of Yash Ghai’s Hong Kong’s New 
Constitutional Order: the Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law (Hong Kong University Press, 
1999), pp501-504. The full texts in both English and Chinese will also be found in Treaties, Conventions, &c., 
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second treaty was the Convention of Peking 1860,TP F54FPT which was signed when the Anglo-
France military force had occupied Beijing (spelled as Peking at the time) – capital of the 
Qing regime, in the Second Opium War. Not only did this Convention enlarged British 
commercial, diplomatic and extraterritorial privileges in China, the Qing government was 
also compelled to recognise the concession of the Kowloon peninsula to Britain.TPF55FPT The third 
treaty was the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, which was concluded at 
Beijing (Peking) on the 9Pth P June 1898. TPF56FPT The New Territories, consisting of the area north of 
Boundary Street of the Kownloon peninsula and more than 200 nearby inlands, was leased to 
Britain for 99 years.TPF57 FPT Although this Convention did not come from the direct threat of 
military force, it was made under the intense diplomatic pressure exerted on the Qing 
government. By the time the third treaty was signed, Britain had occupied all the parts which 
constitute the modern Hong Kong region. 
 
The Qing dynasty and the imperial rule were overthrown in 1911 in which China became a 
republic, and all succeeding regimes coherently refused to recognise the legality of the three 
treaties with Britain.TPF58 FPT The Chinese Communist Party took over the mainland China and 
founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The PRC Government took a 
consistent position over Hong Kong, namely that Hong Kong is part of China’s territory; and 
China do not recognise the three unequal treaties imposed by western imperialism regimes; 
the Hong Kong issue should be resolved through negotiations when conditions are permitted, 
and the existing status of Hong Kong should be maintained pending on a solution.TPF59FPT A policy 
of a “long-term plan and making full use of it” towards Hong Kong was adopted.TPF60FPT In 1972, 
China made a request to the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism to remove 
Hong Kong and Macao from its list of territories for which independence should be sought. A 
letter addressed by the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations (UN) read, “…Hong Kong 
and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. 
The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China’s sovereign 
right and does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories… the Chinese 
government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when 
conditions are ripe. The United Nations has no right to discuss these questions…”TPF 61 FPT 
Consequently, Hong Kong and Macao were deleted by the UN from the list. The UN’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
between China and Foreign States: China, the Maritime Customs, III-Miscellaneous Series, No.30, 2 vols. 2PndP 




PT Ratified on 28 October 1860. 
TP
55
PT Convention of Peking (1860), Article VI. See Treaties, Conventions, &c., between China and Foreign States: 
China, the Maritime Customs, III-Miscellaneous Series, No.30, 2 vols. 2Pnd P ed., (Shanghai: Inspectorate General 
of Customs, 1917), Vol.1, p433, available at http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/books/p2/B3144779XV1/pdf/00000455.pdf 
TP
56
PT Ratifications were exchanged in London, 6 August 1898. 
TP
57
PT Convention of Extension of Hong Kong (1898), in Treaties, Conventions, &c., between China and Foreign 
States: China, the Maritime Customs, III-Miscellaneous Series, No.30, 2 vols. 2PndP ed., (Shanghai: Inspectorate 




PT Zhang Guoliang and Zhang Lin, “The Actions of China’s Various Regimes in its Modern History on Hong 
Kong Issue (Lun zhong guo jin xian dai guo jia zheng quan zai xiang gang wen ti shang de bu tong zuo 
wei)”,(1997) 4 Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics, pp6-9. (in Chinese) 
TP
59
PT See “The Chinese Government Resumed Exercise of Sovereignty over Hong Kong” on the official website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18032.htm (visited on 17 April 2009) 
TP
60
PT Liu Shuyong, “Hong Kong: A Survey of its Political and Economic Development over the Past 150 Years”, 
(1997) 151 The China Quarterly, p590. 
TP
61
PT Quoted in Anthony Dicks, “Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspect of the Status of Hong 
Kong”, (1983) 95 The China Quarterly, p436 
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acceptance of China’s stance provided an international legal legitimacy for China’s claim of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong (and Macao), precluded the possibility of Hong Kong (and 
Macao)’s self-determination and independence, and also excluded the chance of international 
interference into the issue. 
 
According to the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, the term of lease of 
the New Territories would expire with the year 1997 drawing near. The Governor of Hong 
Kong, Sir Crawford Murray MacLehose visited Beijing in March 1979 in an attempt to find 
out China’s position and attitude towards finding a solution to the issue.TPF62FPT China’s leader 
Deng Xiaoping told MacLehose that the PRC has sovereignty over Hong Kong and asserted 
the necessity of Hong Kong’s return to China, upon which Hong Kong would be given 
special status by the PRC government. TPF 63 FPT On 24Pth P September 1982, a meeting was held 
between the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. 
Thatcher insisted on the validity of the three treaties, proposing that if China agreed to 
Britain’s continued administration of Hong Kong after 1997, Britain might later consider the 
demand for sovereignty claimed by China. Deng responded toughly. He remarked, “On the 
question of sovereignty, China has no room to manoeuvre. To be frank, the question is not 
open to discussion. The time is ripe for making it unequivocally clear that China will recover 
Hong Kong in 1997. That is to say, China will not only recover the New Territories but also 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. It must be on that understanding that China and United 
Kingdom hold talks on the ways and means of settling the Hong Kong question.”TPF64FPT China 
offered assurance that it would initiate special policies after recovering Hong Kong, including 
the establishment of a special administrative region (SAR), and the people of Hong Kong 
would be given the power to administrate the SAR to maintain its existing capitalism social 
and economic systems. This is the so-called “one country, two systems” policy. 
 
From July 1983 to September 1984, twenty-two rounds of negotiations were held between 
China and Britain. In the end the two sides reached an agreement that China would recover 
Hong Kong and resume the exercise of sovereignty over it. China insisted that this has to be 
expressed in clear terms in the agreement. Britain did not accept the wording of “resumption 
of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong” as suggested by China, whereas the Chinese 
side strongly objected to the British draft agreement implying the validity of the three 
unequal treaties. However, the two sides finally agreed to use the following expression in the 
form of a Joint Declaration: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares 
that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from l 
July 1997;” and “The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong 
Kong to the People’s Republic of China with effect from l July l997.” The sensitive question 
of sovereignty was therefore deliberatively avoided in a flexible way.TPF 65 FPT On the 26PthP 
                                                 
TP
62
PT Suzanne Pepper, “Elections, Political Change, and Basic Law Government: The Hong Kong System in Search 
of a Political Form”, (2000) 162 The China Quarterly, p419. 
TP
63
PT “The Negotiations between China and Britain and the Signing of Sino-British Declaration (zhong ying tan pan 
he zhong ying lian he sheng ming de qian shu)”, (1997) 13 World Affairs (shi jie zhi shi), 1997 (in Chinese); 
Also see James T. H. Tang and Frank Ching, “Balancing the Beijing-London-Hong Kong ‘Three Legged Stool’ 
1971-1986” in Ming K. Chan and Gerard A. Postiglione (eds), The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese 
Sovereignty (M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p47 
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64
PT Deng Xiaoping, “Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong ”, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 
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http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1040.html (visited on 17 April 2009) 
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PT See “The Chinese Government Resumed Exercise of Sovereignty over Hong Kong” on the official website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18032.htm (visited on 17 April 2009)  
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September 1984, a Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and three 
Annexes were initialled. It was formally signed by the heads of the two governments in 
December of the same year. On the 27Pth P May l985, the two governments exchanged 
instruments of ratification of the Declaration; as of that day, Hong Kong entered into its 
transitional period up to 1997. 
 
Subsequently, the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China enacted The Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (the Basic Law) 
to legalise the policies China promised in the Joint Declaration as well as to provide a 
constitutional foundation for the establishment and the future functions of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in 1997. At the midnight of 30Pth P June l997, the 
Chinese and British governments held a ceremony for the handover of Hong Kong. From the 
1Pst P July 1997, the Chinese Government formally resumed the exercise of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong after the HKSAR was established. Hong Kong came into a new phase of history 
under the “one country, two systems” policy in which “Hong Kong people administering 
Hong Kong” and the region enjoys a high degree of autonomy. In other words, Hong Kong 
acquired a new constitutional order. 
 
We can see that sovereignty has been always a great concern of the Chinese government. Its 
sensitivity is deeply rooted in the national sentiment and thus makes it the most important 
core interest of China. This is primarily resulted from the country’s deep-seated memory of 
humiliation it has suffered in its modern history. This sentiment is a significant factor in 
understanding the attitudes and strategies of the central government of the PRC in dealing 
with Hong Kong affairs both before and after the establishment of the HKSAR. Secondly, the 
process of the talks held with Britain also indicates that China did show flexibility to a large 
extent and that it has adopted a pragmatic approach towards the Hong Kong issue as well. 
China was ready to settle the problems peacefully through negotiations and was willing to 
concede on some issues so as to reach agreements that all parties would accept. Such practice 
and experience was a moderate, flexible and pragmatic stance that was distinctive from its 
firmness on sovereignty, and it was also a vital point for observing and understanding 
China’s actions regarding Hong Kong after 1997. From the enactment of the Basic Law, it 
can also be seen that China began to value the role of law in dealing with Hong Kong affairs. 
This indication shows that China might rely heavily on law, especially the Basic Law, to 
govern Hong Kong. Consequently, while actions of the central Chinese government are 
restricted significantly by law, it would be possible that the Basic Law is utilised as an 
instrument to realise the political will of Beijing towards Hong Kong. At the same time, the 
Basic Law could be wielded by the people of Hong Kong to safeguard their autonomy and 
human rights as well. In addition, the international community may use the Basic Law as an 
effective media or tool to comment and monitor China’s decision-making and actions 
towards Hong Kong in post-1997 periods. 
 
3 The “One Country, Two Systems” Policy and the Basic law Enshrining It 
 
The “one country, two systems” policy (the policy) put forward by the PRC government has 
played a crucial role in achieving a peaceful resolution on the Hong Kong issue, as not only 
did it successfully result in an agreement with Britain, but also in ensuring the confidence of 
the Hong Kong people towards the future. It is perceived by China and many Hong Kong 
people as the foundation for the SAR’s sustainable stability and prosperity. The policy was 
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originally designed by the PRC to seek the reunification with Taiwan.TPF66FPT However, it was 
actually elaborated and applied in the course of solving the Hong Kong issue, and 
subsequently the recovery of Macao. The policy promised that when Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao were reunified with the socialist mainland on the premise of “one China”, their own 
capitalist economic and political systems and social structure would remain unchanged; and 
that they would enjoy a high degree of autonomy with the rule of local people except that the 
central government would be responsible for defence and foreign affairs. As for Taiwan, it 
could even maintain its own military force. TPF67FPT 
 
The “one country, two systems” is a result of the pragmatic approach adopted by the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) after the end of the fanatic and disastrous Cultural 
Revolution. The CPC subverted the Kuomintang (usually denoted as the KMT, meaning the 
Chinese Nationalist Party) regime to found the PRC in 1949, and the KMT government was 
exiled to Taiwan after being defeated in the civil war. That is the historical origin of the 
Taiwan issue. After the Cultural Revolution, the CPC gave up the line of class struggle and 
began to concentrate on economic development. Policies to reform and opening to the outside 
world were adopted as China’s basic state strategy. Consequently, making efforts to realise a 
peaceful reunification between Taiwan and the mainland China became the CPC’s agenda 
and as one of its “three main tasks” in 1980s, this replaced the previous policy of “liberating 
Taiwan” which implied overthrowing the existing capitalist system in the island with armed 
forces.TPF68FPT The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) announced on 
the 1Pst P January 1979 the newly developed policy of “respecting for the current situation of 
Taiwan and seeking for a peaceful reunification”.TPF69 FPT In 1981, nine more detailed policies 
towards the Taiwan issue were delivered by Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the NPCSC at the 
time, proposing that, inter alia, Taiwan may become a special administrative region with a 
high degree of autonomy after the reunification. Under this policy, the existing social and 
economic systems, way of life as well as its economic and cultural connections with foreign 
countries would remain unchanged. Taiwan would even be permitted to keep its own military 
forces, a privilege that Hong Kong and Macao do not have.TPF 70 FPT Ye’s proposal was the 
embryonic form of the “one country, two systems” doctrine. In China’s new Constitution 
1982 (the present one), article 31 confirms that “The state may establish special 
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative 
regions shall be described by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of 
specific condition”.TPF71FPT This forms a constitutional foundation for the implementation of the 
“one country, two systems” policy. 
 
When negotiating with Britain on the Hong Kong issue, China advocated the “one country, 
two systems” idea as a basic principle to resolve the problem and ensure Hong Kong’s future 
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PT People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), October 1, 1981. 
TP
71
PT Art.31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 17 - 
stability and prosperity. China developed the idea into twelve points of basic policy regarding 
Hong Kong and set them out in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. An elaboration of these 
policies was annexed to the Joint Declaration.TPF72FPT Thereafter, these policies were embodied and 
enshrined by the NPC’s enacting of the Basic Law which served as mini-constitution for the 
HKSAR. 
 
The constitutional arrangement of the “one country, two systems” policy enshrined in the 
Basic Law can be outlined as follows: 
 
In the “one country” aspect: 
 
HKSAR is an inalienable part of the PRC (art.1). Upholding national unity and territorial 
integrity is one of the most important purposes for establishing it (Preamble). Its high degree 
of autonomy derives from the authorisation of the NPC (art.2). HKSAR is a local 
administrative region coming directly under the Central Government (art.12), which is 
responsible for defence and foreign affairs relating to the Region (art.13, 14). The power of 
appointing and removing the Chief Executive and principal officials of the Hong Kong 
government is possessed by the Central Government (art.15). Appointment or removal of 
judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court of the HKSAR 
shall be reported to the NPCSC for record (art.90). The Chief Executive is accountable to 
both the Central Government and to the HKSAR (art.43). He or she has the duty to 
implement the directives issued by the Central Government (art.48). The Chief Executive, the 
principal officials, the majority of the members of legislature, the Chief Justice of the Court 
of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court shall be Chinese citizens who are 
permanent residents of the HKSAR with no right of abode in any foreign country (art.44, 61, 
67 and 90). Laws enacted by the HKSAR legislature must be reported to the NPCSC for 
record and those returned shall immediately be invalidated (art.17). National laws mainly 
relating to defence and foreign affairs could be applied in the HKSAR through the way of 
listing them in Annex III to the Basic Law (art.18). Courts of the HKSAR have no 
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs (art.19). Hong Kong 
residents having Chinese citizen status are entitled to participate in the management of state 
affairs (art.21). Laws to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the 
Central Government should be enacted by the HKSAR on its own (art.23). The final power of 
interpretation and amendment of the Basic Law is vested in the NPCSC and NPC 
respectively (art.158, 159). The development of democracy subsequent to the year 2007 
should obtain the consent from the NPCSC (art.7 of Annex I and part III of Annex II). 
 
In the “two systems (autonomy)” aspect: 
 
HKSAR is authorised to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative, 
and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication (art.2). The previous 
capitalist system and way of life will remain unchanged (art.5). The executive authorities and 
legislature shall be composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong (art.3). The laws 
previously in force shall be maintained except for any that contravene the Basic Law (art.8). 
HKSAR formulates its own monetary and financial policies, maintain its own currencies, 
formulates its own policies on education, culture, sports, social welfare system, etc. within 
the framework of the Basic Law (Chapters V and VI). While the Central Government is 
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responsible for Hong Kong’s foreign affairs, HKSAR is permitted to enjoy extensive powers 
in dealing with its external affairs, inter alia, representatives of the HKSAR Government may 
participate, as members of delegations of the PRC, in diplomatic negotiations that directly 
affect the Region, and in other international organisations or conferences limited to states and 
affecting the region; for those international organisations and conferences not limited to states, 
the SAR may participate using the names in the form of “Hong Kong, China” (art.150, 151, 
152.). TPF73FPT The Basic Law also provides constitutional protection on various fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. Specially, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
given a constitutional status through the Basic Law (art.39). 
 
The drafting committee of the Basic Law was composed of members both from Hong Kong 
and from the mainland China. Consequently, the Basic Law, to some extent, is a mixture of 
the common law and civil law philosophy. However, as members from the mainland played a 
dominant role in the drafting process, the Basic Law mainly possesses a civil law feature. 
Notably, although the Basic Law is perceived as a mini-constitution for the SAR providing a 
constitutional framework acting the highest legal status in the Region, it is an ordinary 
national statute located in the Chinese legal hierarchy. It is not applied to the HKSAR solely; 
all the other parts of the mainland China should also comply with it. That is to say, the Basic 
Law has nationwide effect. Another distinct feature of the drafting process is that the Chinese 
Government had laid stress on the realisation of “two systems” within “one country”TPF74FPT. Thus, 
as we can see from the outline above, while granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, 
China has taken care to eliminate any tendency of deviating from the premise of “one 
county”. This is a logical result from China’s consistently sensitive concern for its 
sovereignty. 
 
There are actually some divergences on the proper understanding of the policy. Some 
commentators lean too much towards the “two systems” aspect,TPF75FPT awarding more attention to 
the autonomy of the HKSAR and the separation of the two systems between the SAR and the 
mainland while ignoring or even denying the integrity of “one country” or the interests of the 
Central Government. TPF76FPT Other views on the other hand, stress mainly on the “one country” 
aspects, holding that the expression of “one country” takes precedence over the aspect of 
“two systems” TPF77 FPT and Hong Kong is obliged to maintain and develop its capitalist system 
under the premise that it is part and parcel of China. It is therefore desirable to achieve a 
much more balanced appreciation of the policy, which takes both aspects into account as well 
as considering the interests of both sides. 
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Asian Economic and Political Issues (Nova Publishers, 2003), p25; also see the official website of WTO at 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/gattmem_e.htm. For a list of these international treaties and agreements, 
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Since the establishment of the SAR, the “one country, two systems” policy has been 
implemented for more than 12 years. 12 years’ practice indicates that although some 
controversial episodes occurred and were criticised seeming to have negative impact on the 
autonomy of the region, however the policy succeeds in general not only in maintaining the 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, but also in safeguarding individual liberty and human 
rights of the people in the SAR. The worries and suspicions towards the policy are fading, at 
the same time satisfaction with the present situation and confidence in the future appears to 
be increasing gradually. It should be borne in mind that the doctrine of “one country, two 
systems” is by no means “present perfect”; in fact, it is still “present progressive”. That is to 
say, the policy is a living being that needs to be developed and improved continually 
according to the situation of its actual practice, rather than a rigid dogma. It is just like that in 
the UK that devolution has been said to be a process not an event.TPF78FPT Indeed, perhaps this is 
exactly where the vitality of the policy of “one country, two systems” really lies. Admittedly, 
the policy does have some inherent contradictions from within, such as the relation between 
autonomy and sovereignty, centralism and decentralism, collectivism and democracy, 
socialist civil law system and capitalist common law system. Therefore, to seek a harmony 
between these tensions is vital to realising the policy successfully. In other words, a balance 
among the various aspects of the doctrine should be struck from time to time. To achieve this 
harmony and balance, the relevant institutions and infrastructures for interaction, 
coordination and correction would play a crucial role and this will be discussed later. 
 
4 The Distinctiveness of the HKSAR Systems within China 
 
Undeniably, one of the major features of the “one country, two systems” concept is to 
maintain the systems adopted in the HKSAR that are distinctive from those practised in the 
mainland China,TPF79FPT just as the former PRC president Jiang Zemin pointed out that “the well 
water should not interfere with river water”.TPF80FPT What does the capitalist system as practised in 
Hong Kong which has been promised by the Basic Law to maintain for 50 years actually 
refer to? In other words, what is Hong Kong’s uniqueness compared with the mainland China? 
It seems to connote at least four aspects, including the political, judicial, economic and 
cultural systems.TPF81FPT 
 
First we look at the political aspect. During most of the time in the 150-year of British rule, 
Hong Kong lacked democracy.TPF82 FPT The Governor appointed by London possessed absolute 
power in the colony. TPF83FPT However, having realised China’s inevitable determination to recover 
Hong Kong in the 1980s, the British government began to actively embrace the tide of 
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democratisation and take substantial measures to initiate democracy reforms so as to 
construct a fire wall resisting the assumed China’s interference in the future. In the 1990s, 
dramatically political reforms was proposed and pushed by the last Governor Chris Patten. 
Such actions resulted in Beijing’s establishment of a provisional legislative council for the 
HKSAR to replace the one elected in 1995 which should have continued its work after 1997 
if Patten had not changed its method of election so drastically.TPF84FPT 
 
As the HKSAR follows the principles of “one country two systems”, “Hong Kong people 
administering Hong Kong” and “exercising a high degree of autonomy”, Hong Kong’s 
political systems entered into a new stage, which are different from either the previous 
governor-centred arrangement imported by Britain TPF85FPT or the one-party state systems practised 
in the mainland China at present. In fact, the new systems absorbed the effective aspects of 
the former political structure, adopted the democratic elements in accordance with Hong 
Kong’s practical situation, and set up the final goal of gradually realising full democracy as 
well.TPF86FPT 
 
The Chief Executive (CE) replaced the role of Governor as the top leader of the HKSAR. 
However, the CE must be a Chinese citizen and a permanent resident of Hong Kong who is 
elected by the local people prior to the Central Government’s appointment. The CE cannot 
serve more than two consecutive five-year terms. As an ultimate aim, the post will be 
selected by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating 
committee. The CE represents the SAR, being accountable to the Central Government as well 
as to the HKSAR.TPF87FPT The CE has broad executive and legislative power as well as extensive 
power of personnel, such as appointing or removing the government’s principal officials 
subject to confirmation by the Central Government, appointing or removing members of the 
Executive Council, appointing or removing judges of the courts at all levels and appointing or 
removing holders of public office.TPF88FPT The CE is assisted by the Executive Council in policy-
making. 
 
The CE is not only the leader of the HKSAR but also the head of the SAR government, 
which consists of a Department of Administration, a Department of Finance, a Department of 
Justice, and various bureaux, divisions and commissions.TPF89FPT In the first five years after the 
handover, the posts of the principal government officials were held by previous senior civil 
servants of the colonial government due to considerations that continuity in the civil service 
and the preservation of political impartiality and professionalism were key factors in ensuring 
Hong Kong’s continuing stability and prosperity. However, on 1 Pst P July 2002, in order for the 
SAR Government to become more open and responsive to public demands, the Chief 
Executive Tung Chee-hwa introduced a new system for appointing top officials. Under the 
new system, principal officials of the SAR Government are installed by political 
appointments by the CE, which replaced the previous appointment system of selecting and 
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promoting from permanent civil servants. Politically appointed principal officials are on 
fixed-term contracts and are directly responsible to the CE. All the fourteen principal officials 
are the members of the Executive Council, making it more of a cabinet-style body. Politically 
appointed principal officials are supported by the civil service, which continues to be 
permanent, meritocratic and politically neutral.TPF90FPT 
 
The Legislative Council (LegCo) is the Legislature of the SAR. It is constituted by election. 
The present assembly (elected in 2008) is the fourth term of the LegCo after the 
establishment of the HKSAR and comprises 60 members, with 30 members returned by 
geographical constituencies through direct elections and 30 members returned by functional 
constituencies representing different sectors of the community. The ratio between the two 
types of legislators of the present LegCo is the same as that of the LegCo elected in 2004. 
The composition of the two terms of the LegCo (2004 and 2008) indicates that significant 
progress of democracy had been achieved as they had the highest proportion of directly 
elected legislators since the handover with 50% directly elected, up from 40% (24 out of 60) 
in the 2000 election and 33% (20 out of 60) in 1998. TPF91FPT It is worth noting that the Basic Law 
requires that the method for forming the LegCo be specified in the light of the actual situation 
in the SAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress.TPF92FPT Again, the 
ultimate aim is the election of all the legislators by universal suffrage.TPF93FPT 
 
Since the handover, one of the most serious governing difficulties facing the SAR is how to 
establish good relations between the executive and the LegCo.TPF 94 FPT As already mentioned, 
unlike previous Hong Kong Governors appointed by Britain, the CE of the SAR does not at 
the same time serves as the president of the LegCo. Due to the rule that the CE cannot belong 
to any political partyTPF95FPT, the government often lacks a stable and solid supportive force in the 
LegCo. As a result, many bills initiated or policies introduced by the executive are opposed 
and even blocked by the LegCo which leads to the efficiency of the administration being 
damaged. Even worse, with more and more legislators being directly elected, the legitimacy 
and authority of the indirectly-elected CE faces more and more challenges. Moreover, as 
political parties are not permitted to nominate their own candidates to stand for the CE 
election, to compete for the seats in the LegCo becomes the only way for them to seek 
political power and achieve political ends. Naturally, political parties and legislators lack 
incentives to support the CE and the government. They tend to make the LegCo to play a 
dominant role in the SAR’s political life since this is their best option under the present 
political arrangement. However, the Central Government insists that the political structure in 
the HKSAR must be the executive-led system, which means all political institutions should 
centre on the CE, on the ground that the CE is not only the head of the executive but also the 
head of the SAR representing the whole region. Therefore, to the Central Government, the 
CE and his government ought to play a leading role in the SAR’s political life. This is 
claimed as the original purpose of the drafting committee for the Basic Law in designing 
                                                 
TP
90
PT Christine Loh and Richard Cullen, “Political Reform in Hong Kong: the Principal Officials Accountability 
System. The First Year (2002-2003)”, (2005) 14 Journal of Contemporary China (2005), pp158-163 
TP
91
PT Annex II of the Basic Law. 
TP
92
PT Art 68 of the Basic Law. 
TP
93
PT Art.68 of the Basic Law. 
TP
94
PT “Zeng Yinquan Pointed Out the Ten Pairs of Relation in Hong Kong (zeng yinquan zhichu xianggang de shi 
da maodun)”, Xingtao Daily (3 March 2007). (in Chinese) 
TP
95
PT Section 31 of Chief Executive Election Ordinance (CAP569), Bilingual Laws Information System, 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_export.nsf/home.htm 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 22 - 
HKSAR’s political systems. TPF96FPT Under such political life, there actually exist political tensions 
caused by the two conflicting beliefs, which need to be tackled through the further 
constitutional reforms. It seems to me that the separation of the executive, legislative and 
judicial powers has been achieved in the Region, but good “checks and balances” as well as 
mutual respect and cooperation among these three branches have not yet been established; in 
other words, improved relations and better interactions are in need to be explored and 
developed. That is the foundation of good administration in the SAR. 
 
The second aspect involves the judicial system. One of the proudest claims of Hong Kong is 
probably the rule of law – the most precious legacy left by the British rule. Hong Kong’s 
legal systems were transplanted from the common law system of England and Wales by the 
British government. It functioned excellently and contributed greatly to Hong Kong’s 
prosperity and stability.TPF 97 FPT This legal system has retained after the handover. The laws 
previously in force, including the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate 
legislation, and customary law, are maintained save for any that contravene the Basic Law, 
and subject to subsequent amendment by the SAR legislature.TPF98FPT National laws of the PRC are 
not applied in the HKSAR except for a number of such laws relating to defence and foreign 
affairs which are listed in Annex III to the Basic Law.TPF99FPT HKSAR is vested with independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Judiciary of Hong Kong consists of 
the newly established Court of Final Appeal (which replaced the previous role of the Privy 
Council in London), the High Court (composed of court of first instance and court of appeal), 
district courts, magistrates’ courts, and other special courts.TPF100FPT The courts have jurisdiction 
over all cases in the Region except for acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs.TPF101FPT 
Based on the power of interpreting the Basic Law,TPF102FPT the courts of the HKSAR have claimed 
and frequently used the power of constitutional judicial review which seems to be the most 
important weapon for the courts to check and balance the branches of executive and 
legislature. The high quality of judges and high standard of judgments are essential to the rule 
of law. In order to achieve that, judges in the SAR are chosen with reference to their judicial 
qualities and they may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions.TPF103FPT They are free to 
refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions.TPF104FPT The quality of Hong Kong’s legal 
system is also supported and guaranteed by a highly qualified legal profession and excellent 
legal education. 
 
Thirdly, Hong Kong has a bustling free market economy based on the capitalist system with 
few tariff or non-tariff barriers. Since 1970, Hong Kong has been consistently described as 
the world’s freest economy by notable international institutions.TPF105FPT A policy of “positive non-
intervention” has been pursued by the Hong Kong government since the 1960s. This in fact 
involves two policies. First, a liberal economic philosophy is pursued by maintaining Hong 
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Kong’s free port status, adhering to the system of free enterprise, improving the investment 
environment to encourage competition, and consolidating the economic base. Secondly, any 
defects brought about by the laissez-faire economic policy are remedied by a series of 
measures involving an application of necessary intervention within appropriate limits.TPF 106 FPT 
Hong Kong has developed into an international financial centre, an international trade centre 
and an international transport centre. Its economy continues to thrive after 1997 in spite of 
temporary recessions during 1998’s Asia financial crisis and 2003’s SARS breakout. TPF107FPT The 
secret for its continuous economic success lies primarily in the “one country two systems” 
policy, in which the HKSAR maintains a free and open market economy with a free flow of 
capital, goods, information and services, and a freely convertible currency. The HKSAR 
government formulates its own economic policies, manages its own finances, prepares its 
own budgets, issues its own freely convertible currency, keeps its low and simple tax regime, 
pursues a policy of free trade and maintains a level playing field.TPF108FPT 
 
Last but not least, Hong Kong possesses a unique cultural system which has various 
distinctive features different from that in the communist mainland China. It can be indicated 
by the core values and way of life cherished in the society. Hong Kong is a place where the 
eastern culture and western culture converge. On the one hand, the traditional Chinese values 
and customs are still well kept by many local Chinese people. Unlike the mainland China, the 
storm of communist revolution and the Great Cultural Revolution which attempted to destroy 
all the influence of traditions did not sweep dramatically in Hong Kong. Luckily, as a result 
the Chinese traditional cultural heritage did not suffer a disastrous result as it did in the 
mainland. The Chinese people in Hong Kong still, ideologically and behaviourally, attach 
importance to some Confucian values.TPF109FPT On the other hand, as a free port and a colony of 
Britain, in the tide of modernisation and globalisation, Hong Kong has been influenced and 
moulded considerably by western cultures and way of life which contributed a lot to Hong 
Kong’s prosperity. Some core values including liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
fairness, social justice, peace and compassion, integrity and transparency, plurality, respect 
for individuals, and upholding professionalismTPF110FPT, are derived and developed from western 
civilisation. Many Hong Kong people are convinced that safeguarding these core values is 
essential to the region’s sustainable development and the quality of people’s life.TPF111FPT In other 
words, Hong Kong is a dynamic colourful cosmopolitical city being driven by its pluralist 
cultures. 
 
5 China’s Constitutional Structure and Systems 
 
Although the HKSAR boasts many distinctive systems, which are relatively separate from 
those practised in mainland China, Hong Kong is by no means a self-sufficient isolated 
system without constitutional connection and interaction with institutions of the mainland 
China. On the contrary, the SAR is a local administrative region reports directly to the State 
Council of the PRCTPF112FPT. It is located within the general constitutional structure of the PRC and 
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the two systems are meshing. Thus we must not ignore the “one country” aspect in the “one 
country, two systems” policy, for the constitutional structure and order of the PRC provide 
the framework, foundation and environment for the SAR’s autonomy. That is what we will 
discuss now. 
 
First of all, the PRC is a socialist stateTPF113FPT led by the Communist Party of China (“CPC”, or 
“the Party”) in which the CPC predominates in China’s politics. Although the so-called 
“system of multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the CPC”TPF114FPT is embedded in the 
Party’s Constitution, the eight non-Communist partiesTPF115FPT in China indeed play a very limited 
role in general political life. Apart from these eight parties, no new political organisations are 
permitted to be established. In fact, what the CPC practices is a single-party form of 
government. The structure of the CPC organisation is set up like a pyramid which mirrors 
that of the structures of the state. Theoretically, the CPC’s highest governing body is its 
National Congress whose members meet every five years. The CPC’s National Congress 
elects the Central Committee, which in turn, elects the Politburo. The primary organs of 
power in the CPC are as follows: the Politburo Standing Committee (consisting of 5 to 9 
members), the Politburo (consisting of about 20 members, including those in the Politburo 
Standing Committee), the Secretariat, the Military Commission and the Discipline Inspection 
Commission. TPF116FPT The Politburo and its Standing Committee is the real power centre of the 
Party and thus the state. The Party controls the power over personnel of the state and the 
selection of key officials of state organs are decided by the Party and then appointed formally 
according to the relevant law. Furthermore, the Party possesses the decision-making power, 
providing the direction for the country; thus all important policies are made by the Party. We 
may say that in a sense, the Party is the real decision-making body whilst the state organs, 
including the people’s congresses (National People’s Congress and various local congresses), 
the governments, the courts, the procuratorates, and the military at all levels, are the 
executing agencies of the Party’s will. Therefore, the CPC is the foundation upon which the 
rest of the governmental structure is built in China.TPF117FPT 
 
Under the shadow of the CPC’s leadership, the state is structured and functioned according to 
the Constitution of the PRC. The current version of the constitution was passed by the NPC 
on the 4PthP December 1982 when the CPC had given up up the line of class struggle pursued in 
the Cultural Revolution and began to concentrate on economic development of the country. 
Three previous state constitutions – those of 1954, 1975 and 1978, were superseded in turn. 
The 1982 constitution was further revised in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004 to enshrine some 
significant policies or principles, such as the recognition of individual property right, the 
doctrine of market economy and the protection of human rights, which were gradually 
developed and accepted by the CPC and the state in the process of modernisation under the 
policy of reform and opening up. The HTConstitutionTH consists of five sections: (i) the preamble, 
(ii) general principles, (iii) the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, (iv) the structure of 
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the state, and (v) the HTnational flagTH and HTemblems of stateTH. The Constitution is the highest law 
of the PRC and all other laws are derived from it and cannot contravene it. “All state organs, 
the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and 
undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law.”TPF118FPT According to the wording, even 
the CPC must obey and behave within the limits of the Constitution and the law.TPF119FPT However 
in practice, the implementations of laws are often manipulated by political influence and the 
Constitution does not seem to have real restriction to limit the Party’s wills.  
 
The state structure of the PRC is unitary and centralised. Unlike the United States but similar 
to the UK, China adopts the principle of congressional supremacy rather than separation of 
powers as its foundation of constitutional order. The system of people’s congress is the 
fundamental political system of China; it is claimed that all the powers belong to the people 
and the people exercise state powers through the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the 
local people’s congresses at different levels across the country.TPF120FPT The NPC is the highest 
organ of the state power;TPF 121 FPT its main functions and powers include formulation of laws, 
delegation authority, policy formulation, and supervision of other governing organs. Among 
the broad powers of the NPC is the power to amend the Constitution, to elect the president 
and vice-president of the PRC, to decide the appointment of the premier of the State Council, 
to elect the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and to elect the president of the 
Supreme Court as well as the Procurator-General of the Supreme Procuratorate.TPF 122 FPT The 
Central Government (the State Council), the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate 
are responsible to the NPC; they must produce an annual report for the NPC’s Plenary 
Session held in March every year. The NPC consists of about 3,000 delegates who are elected 
in and by the provinces, the four municipal cities directly under the State CouncilTPF123FPT, the five 
national autonomy regions (NAR)TPF124FPT, the two special administrative regions (SAR) TPF125FPT, and 
the Military, according to relevant law and procedures.TPF126FPT A single term of a NPC deputy is 
five years.TPF127FPT The NPC Standing Committee is the permanent supreme state organ of power 
and legislation. Because the NPC is too large in size and due to the fact that its plenary 
session is only once a year, the NPC Standing Committee assumes responsibility to exercise 
the highest state and legislative powers when the NPC general assembly is not in session. The 
Standing Committee is composed of 158 members;TPF 128 FPT it has the power to interpret the 
Constitution and supervises the implementation, enact and amend laws except for those 
relating to fields reserved for the NPC general assembly, partially supplement and amend 
laws enacted by the NPC when that body is not in session, and to interpret laws in general.TPF129FPT 
 
The President of the PRC is legally the Head of State. This position is elected by the NPC 
according to art.62 of the Constitution. The President promulgates statutes adopted by the 
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NPC and its Standing Committee. The President also has the formal power to appoint the 
Premier (of the State Council), Vice-Premiers, State Council members, ambassadors to 
foreign countries, Ministers of all government departments, and all legislative committee 
chairs, treasurers and secretaries. The President has the power to give Special Presidential 
Decrees, and can declare a state of emergency, and declare war. The President is assisted by 
the Vice-President. It must be pointed out that all of theses powers are pro forma indeed, for 
the President must follow what the Party instructs. In fact, the power of the President varies 
under different circumstances and it is possible that the President could be powerless and acts 
as the nominal head of state in some situations. If the President of the People’s Republic is 
held by the head of the Communist Party concurrently, for example the current President Hu 
Jintao and the former President Jiang Zemin, the Presidency is a powerful position since the 
person is both the head of state and the head of the Party. It seems that the head of 
Communist Party serving concurrently as the President of the People’s Republic has 
gradually become an institutional arrangement or a constitutional convention in China. 
 
The relation between government and people’s congresses in China differs considerably with 
that in the United States, where the executive branch is separated from the legislative branch 
under the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. The Central People’s 
Government of the PRC acting under the name of the State Council is the executive body of 
the highest organ of state power, say, the NPC. It is the highest organ of state 
administration.TPF 130 FPT The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, state 
councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditor-general, and the 
secretary-general. The State Council is responsible for carrying out the principles and policies 
of the Communist Party as well as the regulations and laws adopted by the NPC, and dealing 
with such affairs as China’s internal politics, diplomacy, national defence, finance, economy, 
culture and education. Under the current Constitution, the State Council exercises the power 
of administrative legislation, the power to submit proposals, the power of administrative 
leadership, the power of economic management, the power of diplomatic administration, the 
power of social administration, and other powers granted by the NPC and its Standing 
Committee. TPF131FPT The State Council is responsible, and reports on its work, to the NPC and its 
Standing Committee. However, the State Council appears to be more powerful than the NPC 
and its Standing Committee in practice, although the former is formally inferior to the 
latter.TPF132FPT 
 
At the central level, other state organs below and responsible to the NPC and its Standing 
Committee are the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The Central Military Commission directs the armed force of 
the country. Under the principle of “the Party commanding the gun” adhered firmly to by the 
CPC, the Central Military Commission of the CPC performs the function of the Central 
Military Commission of the State simultaneously. That is to say, the two institutions are 
actually the same one. The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial organ. Unlike the 
judges in most western countries having life tenure, the term of office of the President (the 
Chief Judge) of the Supreme People’s Court is the same as that of the NPC appointing him, 
which is five years, and he shall serve no more than two consecutive terms. TPF133FPT The Supreme 
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People’s Procuratorate is the highest state organ of legal supervision and prosecution. 
Notably, before a court, a prosecutor performs concurrently both the function of prosecuting 
criminals and the role of overseeing the application of law by the court. That means a 
prosecutor in court enjoys a status not only more powerful than the accused, but also higher 
than the judges in a sense. 
 
To match the central institutions, corresponding institutions (except for the military 
commission) are established vertically at different local levels. Formally, all local 
governments, courts, procuratorates are created by and responsible to the local people’s 
congresses and their standing committees at the same level. However, they are actually 
subject to the leadership of the CPC’s local organisations. Concurrently, they are also subject 
to the leadership or supervision of their corresponding institutions at superior levels. 
 
All the state organs, both at central level and local levels, function under the principle of 
democratic centralism.TPF134 FPT As it is generally understood, democratic centralism consists of 
four rules: (1) the individual should be subordinated to the organisation; (2) the minority 
should be subordinated to the majority; (3) the low-level organ should be subordinated to the 
higher level organ; (4) the local authority should be subordinated to the central authority.TPF135FPT 
This principle appears to be favourable for strengthening the solidarity and improving the 
efficiency of China’s huge and complex institutions. Another principle applied and insisted 
on by China worth mentioning here is that China practises a unitary system rather than a 
federal one. The essence of a unitary system, generally understood by Chinese, is that all the 
local regions’ power, no matter how high and how broad, derives from the authorisation of 
the Central Government, mainly the State Council or the NPC and the NPCSC.TPF136FPT Unlike the 
members in a federal state, the local regions in China have no residue power. Conversely, it is 
claimed that all the residue power is reserved by the Central Government.TPF137 FPT That is the 
major reason why the commentators in the mainland China insist that the establishment of 
Hong Kong and Macao Administrative Regions and vesting them high degree of autonomy 
which seems to be even higher than that enjoyed by the members in federal state does not 
change the feature of China’s unitary system.TPF138FPT To these commentators, the autonomy of the 
HKSAR and the MCSAR are granted by the Central Government and the SARs do not have 
inherent or residual powers.TPF139FPT 
 
Another unique institution in China’s political life is the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which serves as a broadly representative organisation of 
the patriotic united frontTPF 140 FPT and an important institution of multiparty cooperation and 
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political consultation led by the CPC. The Constitution of the PRC guarantees this system to 
exist and develop over a long period of time.TPF141FPT The CPPCC has a National Committee and 
local committees, working on the principle of “lasting coexistence, mutual supervision, 
working together with open minds and sharing weal and woe (with the CPC)”. TPF142FPT The two 
most important features of China’s socialist democracy are that the NPC exercises its power 
through elections and voting and that before such elections and voting occurs, the CPPCC 
conducts thorough consultations. The relation between the CPPCC, the NPC and the 
Government is that the CPPCC holds discussions before policy decisions are made, the NPC 
votes on policy decisions after discussions are finished, and the government carries them out 
after policy decisions are finalised. The three functions are unified under the leadership of the 
CPC. The three bodies share the work and cooperate, each doing its own job, and they 
mutually complement each other. 
 
Having discussed China’s political structure, we now turn to look at its economic system, 
which has substantial influence on Hong Kong’s economic performance.TPF143 FPT The Chinese 
Constitution has many provisions prescribing its economic system. Perhaps that is a 
distinctive feature of a socialist constitution and an important aspect of China’s constitutional 
order. Interestingly, the current economic system of China is indeed by any definition a 
capitalist one but in the name of socialism. Perhaps we can consider it is a communist-led 
capitalist economy. China began to initiate its market-oriented economic reform in 1978; 
thanks to nearly three decades of continuous efforts, China’s economic system has changed 
from the rigid Soviet Union style socialist planned economy into a kind of market economy 
with great vitality. The provision of economic planning in the Chinese Constitution was 
amended and the market economy was adopted instead. Article 15 of the present Constitution 
reads “The State has put into practice a socialist market economy. The State strengthens 
formulating economic laws, improves macro adjustment and controls and forbids according 
to law any units or individuals from interfering with the social economic order.” The private 
economy was perceived previously as one of the major features of capitalism and thus 
opposed firmly by the CPC, but it began to be recognised as a major component of socialist 
economy by the Party. The relevant provision of the Constitution was revised into “Individual, 
private and other non-public economies that exist within the limits prescribed by law are 
major components of the socialist market economy”,TPF144FPT “The State protects the lawful rights 
and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private 
sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the 
non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and 
control over the non-public sectors of the economy”. TPF145FPT The Constitution also declared that 
“Citizens’ lawful private property is inviolable” and “The State, in accordance with law, 
protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance.” TPF146FPT Consequently, 
numerous laws were enacted to provide a legal foundation for the development of a market 
economy. Among them, the most significant movements may be the Contract Law which 
protects the freedom of transaction, and the Property Law which protects individuals’ 
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ownership of things. At the same time, the process of economic reform and openness has also 
brought the country into deeper engagement with the outside world. The absorption of 
foreign investment was adopted as an important content of China’s fundamental principle of 
opening up to the outside world.TPF 147 FPT China also sought to participate in the international 
economy community and officially entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001.TPF148FPT Significant economic achievements have been made since China opened its market. 
For the past 25 years, China’s economy has grown on an average rate of 9.4% annually and 
this has resulted into 400 million Chinese people being brought out of poverty. In 2007, 
China’s economy was nearly ten times larger than it had been in 1978, overtaking Germany 
to become the world’s third-largest economy and behind the United States and Japan in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP).TPF149FPT If the current trends continue, China is set to become the 
world’s second largest economy within a decade. However, China’s GDP per capita remains 
well behind leading economies given the fact that the country has the world’s largest 
population of 1.3 billion people.TPF150FPT With the huge success in economic development, China 
has become the new factor in global politics and economics.TPF151FPT As David Chan-oong Kang 
observes, “Now China is in the middle of what may be a long ascent to global great power 
status. Indeed, it may already be a great power, with the only question being how much 
bigger China may become.”TPF152FPT 
 
While China is making amazing progress in economic achievements, the country is also 
undergoing dramatic social and political changes. The Chinese society is moving towards a 
more pluralistic direction, marked primarily by, inter alia, the emerging of a civil society that 
might be the engine of democratic regime change.TPF153 FPT Civil society organisations, notably 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have been enjoying a rapid emergence and 
vigorous development with government’s increasing tolerance of their independence.TPF154FPT A 
middle class of the society, which is widely regarded as the most important driving force for 
democratisation, has appeared and is rising steadily.TPF155FPT The media industry thrives and the 
freedom of expression increases considerably although media control is still an important 
governing means of the party. The fast development of the internet begins to have profound 
impact on creating and maintaining a more and more open and pluralistic society.TPF156FPT Political 
reform has not only been hotly debated and broadly discussed among Chinese intellectuals 
but also has become an official policy objective listed on the CPC agenda and governmental 
meetings and official publications.TPF157FPT Grassroots democracy, such as direct elections in some 
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rural and urban areas, is promoted positively by the government. As a result, people’s 
political participation and awareness improve greatly,TPF 158 FPT laying a foundation for further 
democratisation in China. The country is also in a transition from the rule of man as well as 
rule by law to a version of rule of law, in which the two important hallmarks of modernity: 
the rule of law and the protection of human rights, are increasingly weighed. The CPC has 
endorsed the establishment of a socialist rule-of-law state in which the government must act 
in accordance with law, and the new policy was expressly incorporated via amendment into 
the Constitution in 1999.TPF159FPT Numerous laws and regulations have been enacted to meet the 
huge need in commercial transactions and everyday life. The legislative forms, skills and the 
underpinning concepts and values of most of these laws were borrowed or learnt from 
western countries. Reforms of the legal or judicial system have been steadily carried out. The 
number of lawyers and their overall level of expertise have increased rapidly. The legal 
profession has also become much more independent. Chinese citizens and private 
entrepreneurs are increasingly using the legal system to protect their personal and property 
rights. More strikingly, China’s theoretical underpinnings of law appear to be changing from 
a purely instrumental conception of law toward a conception of rule of law where law was 
meant to bind both government officials and citizens alike.TPF 160 FPT Thus, generally speaking, 
China has made various progresses in building a modern legal system that can effectively 
protect property rights and human rights.TPF161FPT As far as human rights are concerned, significant 
progress has also been made as respect for and protection of human rights has been enshrined 
in the Constitution and effective measures have been taken to promote the cause of human 
rights. While enjoying enhanced material and cultural life, the Chinese people have been 
provided with firm guarantees for their political, economic, cultural and social rights.TPF162FPT “[A] 
new chapter has opened in the history of the development of the cause of human rights in 
China.” TPF163FPT All these evidences are showing that China is rising and changing; and that it is 
gradually transitioning into a much more civilised, modernised and democratic country. This 
will inevitably have considerable impact on its attitude towards and the practice of the “one 
country, two systems” policy, because its own progresses will help the Central Government 
in Beijing to understand better the values of the systems of the SARs. 
 
However, it must be noted that although great social and political progress has been achieved, 
we may draw an interesting conclusion from the above investigation that the system practised 
in the mainland China can be referred as a kind of “one country, two systems” as well – in the 
political aspect, China is still firmly adhered to the traditional socialist system; while in the 
economic sphere, western style capitalist is adopted. Both of the aspects are subject to the 
leadership of the CPC. Overall, the political system appears not to match the development of 
economic progress; in other words, the pluralism-oriented political reforms in China lag 
behind its economic reforms. This seems to be an effective model which is helpful to us in 
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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PeiTestimony050607.pdf accessed on 23Prd P April 2009 
TP
162
PT State Council Information Office of PRC, National Human Rights Actions Plan (2009-2010), People’s Daily 





THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 31 - 
observing and understanding the complexity of China’s systems, which has significant 
implications in Hong Kong’s autonomy. 
 
6 The Intersections and Interactions Between the Two Systems 
 
As already mentioned, although the HKSAR enjoys such a high degree of autonomy under 
the doctrine of “one country, two systems”, it does not necessarily mean that Hong Kong is 
an independent political unity or an isolated island outside China. On the contrary, the 
HKSAR is situated within the constitutional framework of China as it has many unique 
intersections and interactions with the mainland China. 
 
First of all, it is worth noticing that the Basis Law, which serves as the HKSAR’s mini-
constitution, is also a national statute of the PRC enacted by the NPC in accordance with the 
Constitution of the PRC. TPF164 FPT However, the relationship or the compatibility between Hong 
Kong’s Basic Law and the PRC’s Constitution is still a particularly ambiguous and debatable 
question. The Constitution declares that the PRC is a socialist state and the state upholds the 
unity and dignity of the socialist legal system,TPF 165 FPT while the Basic Law guarantees the 
capitalist and the common law system in Hong Kong to be continued and it even bestows 
Hong Kong with the final adjudication power.TPF166 FPT Although Article 31 of the Constitution 
authorises the state to establish special administrative regions when necessary and implies 
that different systems may be practiced in the special administrative regions, it is not clear to 
what extent any newly established region may deviate from the socialist system and what 
provisions of the Constitution should be excluded from being applied into Hong Kong.TPF167FPT To 
resolve the problem of questioning the constitutionality of the Basic Law, the NPC made a 
decision when passed it to proclaim that the Basic Law “is constitutional as it is enacted in 
accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and in the light of the 
specific conditions of Hong Kong” and affirm that the systems, policies and laws to be 
instituted in the HKSAR shall be based on the Basic Law.TPF168FPT However, it did not answer the 
question of whether or how the Constitution shall be applied to Hong Kong. Some scholars 
argue that the Constitution applies as a whole, not only the concrete articles, to Hong 
Kong.TPF 169 FPT This is indeed a strange and confused argument, for it is not easy for us to 
understand how to apply a constitution as a whole without applying any specific articles. 
Others insist that the Constitution only partially applies and attempt to identify the exact 
provisions that should be applied or excluded.TPF170FPT Another interesting argument advocates that 
the Basic Law should not be regarded just as an ordinary statute; rather, it is a special law of 
the Constitution. Therefore it is legitimate that the Basic Law contains provisions different 
from those in the Constitution and no question of constitutionality would be raised, since in 
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China’s legal theory the principle that the special law prevails over the general law is 
adopted.TPF171FPT It seems to me that the concrete articles of the Constitution indeed do not directly 
apply to the special administrative regions, but the Basic Law is the instrument or the bridge 
through which the Constitution apply to Hong Kong indirectly. In other words, applying the 
Basic Law itself is applying the Constitution, as the Basic Law is derived directly from the 
Constitution and it materialises the Constitution. Perhaps we may say that the Constitution is 
Kelsen’s basic normTPF172FPT for the Basic Law, which in turn serves as the basic norm for all the 
other laws applied in the HKSAR. 
 
Although the Basic Law maintains and safeguards the uniqueness and distinctiveness of 
Hong Kong’s system, it is by no means aims at separating or cutting off Hong Kong’s system 
entirely from that of the mainland China as perceived by some scholars.TPF173FPT In fact, the Basic 
Law also provides many significant interfaces or intersections for the two systems. Among 
them, the role of the Chief Executive (CE) may be the most important one. The CE is 
appointed by the Central Government after being selected by the local election and he or she 
shall be accountable to the Central Government (the State Council) as well as to the 
HKSAR. TPF 174 FPT The CE has the duty to implement the directives issued by the Central 
Government in respect of the relevant matters provided for in the Basic Law. All the principal 
officials of the HKSAR Government are nominated by the CE and nominations shall be 
reported to the Central Government for approval and appointment.TPF175 FPT In practice, the CE 
travels to Beijing once each year to report his or her work officially and directly to the 
President and the Premier of the PRC. In day-to-day work, the CE’s office and the SAR 
government’s Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau keep close communications and 
connections with the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. The CE is the 
head of the HKSAR who represents the Region; through the role of the CE, the HKSAR is 
connected with or locked to the huge and complex systems of the mainland China. According 
to Article 22(5) of the Basic Law, the Government of the HKSAR also sets up a Beijing 
Office in Beijing to further enhance liaison and communication between the SAR 
Government and the Central Government and other mainland authorities.TPF176FPT 
 
Another interface is the legislative connection of the two systems. The HKSAR enjoys a high 
degree of legislative autonomy and the legislature is created by local elections. However, all 
the laws enacted by the legislature must be reported to the NPCSC for “record”.TPF177 FPT The 
NPCSC may return and thus immediately invalidate any of those laws regarding affairs 
within the responsibility of the Central Government or regarding the relationship between the 
Central Government and the Region, on the ground that they are not in conformity with the 
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Basic Law. TPF178FPT The HKSAR applies its own laws, but some national laws can be inserted in 
Hong Kong’s legal system by being listed in Annex III of the Basic Law or being ordered by 
the Central Government when the HKSAR is in a state of emergency.TPF 179 FPT Notably, an 
amendment of the Basic Law would to some extent be a result of the interaction of the two 
systems. The power of the amendment of the Basic Law is vested in the NPC. The HKSAR 
has the right to propose bills for amendment which should be submitted to the NPC by the 
delegation of the Region to the NPC after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies 
of the Region to the NPC, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Council of the 
Region, and the CE of the Region. Before a bill for amendment is put on the agenda of the 
NPC, the Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR consisting of members both from the 
SAR and the mainland China shall study it and submit its views.TPF180FPT The amendment of Annex 
I and Annex II of the Basic Law, which provides the method for the selection of the Chief 
Executive and the method for the formation of the Legislative Council, shall be reported to 
the NPCSC for approval or record.TPF181FPT The NPCSC also has the power to decide beforehand 
whether to initiate the amending process of the two Annexes.TPF182FPT So far, the Basic Law has not 
experienced an amendment. However, the NPCSC has agreed that Annex I and Annex II of 
the Basic Law may be amended for the selection of the Chief Executive and the formation of 
the Legislative Council in the year of 2012.TPF183FPT 
 
As for the judiciary, the HKSAR possesses an independent court system and the power of 
“final adjudication”.TPF184FPT As a SAR of China, any court case in Hong Kong can be resolved 
locally and does not need to go outside the SAR to a superior adjudicator in Beijing. All the 
courts in the mainland China, including the People’s Supreme Court, has no jurisdiction over 
Hong Kong’s cases. The CFA has the last word in a local dispute. Nonetheless, there would 
still be some direct interactions occurring between the courts and the NPCSC under certain 
circumstances as the NPCSC has the final power of interpreting the Basic Law. The courts of 
the HKSAR are authorised by the NPCSC to interpret the provisions of the Basic Law, but 
when they need to interpret the provisions concerning the responsibility of the Central 
Government or concerning the relationship between the Central authorities and the Region, 
and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts shall, before 
making their final judgment which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant 
provisions from the NPCSC through the CFA. TPF185FPT In addition, the Basic Law also provides 
that the HKSAR may maintain juridical relations with the judicial organs of other parts of the 
country, and they may render assistance to each other.TPF186FPT Three important arrangements of 
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mutual legal assistance between the SAR and the mainland China have been signed.TPF187FPT These 
form a framework for the daily interactions between the courts of the two sides. 
 
Furthermore, there are two political arrangements connecting the HKSAR with the national 
polity and political life. One is the deputies of the HKSAR to the National People’s Congress; 
another is the members specially invited from the HKSAR to the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). As Hong Kong is an inalienable part of the PRC, its 
residents who are Chinese citizens have the right to participate in the management of state 
affairs.TPF188FPT The HKSAR has thirty-six deputies to the NPC, representing the people of the 
SAR in the highest organ of state power. They are supposed to perform the following 
functions: to attend NPC conferences, deliberating the bills and reports put on the NPC’s 
agenda, submitting bills, proposals and opinions according to law, participating in elections; 
to take part in activities organised by the NPCSC when the NPC is not in session and to make 
proposals, criticisms and opinions to the NPCSC; to submit the bill for amendment to the 
Basic Law according to article 159 of that law and to participate in electing the Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR and part of the legislature members of the HKSAR subject to 
relevant provisions of the Basic Law; to play an positive role in the social affairs of the 
HKSAR, but not to intervene in the work of the SAR Government and the affairs within the 
SAR’s autonomy.TPF189FPT It is expected that these duties could serve as an effective channel to 
facilitate the communication and interaction between the HKSAR and the mainland China. 
Members of the HKSAR invited to the CPPCC play a similar role as well. The two organs 
have provided platforms for Hong Kong people to participate, primarily through their 
representatives to the two organs, in the management of state affairs and thus strengthen their 
identity of being Chinese citizens as well as to make closer connection between the HKSAR 
and the mainland China.  
 
There are three institutions representing the Central Government in the Hong Kong SAR. 
They are the Liaison Office of the Central Government, the Office of the Commissioner of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison. The 
latter two institutions deal with foreign affairs related to the territory and perform defence 
duties respectively, which are not within the autonomy of the HKSAR.TPF190FPT The Liaison Office 
of the Central Government is responsible for liaisons with the other two institutions, and is 
also responsible for liaisons with major state-owned Chinese companies in Hong Kong, and 
facilitating economic, cultural, educational, technology and sport exchanges and co-
operations between the SAR and the mainland China. It is worth mentioning that according to 
the Basic Law, all institutions representing the Central Government in Hong Kong cannot 
interfere with the SAR’s internal affairs and must abide by Hong Kong’s law.TPF 191 FPT Also 
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according to the Basic Law, departments of the Central Government or provincial 
governments may set up representative offices in Hong Kong under strict procedural 
requirements.TPF192FPT However, no such office has been set up so far. 
 
In the economic aspect, we see much closer and broader connections and interactions. 
Historically, the proximity to the mainland China was a vital element for Hong Kong’s 
economic success as the mainland served as a supportive base for Hong Kong’s economic 
development, supplying the region with important resources such as abundant manpower and 
raw materials. After China adopted the policy of reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, the 
capital from Hong Kong flowed into the mainland China and Hong Kong soon became the 
top “foreign” investor in China; as a result, China’s economy was soon stimulated and 
activated. At the same time, an economic upsurge as a reward of such investment activities 
emerged in Hong Kong which has attracted world-wide attention and made the region one of 
the four “Asian dragons”. Since the reunification in 1997, significant measures have been 
taken to institutionalise and enhance the economic connections and interactions between the 
HKSAR and the mainland China, which played an important role in making Hong Kong to 
recover from the economic depression caused by the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the 
SARS crisis in 2003. Among all economic cooperations after the reunification, the most 
significant event may be the “Mainland China and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement” (CEPA) signed in 2003 and its supplements signed in the subsequent years. 
CEPA offers Hong Kong companies, products, and residents preferential access to the 
mainland market.TPF193FPT The arrangement has enhanced Hong Kong’s attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and resulted in a rise of it. The CEPA has also promoted employment 
in Hong Kong, especially in the service sector. The Individual Visitor Scheme introduced in 
the CEPA framework has attracted a considerable number of Chinese tourists to Hong Kong, 
resulting in an increase in employment and aggregate consumption. It is seen as a major 
contributing factor in Hong Kong’s economic recovery.TPF 194 FPT To cope with the economy 
recession caused by the world financial crisis in 2008, the Central Government took many 
important measures to help Hong Kong. For example, a cross-border Renminbi (currency of 
the PRC in the mainland China, currency code CNY) settlement centre pilot programme was 
approved by the State Council to be launched in Hong Kong. TPF195 FPT The programme would 
contribute significantly to strengthening Hong Kong’s status as an international financial 
centre. Supported by the Central authorities, the construction of a bridge connecting Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Zhuhai is under progress,TPF196FPT which would stimulate greatly Hong Kong’s 
economic performance. In addition, to participate actively in the Pan-Pearl Delta 
Development Scheme is another important step that the HKSAR Government has taken to 
strengthen its economic links with the South China. The agreement of the Scheme was signed 
by nine Chinese provinces (Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan) as well as the two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and 
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Macao (therefore referred as “9+2”), aiming at reducing trade barriers among these eleven 
members, standardising regulations, improving infrastructures and jointly tapping 
international resources and markets. TPF 197 FPT A special Hong Kong/Guangdong Co-operation 
Conference is held annually between the two governments, promoting and enhancing their 
co-operation in various areas. From these facts, we can see that the separation of the two 
economic systems does not prevent their cooperation and integration. Hong Kong embraces 
the economic integration with the mainland China favourably and positively, making good 
use of the opportunities it has provided and hence benefiting greatly.TPF198FPT 
 
With the development of links and intersections between the two sides, a serious problem 
emerges: that is, a neutral institution above both sides serving as an authoritative adjudicator 
to solve the likely legal and constitutional disputes or conflicts arisen between the two sides 
during the course of interactions does not exist. The courts in the mainland China, including 
the Supreme People’s Court, have no jurisdiction over the HKSAR. Hong Kong enjoys the 
power of final adjudication, but the SAR’s CFA has no jurisdiction over the so-called acts of 
stateTPF199FPT and it cannot exercise the power of judicial review over the acts of the NPC or the 
NPCSC. TPF200FPT The NPCSC exercises its power to interpret the Basic Law provisions concerning 
the relationship between the Central authorities and the HKSAR seems to be playing the role 
of the needed adjudicator, but its neutrality or fairness is doubtful as the NPCSC is a political 
body without judicial function whose duty does not include dealing with the concrete cases 
but to abstractly interpret provisions of law. Moreover, in most cases the NPCSC can be a 
party of the disputes or conflicts between the mainland China and the HKSAR; how can such 
an institution adjudicate disputes that involves itself appropriately? To tackle the problem of 
lacking dispute resolving adjudicator, there tend to be three options. The first option, 
advocated by Professor Yash Ghai, is to judicialise the Committee for the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the NPCSC, empowering it with a judicial role 
within the NPCSC structure to deal with disputes or conflicts mentioned above.TPF201FPT Option 
two is to make the CFA of the HKSAR to play a significant part in resolving the problem; 
this may mean a reform to its jurisdiction to cover these issues. The third option is to create a 
new institution to assume the function. 
 
7 A Comparison of the HKSAR’s Constitutional Arrangements with the EU and 
the UK 
 
The primary feature of China’s “one country, two systems” (OCTS) doctrine is that within 
one united polity, there exist various subunits which enjoy a high degree of autonomy with 
relatively independent social, economical, political and legal systems. In this sense it is 
similar to the constitutional arrangement of the European Union (EU) and that of the United 
Kingdom (UK) as to the centre-region relationship despite huge differences between them. In 
order to make China’s OCTS a constitutional order, which constitutes the conditions and 
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environment for the CFA’s operation, emerge more clearly, a comparative discussion on the 
constitutional practices in the EU and the UK will be made in this section. The focus will be 
placed mainly on the evolution of the EU’s legal order and its nature, and the UK’s 
devolution settlement in Scotland under its parliamentary sovereignty doctrine. The two cases 
seem to represent two ends of the spectrum of the plural polity structure practised in Europe 
today in terms of the degree of centralisation or decentralisation. The UK case occupies the 
densest end due to its unitary nature while the EU example takes the lightest end because of 
its intergovernmental or quasi-federal characteristic. At the same time, the UK’s devolution 
settlement indicates a centrifugal inclination and the EU’s evolution reflects a centripetal 
trend. Under China’s OCTS arrangement, decentralisation is a major element. In some 
aspects, the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) even have powers as high as that of 
sovereign states. But China’s constitutional order is unitary; to maintain that, some crucial 
aspects of the OCTS also shows centralisation preference so that the SARs can be kept as 
inalienable parts of China. A comparative examination will therefore be helpful to finding a 
proper position on the spectrum for the HKSAR. 
 
Firstly, we will take a look at the EU’s story. The EU is an economic and political 
community with both supranational and intergovernmental features, consisting of twenty-
seven member states at present. While the objective of China’s OCTS policy is to achieve a 
peaceful reunification with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and to maintain their stability and 
prosperity, the primary utilitarian justification for the EU integration has been also based on 
two identical ideals which have remained central to the process and the project of the EU 
integration to date: peace and prosperity.TPF 202 FPT The EU’s origin can be traced back to the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1951TPF203FPT and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) established by six European Countries in 1957. Thereafter the size of the 
EEC was enlarged considerably through the accession of more and more new members. Its 
powers also increased significantly. Its current legal framework was formed by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon was signed. It amends the existing 
EU treaties and adopts some reforms. The Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
Important institutions of the EU include the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
the Council of the European Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the European 
Central Bank. The EU citizens elect the Parliament every five years. By now the EU seems to 
have, arguably, evolved into a quasi-federal polity which enjoys a single market, maintains 
common policies in areas such as trade, agriculture, fisheries and regional development, and 
adopts a common currency. TPF204 FPT Most notably, a unique EU constitutional order and legal 
system has been formed and consolidated. 
 
The EU law can be categorised into Treaties, International Agreements, the EU legislation, 
and case law of the ECJ. Through the development of its case law, primarily by using the 
preliminary rulings procedure (it will be further discussed in Chapter 4 when considering the 
interpretative mechanism of Hong Kong’s Basic Law), the ECJ, with the cooperation from 
member states’ national courts, has made significant contributions to the creation of an 
autonomous EU legal order and the evolution and integration of the EU itself. The most 
influential and important constitutional principles that have been developed by the ECJ are 
the notions of supremacy and of direct effect. They have played a crucial role in developing a 
uniform legal order for the EU. 
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In the ECJ’s point of view, “the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law, 
for whose benefit the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields.”TPF205FPT Therefore, it holds that EU law is superior to member states’ domestic laws,TPF206FPT and 
even member states’ constitutions.TPF207FPT Where a conflict arises between EU law and the law of 
a member state, EU law prevails and the law of the member state must be disapplied. 
Moreover, the ECJ has established the principle of directive effect to ensure individuals can 
invoke directly the provisions of EU law before national courts not only to challenge member 
states but also to against individuals. TPF208FPT In a series of leading cases, the ECJ has extended 
direct effect to treaty articles, regulations, directives, decisions, and even to provisions of 
international agreements to which the EU is a party.TPF209FPT The direct effect principle serves as an 
essential factor for the integration of EU legal order. As Stephen Weatherill points out, 
“Direct effect is a constitutional device that shape a system within which Community law are 
not distinct layers, but instead part of the same mixture. Community law becomes national 
law and is enforced through the national system. National courts become Community courts 
and enforce Community rules.”TPF210FPT 
 
Although, as mentioned, the EU may be seen as a quasi-federal polity, there has actually no 
consensus on its nature among commentators. As Cormac Mac Amhlaigh has indicated, “The 
attempt to give a precise account of what the European Union (EU) actually constitutes – an 
international organisation, supranational entity, multilevel governance structure, nascent 
federal state, or ‘un objet politique non-identifié’ – is a perennial issue in European 
integration studies.”TPF211FPT Here I will examine selectively several typical explanations of the EU 
legal order’s nature so as to acquire a general understanding of the issue. In fact, when 
exploring the nature of China’s “one country, two systems” constitutional architecture, we 
encounter the same difficulty in providing a precise account of it. Scholars’ efforts in 
analysing the EU issue may offer us some useful thoughts and constructive approaches for 
the discussion of Hong Kong’s constitutional framework. 
 
There is no doubt that initially the European Community was a traditional international 
organisation governed by international law. Due to its considerable evolution and integration 
progress, especially after the effective establishment of the principles of supremacy and of 
direct effect by the ECJ, different views about the nature of EU’s legal order emerge. Some 
insist that it still remains an international organisation primarily because the member states 
remain as the masters of the EU treaties.TPF212FPT Contrarily, some scholars argue that the EU has 
indeed evolved into a federal or quasi-federal polity, although an imperfect one, with an 
autonomous legal order and supranational nature.TPF 213 FPT In their opinions, the ECJ’s 
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jurisprudence in Van Gend en LoosTPF214FPT and CostaTPF215FPT, together with its doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect, served to generate a process of constitutionalising the Treaties.TPF216FPT Through 
the process the Community Treaties has been transformed into constitutional documents and 
the ECJ has itself evolved into a constitutional court. They therefore claim that the legal 
system the ECJ has constituted is unmistakably “federal” in orientation.TPF217FPT However, it has 
also been noticed that the Community has adopted constitutional practices without any 
underlying legitimising constitutionalism. That means, although the EU has some of the 
characteristics of a constitutional order, it lacks the most fundamental property: legitimation 
through a popular constituent power which can only be the European people(s).TPF218FPT 
 
Another classical articulation of the EU’s nature is an assertion from a pluralist perspective. 
As Neil MacCormick famously argued, 
 
“…the most appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than 
monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal systems and their common legal 
system of EC law are distinct, but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relations of 
validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not act up to any sort of all-
purpose superiority of one system over another. It follows also that the interpretative power 
of the highest decision-making authorities of the different systems must be, as to each system, 
ultimate.”TPF219FPT 
 
The pluralist approaches have recently gained popularity in explaining the relationship 
between the Community and national legal orders. The pluralist concepts generally regard the 
national and European constitutional documents as no longer being the emanation of two 
independent legal orders, where the sovereign states are the ultimate source and centre of 
authority.TPF 220 FPT Instead, the relationship between the orders “is now horizontal rather than 
vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical”.TPF221FPT Each highest court within a subsystem – 
constitutional courts, ECJ, as well as other adjudicating bodies such as the European Court of 
Human Rights and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body – derives both authority and 
legitimacy from its own basic document, retaining “interpretation competence-
competence”.TPF222FPT The focus here is on the prevention of conflicts through cooperation and 
interaction. If conflicts nonetheless occur, they should be solved on the basis of certain 
principles, taking account of the concrete constitutional context, time and practicalities;TPF223FPT on 
occasion “some political action” may be necessary to produce a solution.TPF224FPT 
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Due to its preference for avoidance of conflict solution by courts, this theory might 
potentially jeopardise the efficacy and uniformity of the EU law, which is the pre-condition 
of the survival and functioning of the EU itself. In reality, there certainly would emerge 
conflicts between the rules of the EU system and that of its member states system. A single 
highest legal authority to say the final word on this type of disputes seems necessary for 
saving the EU system from a possible danger of fragmenting. However, there is no doubt that 
a pluralistic analysis could considerably enhance our understanding of the EU legal order. 
Moreover, compared with other models of analysing the nature of the EU, the pluralistic 
approach seems to be a better and constructive tool which can be borrowed to illuminate the 
nature of Hong Kong’s new constitutional order under China’s “one country, two systems” 
policy. 
 
Having examined the EU practice, now we turn to another example of multi-systems within a 
single polity: the devolved Scotland in the United Kingdom. The value of such an 
investigation is based on the following comparability: Firstly, technically both China and the 
UK can be seen as unitary states, primarily in the sense of not have federal characteristics. 
Secondly, both states’ Parliaments (in China the National Peoples Congress) are the highest 
organs of state power. And thirdly, both Scotland and Hong Kong enjoy high degrees of 
autonomy granted by the Parliament (the UK Parliament and the NPC of China respectively) 
through a constitutional document (the Scotland Act 1998 and the Basic Law of the HKSAR 
respectively). Admittedly, although similarities exist as mentioned, there are also huge 
differences in constitutional, political, legal, economic, societal and cultural aspects between 
Scotland and Hong Kong. However, these differences do not necessarily make a selective 
comparative discussion impossible. In addition, the fact that Hong Kong was a British colony 
and now a SAR of China itself could be a good connective factor for our comparison. 
 
In the first place, we will start our discussion by looking at the parliamentary sovereignty 
doctrine, which is the most important constitutional principle of the UK, under which the 
devolved institutions of Scotland and its judiciary operate. In other words, the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty is the major element of the constitutional context against which the 
legal relationship between Scottish institutions and the Central authorities of the UK is 
defined and framed. Interestingly, the communist China has a similar constitutional principle 
– the idea of congressional supremacy, under which the Hong Kong autonomy and its legal 
system functions. When defining the roles of Hong Kong’s CFA, especially the role in 
interpreting the Basic Law, the NPCSC’s unchallengeable power of constitution and law 
interpretation stemmed certainly from the congressional supremacy principle must be borne 
in mind, for it is a precondition of the Courts of Hong Kong’s constitutional interpretative 
power. Thus an examination of UK’s parliamentary sovereignty might be helpful in our later 
exploration of the case of Hong Kong. 
 
The supreme status of the UK Parliament can be traced to the Bill of Rights 1689, which 
makes the Crown to subject to the will of the Parliament (the Parliament of England) and also 
recognises that the Parliament (the Crown, Lords, and Commons) has unlimited legislative 
authority.TPF225FPT This view was typically presented by Dicey, who believed that “Parliament… 
has under the English constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, 
further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
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override or set aside the legislation of Parliament,” and it is “the very keystone of the law of 
the constitution.” 
 
The legal sovereignty of Parliament has been regarded as the founding principle of the UK 
constitution.TPF226FPT It embraces four principal propositions: First, the Parliament has the capacity 
to pass or repeal any law without any legal limits. Second, the Parliament cannot bind its 
successors – Today’s Parliament cannot enact a law that cannot be changed or repealed by a 
future Parliament. That means the most recent statute takes priority over those in an older 
statute because the Parliament’s last word on the matter controls. Third, no other body has the 
authority to challenge the validity of laws made by the Parliament in the proper manner, 
therefore courts are incapable of invalidating primary legislation through judicial review.TPF227FPT 
The fourth and the last point is that parliamentary sovereignty determines that the UK is a 
unitary state. All the powers of its regional subunits are stemmed from Westminster; their 
autonomy are granted by the UK Parliament through devolution Acts. Those Acts, at least in 
theory, can be suspended, changed or even repealed by the Parliament at will. 
 
It must be noted that however, there have been some developments that erode the 
absoluteness of parliamentary sovereignty. Among them the most prominent ones are the 
UK’s membership of the EU and its acceptance of the European human rights law. Indeed, 
parliamentary supremacy has been limited by EU law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.TPF228FPT Nonetheless, the doctrine remains orthodoxy in Britain’s political life and 
has considerable restriction on the flexibility of the UK’s constitution.TPF229FPT 
 
Under the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine, devolution settlement for Scotland was made. 
So far it has been a success story. There must, therefore, be something that Hong Kong could 
learn from when practising its own autonomy under China’s OCTS, or at least something 
could help in identifying Hong Kong’s own problems. Scotland was united with England in 
1707 when the Acts of Union took effect. However, it continues to boast a separate legal 
system – a distinct body of Scots law, a national education system and the Kirk (Church of 
Scotland).TPF230FPT All of these have contributed to the continuation of Scottish culture and Scottish 
national identity since the Union. Stimulated by the discovery of reserves of oil and gas in the 
North Sea in the 1960s and the UK membership of the European Economic Community in 
1973, Scottish nationalism had increasingly influence in political life,TPF231FPT and the demand for 
“home rule” had been growing. There was even an emergence of a minority seeking 
independence. Responding to the situation, the Labour Party was determined to create 
devolved institutions in Scotland. It was finally arranged in 1999 through the enactment of 
the Scotland Act 1998. 
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The Act creates the Scottish Parliament and empowers it to pass laws which are called Acts 
of the Scottish Parliament.TPF232FPT The Scotland Act defines the Scottish Parliament’s legislative 
competence by specifying the matters over which it enjoys no competence (reserved 
powers),TPF233FPT rather than listing the matters over which it is competent to legislate (devolved 
powers). Furthermore, a list of statutes which are not amenable to amendment or repeal by 
the Scottish Parliament is designated. TPF234FPT Even when acting within its legislative competence, 
the Act further constrains the powers of the Scottish Parliament, as well as the Scottish 
Executive (which is composed of by Ministers, the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor-General 
for Scotland)TPF235FPT, by inhibiting it from acting in a manner incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights or European Community Law. TPF 236 FPT Moreover, the UK 
Parliament retains power to legislate even in areas devolved to Scotland. Although the 
“Sewel Convention” requires that the UK Parliament not normally to do so without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament, TPF237FPT the situation has not worked out quite as envisaged in 
practice because Scotland’s Parliament and Executive have regularly consented to the UK 
Parliament legislating on devolved matters.TPF238FPT Therefore, Westminster legislation continues 
to be of importance in relation to certain devolved areas of competence. These limits to the 
Scottish legislative competence might to some extent reflect the Westminster’s effort to 
ensure its parliamentary sovereignty would not be undermined by the devolution arrangement. 
The unitary feature of the UK’s constitutional order thus seems to have not changed much. 
 
The Scotland Act creates a Scottish Administration which constitutes the government of 
Scotland in respect of devolved matters. It assumes the previous functions of the Scottish 
Office, which was a Department of the UK government exercising a wide range of 
government functions in relation to Scotland under the control of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland,TPF 239 FPT and associated departments (Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries; 
Development; Education and Industry; Home and Health; as well as a Central Services 
department TPF240FPT). The Scottish Administration is under the direction and control of a Scottish 
Executive, drawn from the Scottish Parliament on the Westminster model, and is responsible 
to it for the devolved government of Scotland. The accountability of the Executive to the 
Parliament is underpinned by the provisions of the Act, which require members of the 
Executive to resign in the event of a motion of no confidence in it being passed by the 
Parliament.TPF241FPT 
 
As mentioned earlier, Scotland remains a separate legal system from other parts of the United 
Kingdom after the union. The Court of Session is the supreme civil court in Scotland. 
However, certain civil cases from the Court of Session may go to the Supreme Court 
(previously the House of Lords) for final appeal. By contrast, for criminal cases, there is no 
further appeal to the Supreme Court (in London) from the High Court of Justiciary (of 
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Scotland), in which the latter is the supreme criminal court of Scotland. Notably, appeals as 
to devolution issues under the Scotland Act 1998 are to be heard and determined by the 
Supreme Court (previously the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).TPF242FPT 
 
The devolution arrangement enhances the role of the courts. They may be asked to examine 
whether the provisions of Acts of Scottish Parliament or actions by a member of the Scottish 
Executive are within their respective competence. Both of these types of question constitute 
what are described in the Act as “devolution issues”TPF 243 FPT and grant the courts a kind of 
constitutional judicial review power, addition to their normal power of judicial review. The 
Act also makes the Supreme Court as the common court of final appeal for devolution issues. 
In order to avoid disputes and reduce the need to amend legislation, the courts perform the 
above statutory role with the assistance of new interpretative rules which place judges under 
an obligation to read Scottish legislation and subordinate legislation so as to render any 
measure under consideration within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if 
possible.TPF244FPT This is sometimes called the principle of efficacy, under which the courts seek to 
give effect to legislation rather than to invalidate it.TPF245FPT 
 
Devolution cases can be appealed to the Supreme Court and they can also be referred to the 
Supreme Court directly by the court in Scotland under certain circumstances. As devolution 
issues may be involved in certain criminal cases and thus fall in the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, this changes the traditional principle that criminal cases in Scotland cannot 
be appealed to London. 
 
Moreover, the Act designs a pre-legislative scrutiny mechanism, under which the Advocate 
General, the Lord Advocate or the Attorney General may refer the question of whether a Bill 
or any provision of a Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament to the Supreme Court for decision.TPF246FPT This can occur at any time during the four 
weeks from the passing of the Bill or any subsequent approval.TPF247FPT Since such a review is not 
based on a concrete dispute, but on hypothetical facts, we may claim that in a sense the Act 
gives the Supreme Court not only a new concrete constitutional review jurisdiction to deal 
with devolution issues, but also the abstract constitutional review power to exercise pre-
legislative scrutiny. 
 
It must be noted that although the Scotland Act 1998 plays a significant role in reshaping the 
constitutional order of the United Kingdom, it is by no means the end of the story of the 
reconstruction of the relationship between Scotland and the Central Government of the UK. 
As Professors Himsworth and Munro indicate, the process of devolution has been 
evolutionary, and the Act marks merely a further stage in this process, albeit an important 
one.TPF248 FPT The Act may cause fresh problems or issues, such as the West Lothian question 
(which concerns the fact that after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament the Scots MPs 
at Westminster can speak and vote on English matters while English MPs cannot speak and 
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vote on matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament),TPF249FPT and result in further constitutional 
reforms.TPF250FPT 
 
All in all, the above examination of the EU and UK constitutional practices as to the 
relationship between the regions and the Central can provide us with many valuable clues and 
insights for a deeper appreciation of Hong Kong’s constitutional relationship with Beijing. In 
summary, those points that could be placed side by side so as to achieve a better 
understanding of each other can be listed as follows: (1) the supremacy and direct effect of 
EU law vs. the Annex III of the HKSAR’s Basic Law, which lists national laws that can be 
enforced in Hong Kong, and the relationship between the Basic Law and China’s 
Constitution; (2) the ECJ’s preliminary rule procedure vs. the Basic Law’s interpretative 
mechanism; (3) the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty vs. China’s congressional supremacy 
(Indicated in the devolution Acts, the UK Parliament has residual powers and retains 
competence to enact any law for the devolved regions. According to the Basic Law, China’s 
NPC also enjoys residual powers, but it cannot directly enact laws for the SARs, rather, its 
Standing Committee has the power to interpret all the provisions of the Basic Law.); (4) the 
judicial role in devolution issues and its impact on Scotland’s courts’ power of final appeal vs. 
Hong Kong’s final adjudication power and its relationship with the NPCSC’s power of 
interpreting the Basic Law; (5) The EU legal order’s nature, the UK’s unitary system with 
federal feature caused by the devolution vs. China’s “one country, two systems, three legal 
orders, and four law districts” phenomenon and its claim of the remaining of the unitary 
nature; (6) There is a need to change the orthodoxy to improve the constitutional flexibility to 
contain new developments and provide better account: Unitary system vs. federalism vs. 
pluralism. Due to limitations of space and knowledge, I cannot analyse all these issues here in 
detail, the brief comparison only serves to call for sufficient attention when we explore the 
project so as to deepen and better develop our understanding of the HKSAR and the CFA’s 




Before 1997, many people doubted whether capitalist Hong Kong would survive within a 
communist China. Since the handover, more than twelve years’ practice has showed that 
Hong Kong not only survives but also thrives. Socialist and capitalist was once seen as two 
incompatible systems like fire and water, but Hong Kong’s experience has demonstrated that 
these two systems can now peacefully coexist and develop side by side not only 
internationally but also domestically. Moreover, under the “one country, two systems” policy, 
socialist and capitalist even tend to contribute to each other’s sustainable prosperity, for the 
coexisting of them within a country constitutes a vivid pluralist environment in which the 
country can gain the dynamic force and vitality necessary to its continuous thrive in the tide 
of globalisation. Certainly, there would be inevitable disputes or even conflicts between the 
two systems during their interactions, thus appropriate principles and constitutional 
arrangements need to be established to settle such disputes or conflicts smoothly in case they 
arise. As a result, a harmonious relationship between the HKSAR and the mainland China 
could be maintained and developed, which would be vital to the benefits of the two sides. In 
this respect, some useful lessons may be learnt from the EU and UK’s experience in dealing 
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with their centre-region relationships. Last but not least, it is very fortunate for China to have 
a capitalist Hong Kong; and it is very fortunate for Hong Kong to return to a rising China, 
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This chapter aims to provide some comparative theoretical standards for the illumination and 
explanation of the work of Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in the following 
chapters. I will mainly focus on western scholars’ exploration of the “Mighty Problem”TPF251FPT or 
the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”TPF252 FPT faced by the judiciary – that is, the legitimacy of 
courts’ judicial review power within a democratic society. In other words, what justifies 
unelected and unaccountable judges to examine and strike down laws enacted by the elected 
legislature which represents the will of the people and the actions taken by accountable 
governments? Although this is a major topic which has been investigated deeply by 
constitutional theorists in western democracies, it is strangely that such question has not yet 
been raised in Hong Kong at all, neither in public debates nor in academic discussions. The 
reason for the silence may lie in the fact that Hong Kong is still not a democratic society as 
full democracy has not been realised yet. The Chief Executive (CE) of the HKSAR and half 
of the legislature members are still elected indirectly. However, it must be noted that 
democracy in Hong Kong has been developing steadily and significantly. The first CE of the 
SAR was elected by a four-hundred member electing committee, and the present CE (the 
third term of office since the establishment of the SAR) was elected by an eight-hundred 
member electing committee. As promised by Beijing, the representativeness of the electing 
committee will continue to be broadened, and the ultimate goal of the CE election by 
universal suffrage set by the Basic Law will be achieved in 2017.TPF253FPT As for the Legislative 
Council, 24 members were directly elected in the second term of office, and 30 members 
were elected directly in the third term of office accounting for 50% of the total numbers of 
legislature members. All the legislators will be elected by universal suffrage in 2020.TPF254FPT With 
the democratisation being incrementally achieved in Hong Kong, the concern over the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty of the courts’ judicial review may be raised and this would be 
worth addressing in our discussion of the roles of the CFA. Moreover, the CFA has claimed 
that the courts of Hong Kong have the power to review the constitutionality of actions of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee (NPCSC),TPF255FPT which are the 
national legislature of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) representing the will of the 
Chinese people according to the Constitution of the PRC.TPF256FPT Of course, this power asserted 
by the CFA faces the counter-majoritarian difficulty for it is doubtful that the courts of Hong 
Kong as regional judiciary which are composed of unelected judges are capable of 
challenging the authority of the NPC and its Standing Committee who are the highest 
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democratic institutions (not in the western sense) through which the Chinese people exercise 
state powers.TPF257FPT Therefore, the CFA’s assertion needs to be legitimised not only from a pure 
legal analysis but also from a justification of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. However, I 
will not deal with this Hong Kong-related particular issue in this chapter; rather, I will 
examine some typical works of western scholars on the problem in an attempt to set up a 
theoretical standard for further discussions of the CFA issue in the following chapters. 
 
Academic works in this area are numerous and it is impossible to examine all of them in one 
chapter. Therefore my investigation will be highly selective, emphasising primarily on some 
views which appear to be relevant and helpful in our discussion of the Hong Kong case. First, 
I will examine Professor Alexander Bickel’s worry on the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”, 
and Robert Martin’s sharp critique about the Canadian Supreme Court which he marks as 
“the most dangerous branch”. Second, I will discuss W. J. Waluchow’s common law 
conception of Charters and judicial review. Third, I will discuss Cass R. Sunstein’s theory of 
judicial minimalism and his analysis of incompletely theorised agreements, which are 
supposed to be useful for enhancing courts’ legitimacy. Fourth, I will explore John Hart Ely’s 
famous assertion of a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial 
review. Fifth and finally, I will look at the theory of “dialogue” represented by Professor 
Barry Friedman, another creative answer to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”. After the 
exploration of various theoretical discussions of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, 
we may obtain a schematic picture of what western scholars think about the role of courts and 
this could give us a theoretical background for our analysis of the behaviour of the CFA in 
Hong Kong later. 
 
2 Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Questioning the Legitimacy of Judicial Review 
 
The power of judicial review is perhaps the most important weapon which could be wielded 
by the judiciary to make the “least dangerous branch”TPF 258 FPT strong enough in the modern 
constitutional democracies. There might be little doubt that judicial review has become one of 
the most remarkable features of the rule of law and constitutional democracy in the 
contemporary era. Interestingly, however, the compatibility of judicial review with 
majoritarian democracy has been seriously questioned by political scientists and academic 
lawyers. 
 
Professor Alexander Bickel was one of the earliest scholars who raised seriously the question 
of judicial democratic legitimacy. Actually, the term of “Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty” 
was named by him in his famous book, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics. When unelected, unaccountable judges sought to substitute their views for 
those of elected, accountable legislators, this could give rise to what Bickel described as the 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty”. He pointed out that “judicial review is a deviant institution 
in the American democracy”TPF259FPT as it worked counter to the distinguishing characteristic of the 
system, that is, the policy-making power of representative institutions was born of the 
electoral process.TPF260FPT He even believed that judicial review might have a tendency over time 
seriously to weaken the democratic progress because he thought that relying on the correcting 
function of judicial review, the legislature would pay little attention to its own duty of 
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considering the constitutionality of its enactments and thus the level of legislative 
performance might be lowered considerably. The fact that the correction of legislative 
mistakes came from the outside would damage the political capacity of the people and their 
sense of moral responsibility.TPF 261 FPT Bickel claimed, “It is that judicial review runs so 
fundamentally counter to democratic theory that in a society which in all other respects rests 
on that theory, judicial review cannot ultimately be effective” and “our chief protection lies 
elsewhere”.TPF262FPT However, Bickel’s purpose was to defend judicial review rather than merely 
criticised and discarded it. Recognising these concerns, he believed that judicial review was 
acceptable if it was based upon certain practices and the avoidance of others. He thought that 
the Court’s appropriate role was to judge on the basis of principle. He also stressed that the 
Court should make frequent and strategic use of what he called the “passive virtues”TPF263FPT – 
techniques to avoid deciding cases on substantive grounds if narrower grounds existed to 
decide the case, and should wait until the appropriate principle had “ripened” before finally 
applying it to the issue in question.TPF 264 FPT To him, the doctrines of “standing, case and 
controversy, ripeness and political question” were the means the Court adopted to prevent 
itself from being an active politicised judiciary and whereby the legitimacy of judicial review 
could be ensured.TPF265FPT 
 
It is worth mentioning here that although Professor Bickel is thought to be the father of 
studying the counter-majoritarian difficulty, he is by no means the first one who noticed the 
problem. In fact, this was also the intellectual tradition of figures such as James Bradley 
Thayer, Learned Hand, Felix Frankfurter, and perhaps Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis 
Brandeis as well.TPF266FPT However, Bickel’s contribution is that his concern provoked a heated 
debate about this issue. For at least two or three decades after his naming of this problem, it 
dominated constitutional theory. Numerous articles and books have been written to try to 
resolve the counter-majoritarian difficulty. My discussion in this thesis will be focusing on 
some selected writings which might be much more helpful to our understanding of this issue. 
 
One of the strongest critiques of the legitimacy of judicial review might be a recent book by 
Robert Martin. Martin’s analysis focuses on the situation in Canada. Interestingly, contrary to 
Bickel, Martin names his book as The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court of 
Canada Has Undermined Our Law and Democracy.TPF267FPT Actually, Martin agrees with Bickel 
that courts must be guided by reason and principle when exercising their power of judicial 
review. But he alleges that the practice of judicial review by the judges of the Supreme Court 
of Canada is a process seriously lacking in principle and reason and characterised to an 
unacceptable degree by personal preference and personal power.TPF268FPT He believes that these 
judges are “arrogant and unprincipled poseurs, largely out of control” who “amend the 
Constitution at will” with “capricious, arbitrary, unpredictable, and largely ad hoc”TPF 269 FPT 
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decisions. In his eyes, the judges and their judgements are not guided by the law and the 
Constitution, but by the demands of the prevailing orthodoxy.TPF270FPT 
 
In Martin’s view, law is general, consistent, coherent, and predictable. But he thinks that the 
decisions of the Supreme Court violate these standards of law, mainly by employing the 
“contextual approach”.TPF271FPT He complains that the invention of the “contextual approach” and 
rejection of the “abstract approach” by the Court has abandoned the standard that law should 
be general and thus “discards principle in favour of the personal social preference of the 
judge”.TPF272 FPT As a result, the question of whether a litigant may claim a Charter right will 
depend largely on a judge’s purely subjective view as to the litigant and the litigant’s 
situation.TPF273 FPT What is worse, according to him, the judges have politicised their role. The 
dominant orthodoxy has become the primary factor that determines the outcome of litigation 
before the Court. The Supreme Court has taken the lead in transforming the courts into eager 
instruments for the application of the dominant ideology just like Nazi Germany and Stalinist 
Russia, in his opinion.TPF274FPT 
 
Moreover, Martin harshly accuses the Court to be an attack on democracy. He claims, “The 
Supreme Court has acted so as to undermine the essential structure and subvert the process of 
Canadian constitutional democracy.”TPF 275 FPT Although there may be flaws in the Canadian 
democratic system, Martin believes they are certainly not so serious that can justify replacing 
democracy with rule by the judges.TPF276 FPT He points out that “in a constitutional democracy 
unelected, unaccountable judges should not do certain things. Included amongst these would 
be setting the social agenda, amending legislation, amending the constitution, and publicly 
attacking democracy and democratic institutions. The judges of the Supreme Court have, in 
recent years, done all these things.”TPF277FPT The alleged judicial usurpation is labelled by Martin as 
“judicialisation of politics”, which “denotes where the central issues which engage a society 
are resolved in the courtroom, making judges the significant political decision makers and 
lawyers the mediators of political activity.”TPF278FPT In other words, in the process of judicialisation 
of politics, all social issues eventually become legal issues and thus the social, intellectual, 
and moral agendas are set by lawyers. As a result, the active participation of citizens to the 
political process, an essential element of democracy, is excluded by the domination of 
lawyers and judges in that process.TPF279FPT It seems that Martin attributes the Court’s aggression to 
the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He feels that the individual 
rights enshrined in the Charter, which is thought to be enjoyed actually by the elite or the 
“chattering class”, has taken precedence in the minds of Canadians over the collective good. 
Canadians have been persuaded that rights and more of them are the answer to all social ills 
and seem have forgotten that the things which Canadians value most are the result of political 
action, not of litigation over rights.TPF280FPT According to Martin, the judges of the Supreme Court 
have used the Charter inappropriately to justify their creation of law. They have created rights 
not specified in the Charter through the technique of “reading in”. That is, they have created 
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or amended legislation by adding “words not placed in [an existing] statute by the 
legislature.”TPF281FPT 
 
Another of Martin’s serious accusations of the Supreme Court of Canada’s anti-democratic 
behaviour is that it embraces both interest group and identity politics. Interest group politics 
and identity politics are seen to be highly exclusive, eliminating everyone who does not seek 
a particular objective or is not a believer or does not share the requisite identity. Evidently, 
Martin points out, the organisations of such politics are unlikely achieve significant electoral 
support due to their essential feature of exclusivity. However, “the individuals involved have 
turned to litigation, hoping to win victories from the courts which they could not have 
achieved through the ballot box.”TPF 282 FPT On the other hand, the Court has facilitated their 
employing of such strategy by largely discarding early rules of “standing”, which regulate the 
eligibility of an individual to bring an issue before the courts. As a result, it is now very easy 
for anyone who just dislikes a state act to challenge it through judicial review. And even 
worse, Martin indicates, a litigant may bring a matter before the court on the basis of an 
alleged violation of someone else’s rights, not necessarily of his or her own.TPF283FPT Consequently, 
the Supreme Court has turned itself, in Martin’s words, into the forum of choice for interest 
group and identity politics. The very process of turning political and social issues into legal 
battles over rights, he claims, is by its nature anti-democratic, because there is no negotiation 
and give-and-take in this process, which is the essential element of a democracy. Indeed, it is 
a winner-take-all process. He reminds us of noting the fact that the courts are simply 
incapable of finally resolving all social issues.TPF284FPT 
 
Martin dislikes the alleged anti-democratic performance of the Supreme Court of Canada so 
much that he offers some extreme proposals attempting to restrict the judges’ arbitrary. They 
include establishing an independent judicial nominating commission, making legislation 
tightening the rules on standing and limiting interventors in a particular appeal, cutting the 
funding of the Court, promoting a degree of public openness of the judicial process and even 
rehabilitating section 33 of the Charter of Canada so as to reassert Parliamentary control over 
public policy.TPF285FPT 
 
Martin’s critique of the Supreme Court is extremely sharp, but we cannot thereby make a 
conclusion that he is hostile to individual rights. Conversely, we can find according to his 
book that he is indeed a liberalist who favours civil liberties enthusiastically. His sharpness 
comes from his deep love of liberty as he really believes that the behaviour of the Court 
threatens the democracy of Canada and thus the freedom of the Canadian people. The 
primary purpose of his book is to awaken the people by telling them the truth he finds, and as 
he expects, the democracy and liberty might thus be saved from the erosion of the orthodoxy 
which underlies the performance of the Court and blinds the people. I believe that Martin’s 
sharp critique, although set in the context of Canada, could serve as a typical representative 
of numerous works of those who question the legitimacy of judicial review. From his book, 
we could see a general impression of those scholars’ concern about this issue and understand 
the necessity of exploration and answering the challenge of anti-majoritarian difficulty. In 
fact, since the Basic Law came into force in Hong Kong after the handover, there has also 
emerged a trend of what Martin calls the “judicialisation of politics”. Courts are frequently 
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turned into the extensions of political battle fields. Judicial review is often used by some 
politicians as a strategy or means to achieve their political ends. It tends to be abused as a 
panacea for all social and political issues. Martin’s analysis of the Canada case could illumine 
our observation of Hong Kong’s situation. Bickel’s finding of the “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” and his suggestion of “passive virtues” are also valuable for our discussion on the 
relationship between the Judiciary of Hong Kong and political branches and defining an 
appropriate role for the courts of Hong Kong. Next, I will examine a theory proposed by 
another Canadian scholar Professor Waluchow, which might serve as an answer to Bickel’s 
question and Martin’s challenge. 
 
3 Waluchow’s Answer: the Living Tree Theory 
 
Professor W. J. Waluchow in his recent book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: the 
Living Tree,TPF286FPT discusses carefully the views both of the advocates and opponents of adopting 
a constitutional Charter which would be enforced by courts through judicial review. Like 
Martin, Waluchow’s investigation is also set in the context of Canada. Unlike Martin, 
however, Waluchow is a defender of judicial review. His comment is not so sharp or 
emotional. His analysis is meticulous and systematic. Based on a delicate examination, 
Waluchow puts forward a new theory for understanding the judicial review and thereby 
defending its legitimacy. 
 
Firstly, let us look at Waluchow’s general responses to some typical arguments against the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review. Critics point out that “allowing (largely) unelected 
judges to overrule the considered views of responsible, representative legislators represents 
the complete abandonment of self-government”TPF287FPT, which lies at the very heart of democratic 
forms of government. Waluchow thinks that the critics’ starting point seems to be wrong. 
Their critique stems from the idea that in a democracy, it is the people who are making the 
law-determining decisions that affect them, not the judges. However, the critics fail to 
acknowledge that there always exists a distance between the people and the law-determining 
decisions made on their behalf. In other words, law-determining decisions are not made by 
“the people” most of the time and such decisions are made by other people on their behalf. 
Moreover, there are numerous law-determining decisions made by unelected individuals who 
are appointed to sit in administrative bodies and responsible for developing legally binding 
rules and regulations in modern indirect democracies. Waluchow believes this situation 
“undermines the suggestion that we consider a system in which law-determining decisions 
are sometimes made by unelected representatives unworthy of the title ‘democratic’”.TPF 288 FPT 
Although it might be argued that members of administrative agencies are appointed by 
representatives who have been elected by the people and thus we can trace the line of 
authority back far enough we eventually come to decisions made by the people themselves, 
much the same thing is true of unelected judges, because they too are appointed, and often 
vetted, by government representatives. Therefore Waluchow points out, judicial review, even 
when undertaken by unelected judges, shares much of the democratic pedigree we accord 
many other law-determining bodies.TPF289FPT 
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Another defence provided by Waluchow is that unlike the case of United States, in Canada 
the decisions of judges are seldom “final” because the Parliaments remain a potentially 
powerful tool, the section 33 of Canadian Constitution Act 1982, to override those decisions 
and also because the idea of a shared partnership, involving a dialogue between Parliament 
and the courts, has begun to take hold in both public debate and judicial decisions. To 
Waluchow, the effect of judicial review in Canada is rarely to thwart the democratic will but 
to influence the design and implementation of legislation expressive of that will. In other 
words, judicial review is on stage in the ongoing democratic process.TPF290FPT However, the critics 
may insist that the claimed “dialogue” between courts and Parliament is nothing but shallow 
rhetoric as the Supreme Court justices are accountable to no one but themselves, and thus 
nothing could prevent the Supreme Court from removing itself from the dialogue whenever it 
sees fit to do so. Waluchow demonstrates that this is not the case in fact. He indicates that 
there are effective limits to the normative powers of Supreme Court Justices indeed, 
including the requirements of the constitution and the good-faith requirement.TPF291FPT Judges are 
bound to apply the constitution with the duty to come to their best understanding of it. More 
importantly, the constitutional rules defining the role of Supreme Court justices are not 
entirely within the normative power of judges to change or eliminate. On the contrary, they 
are rules of the political system, and the justices play only one part in that system.  
 
Some critics may still doubt the effectiveness of good-faith requirement for judges as they 
worry about that there may be no one who can force the judges to comply with their duty to 
apply the constitution in good faith. They ask, “Who is to guard the Guardians?” Waluchow 
answers: it is the social pressures posed by “we”, the people, that guard the Guardians. He 
says,  
 
“[w]e must bear in mind that the fundamental rules in terms of which we establish our 
political systems are social rules. They exist within, and only within, a complex web of 
practices involving the behaviour and attitudes of a great many people serving in a great 
many roles. Individuals who ignore these rules threaten the very foundations of the system, a 
system that most of us find conductive to our interests and that we will normally take great 
pains to protect through a variety of social pressures. Judges who flout their constitutional 
duties will not be immune from these pressures. Indeed, the critical reactions—and judicial 
reactions to these critical reactions – cited above suggest that judges are quite sensitive to 
the various pressures emanating from the public, and from the wider political sphere in 
which they operate. Judges do not want to be seen as usurping someone else’s role. They do 
not want to be seen as violating the fundamental rules of the constitutional system of which 
they form an integral part. If we cannot trust our judges to act with integrity in honouring 
their constitutional duties – including the ever-present good-faith requirement—in the face of 
such pressures, then what hope is there for constitutional democracy?”TPF292FPT 
 
It must be noted that in his book, Waluchow ties the legitimacy of judicial review closely 
with the justification of adopting a Charter which would be enforced by courts. He sketches 
and examines the so-called “Standard Case”, which refers to the typical arguments of the 
Advocates of Charters who attempt to answer the question: “why, among the numerous 
possibilities open to it, would a democratic society choose a system of government in which 
the powers of government are limited by an entrenched, written Charter of Rights? And why 
would it then call upon one of the parties whose powers are created and regulated by 
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constitutional law and convention – the judiciary – to apply this Charter in ways that can 
sometimes thwart the will of the legislature and, arguably, the people upon whose authority 
the legitimacy of the entire system rests? What could possibly justify the taking of such a 
monumental step?”TPF293FPT The protection of minority and individual interests from government 
and majority excesses is a central element of the Standard Case. Waluchow agrees with the 
advocates that an inherent flaw of the representative democracy is that under it the minorities 
are vulnerable to “tyranny of the majority”, because the majority-voting procedures and the 
representatives’ role of voting only for his/her constituents’ interests tend to ignore or even 
infringe the minorities’ rights. Therefore, an entrenched constitutional Charter enshrining 
minority rights and enjoying immunity from the ordinary process of political change will 
serve to overcome the deficiencies of unencumbered majoritarianism. Thus, Waluchow 
indicates, “[e]nshrinement in an entrenched Charter then, is a means by which a society ties 
itself to the mast of its fundamental beliefs, values, commitments, and settled preferences. It is 
a means of helping to ensure that the legislative process never falls victim to the inauthentic 
wishes of a majority. It provides a (limited) immunity from such occurrences.”TPF294FPT Moreover, 
Waluchow claims, enforcing a Charter by unelected judges through judicial review can also 
provide the desired immunity from political pressures and therefore judges are better situated 
to be guardians of minority rights and interests.TPF295FPT Other benefits of a Charter mentioned by 
Waluchow include increasing public awareness of moral rights, facilitating effective 
enforcement of moral rights, raising public debate concerning fundamental questions of 
political morality, introducing a uniformity of rights and helping to establish a nation’s moral 
identity.TPF296FPT 
 
After examining these typical opposing arguments and the Standard Case of advocates, 
Waluchow chooses the work of Jeremy Waldron, one of the strongest critics of the “Standard 
Case”, to continue his careful investigation. Waldron argues that there is a deep inconsistency 
in the advocates’ idea of judicial review (the Standard Case). On the one hand the people are 
viewed as autonomous moral agents worthy of the possession and informed, responsible 
exercise of the moral rights enshrined in Charters. On the other hand the people and their 
agents are also viewed as predators, which cannot be trusted to exercise their rights 
responsibly without undermining the rights of others. As Waluchow thinks, Waldron pointed 
out rightly that these two views of human agents cannot possibly be reconciled.TPF297FPT Waldron 
claims that the fact that the circumstances of politics include radical dissensus about rights 
has important implication for the Standard Case. “If we cannot agree in advance what our 
rights and freedoms are, cannot know what these are and what it is we have committed 
ourselves to in adopting a system of judicial review that both embodies and protects them, 
then it cannot be important to have such a system. Nor can it be important to strive to achieve 
these lofty goals. It can only amount to sheer stupidity – or as Waldron might say, sheer 
idiocy.”TPF298FPT As for the advocates’ claim that judicial review is a valuable means of improving 
public debate, Waldron disagrees and points out that transforming debates of political 
morality into constitutional disputes is as likely to reduce the level of public debate as to 
improve it. He also thinks the “verbal rigidity” of the provisions of Charters would result in a 
comparatively low quality of political discourse.TPF299FPT 
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After having provided some immediate responses to the critics’ case, Waluchow ambitiously 
determines to subvert the foundation of the critics’ arguments entirely by developing a new 
conception of Charters. He discovers that most writers, both critics and advocates, base their 
arguments on the assumptions that a Charter provides a stable, fixed point of agreement on 
and pre-commitment to moral limits to government power and there are “objective” truths 
concerning political morality, the framers’ intention, or the Charter’s plain or original 
meaning, which an impartial, morally neutral judiciary is capable of discerning and drawing 
upon in making Charter decisions.TPF 300 FPT To Waluchow, if these assumptions are accepted, 
defending the adoption of a Charter and judicial review would be difficult. Therefore, it is 
necessary to propose an alternative understanding of a Charter, which can even be legitimated 
by Waldron’s claim of “circumstances of politics” rather than being undermined by it. 
 
Waluchow begins his journey by drawing on the work of H. L. A. Hart, particularly of Hart’s 
analysis of distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules refer to legal rules 
which impose duties and obligations directly upon people. Secondary rules are rules about 
rules. They do not impose duties, rather they “provide that human beings may by doing or 
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, 
or in various ways determine their incidence or control their operations.” TPF301 FPT The typical 
secondary rules are those power-conferring rules. In Hart’s view, a legal system can emerge 
within a society only with the introduction of secondary rules and their “union” with the 
society’s primary rules. In a hypothetical, pre-legal society which has only primary rules, 
there exist a number of inherent “defects” such as uncertainty, the static quality of the rules, 
and inefficiency in their enforcement. Each defect can be remedied through the introduction 
of such secondary rules as rule of recognition, rules of change and rules of adjudication.TPF302FPT 
 
However, Hart points out that a legal system having secondary rules could develop two major 
dangers. The first one is the emergence of a divorce between validity and acceptance 
resulting from the introduction of rule of recognition. In a pre-legal society, the validity of 
social rules depends upon the wide social acceptance of such rules, while in a legal system 
the validity of legal rules is primarily determined by the rule of recognition. Thus, “There is 
nothing to guarantee that what is legally valid will be generally acceptable. Nor is there 
anything to guarantee that the rules will in any way serve the interests of justice, fairness, or 
utility.”TPF303 FPT Waluchow believes that this danger could be overcome by coupling law with 
democratic procedures because in a society in which legal validity is heavily dependent on 
the people’s direct or indirect approval Hart’s worry is far less likely to emerge.TPF304FPT 
 
Another inherent hazard of legal regulation that Hart worries about is the rigidity of legal 
formalism. Tightly crafted written rules lack flexibility and adaptability to suit the changing 
world. They leave no room for judges to use discretion when dealing with concrete cases.TPF305FPT 
Waluchow attempts to demonstrate that besides using open-textured terms by legislators, 
adopting common law methodology – that is, to leave rule development to the courts, could 
satisfy both of Hart’s fundamental needs: the needs for fixity and adaptability of rules. The 
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reason, Waluchow believes, is that under the common law judges abide by the precedents on 
the one hand, they may also escape from the restriction of a precedent and develop the rules 
by distinguishing the case when they see fit on the other hand. Therefore, he proposes to use 
the common law as a model for understanding Charters and the roles they are capable of 
playing, that is, to view Charters as setting the stage for a kind of common law jurisprudence 
of the moral rights cited in the Charter.TPF306FPT 
 
To explain further his argument, Waluchow discusses Denise Reaume’s analysis of the 
difficulties encountered in the area of Canadian discrimination law, which is deceived in 
desperate need of change. Reaume attributes the problem facing Canadian discrimination law 
to the “top-down model” of legal regulation. According to this highly idealised model, legal 
regulations tend to announce precise rules in advance, refusing further need of law-creating 
activity on the part of adjudicators. As a result, injustice, in the case of discrimination law, 
appears and lacks remedy. To resolve this problem, Reaume introduces a “bottom-up model” 
of legal regulation, which lets the implications of the abstract principles be revealed 
incrementally through confronting fact situations on a case-by-case basis rather than attempt 
a comprehensive theory issuing a precise network of rules at the outset. She argues that the 
bottom-up model is far more promising than the top-down model as a way of developing 
discrimination law.TPF307FPT Based on Reamue’s ideas, Waluchow declares that the notion that a 
Charter can establish fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment to moral limits on 
government power is wrong, instead, the categories are never closed and they demand the 
case-by-case, incremental changes and improvements that common law methodology makes 
possible.TPF308FPT 
 
Waluchow continues his efforts to defend judicial review from the popular complaint of the 
critics – that is, judges engaged in judicial review are being allowed to substitute their own 
subjective moral views for those of the community and its democratic representatives. He 
offers the concepts of “reflective equilibrium”, “moral opinions”, “true moral commitments” 
and “the community’s constitutional morality” to establish his arguments.TPF309FPT He believes that 
the constitutional morality can include an overlapping consensus of true commitments on 
many issues. It can also be included in our conditions of legal validity, entrusting judges with 
the task of deciding whether and when the relevant norms of this morality have been 
compromised by general legislative rules, so that the danger of divorcing legal validity with 
social acceptance by secondary rules could be avoided. While the community can be wrong 
about what its own constitutional morality requires, judges might discern the “true” 
constitutional morality of a community by “reflective equilibrium”. Moreover, judicial 
discretion can help legal systems to deal with unforeseeable issues and cases. The bottom-up, 
common law method exercised by judges is exactly what Charter cases demand and make 
them better equipped than legislators to deal with relevant issues in Charter cases. The 
insulation from the various political pressures can also put courts in a much better position 
than legislatures to take constitutional rights seriously. However, the author points out, 
“judges and legislators need not be seen to be in competition with each other over who has 
more courage or the better moral vision. On the contrary, they can each be seen to contribute, 
in their own unique ways, from their own unique perspectives, and within their unique 
contexts of decision, to the achievement of a morally sensitive and enlightened rule of 
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law.” TPF310 FPT Thus, his argument of judges being in fact respecting, not violating, democratic 
principles is proved. 
 
All in all, Waluchow defends judicial review in his book by rejecting the fixed ways of 
viewing Charters as attempts to establish illusory fixed points of agreement and pre-
commitment. Instead, he proposes the Common Law methodology to view Charters as living 
trees whose roots are fixed by some factors while whose branches should be allowed to grow 
over time through a developing common law jurisprudence of that same community’s 
constitutional morality. 
 
Some comments on Wacluchow’s theory need to be made here. As I mentioned earlier, 
Waluchow tightly links Charters with judicial review in his analysis. He has two primary 
tasks, one is to justify the adoption of a Charter and the other is to legitimate judicial review, 
but he does not analyse the two issues separately. On the contrary, he attempts to use a 
common law conception to achieve both goals at the same time. According to Waluchow’s 
logic and put simply, the adoption of a Charter can be justified by its enforcement by courts 
through judicial review, because judicial review can make the Charter a living tree and at the 
same time, based on the same reason the legitimacy of judicial review is proved. In other 
words, if A can be demonstrated (or justified) by B, then B is also demonstrated (justified). It 
seems to me that this might be a vicious circle. Another problem that might emerge from the 
interlocking of the two is that it is unlikely to provide an answer to justify judicial review in a 
constitutional system without a Charter. In a broader context, unlike Canada, judicial review 
may not be a means of enforcing a Charter. It may just concentrate on supervising the power 
division set up by a Constitution. Therefore Waluchow’s common law methodology, which 
comes from the link-up of Charters and judicial review, seems unable to offer a satisfactory 
explanation in that situation. 
 
It is doubtful that Waluchow’s proposal of common law methodology could resolve the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty of judicial review. His argument seems to have confused the 
legitimacy of common law with that of judicial review. He ignores the fact that common law 
is subject to statutes, which is a fundamental feature of common law and makes it free from 
democratic problems. However, the case of judicial review is obviously different. Judicial 
review concerns the interpretation of a constitution. Judges play a most significant role in 
discerning the meaning of the relevant provisions of the constitution when discharging their 
constitutional interpretative function. They can use their understanding of the constitution to 
strike down a statute which is duly enacted by the legislators. So judges’ exercising of the 
power of judicial review is not subject to the will of the legislature. Therefore, adopting the 
common law methodology to understand and justify judicial review might be flawed by this 
ignorance of the difference between them.  
  
Another problem of Waluchow’s doctrine is that it applies only to common law systems. 
Judicial review is a pervasive legal phenomenon. It is practised in systems other than those 
which boast common law traditions. For example, in many European countries such as 
Germany and France, judicial review plays an important part in their political life as well. 
These countries have civil law systems which are very different from their counterparts – the 
common law systems practised in the US, Canada and the UK. To use Waluchow’s common 
law conception to explain and legitimate Charters and judicial review in the civil law 
countries is problematic. In other words, even if Waluchow’s theory could justify judicial 
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review in common law systems, difficulty would arise to provide legitimacy for judicial 
review based on civil law systems and their jurisprudence. Waluchow seems to have ignored 
that judicial review has been a global phenomenon which does not merely exist in the 
common law world. Therefore, his model cannot provide an universal explanation of the 
legitimacy of judicial review. 
 
Moreover, Waluchow seems to bases his theory on a wrong assumption like most other 
adovocates and critics do. They all assume that democracy is the supreme value in a society 
and democracy is the only authoritative criterion to judge institutions and their actions. Thus, 
critics attempt to demonstrate that judicial review violates democratic principles while 
advocates do their best to work out theoretical models to reconcile judicial review with 
democracy. In my view, their starting point is questionable as there are other values which 
have equal merit with democracy in a society: human rights and the rule of law can serve as 
two examples. They are not necessarily dependants of democracy as some may argue. For 
instance, human rights may be achieved by the benevolent rule or the rule of “philosopher 
king”, which has no element of modern democracy. The same is true for the rule of law. It 
can be argued that the rule of law may be realised without modern democracy provided that 
the law satisfies requirements of justice. In other words, the rule of law is dependant of 
justice other than that of democracy. However, justice involves human rights more than 
democracy. There are two points we must bear in mind. First, if the law enforced in a society 
systematically violates human rights, thus inconsistent with the requirements of justice, then 
we cannot call this society a society of rule of law. Secondly, democracy is by no means a 
perfect institution which can guarantee justice such as human rights by itself due to the 
possibility of majority tyranny. Therefore, if we acknowledge democracy is not the only good 
that a modern society should provide as there are other equal values to which democracy 
must pay respect, then the counter-majoritarian difficulty might not be a problem any more, 
as judicial review rather than democracy, is better suited to reflect or to guarantee these equal 
values. Perhaps that is enough for justifying judicial review. 
 
Given the facts that under the “one county, two systems” principle, Hong Kong continues its 
common law system inherited from Britain and fundamental rights are enshrined by the Basic 
Law and enforced by Hong Kong courts primarily through judicial review. Waluchow’s 
living tree theory based on Canada’s adoption of a Charter and common law practice may, 
nonetheless, offer an alternative perspective to improve our appreciation of the role of the 
courts of Hong Kong in constitutional adjudication. However, as mentioned earlier, 
Waluchow’s theory does not seem to provide a fully satisfactory defence of that role. 
 
4 Incompletely Theorised Agreements and Judicial Minimalism 
 
Based on their respective understandings of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and 
the appropriate role of courts, scholars advocate accordingly judicial self-restraint and 
judicial activism so as to ensure the justification of judicial behaviour. Judicial self-restraint 
may cover both interpretativism, which means that judges deciding constitutional issues 
should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written 
Constitution,TPF311FPT and originalism, which indicates that interpretation of a written constitution 
should be consistent with the original intent of the draftersTPF312FPT or based on what reasonable 
persons living at the time of its adoption would have declared the ordinary meaning of the 
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text to beTPF313FPT. Judicial activism may be referred to as noninterpretativsm, indicating the view 
that courts should go beyond the text of constitution and enforce norms that cannot be 
discovered in the document.TPF314FPT Between judicial self-restraint and judicial activism, there is a 
moderate assertion, that is, judicial minimalism, on which my discussion will be mainly 
concentrated in this section. 
 
Judicial minimalism is originally defined by Cass R. Sunstein, who remains its primary 
advocate. Minimalists believe that judges should focus primarily on deciding the case at hand, 
and avoid making sweeping changes to the law or decisions that have broad-reaching effects 
by leaving fundamental issues undecided. They believe minimalism could be democracy-
promoting and thus hopefully avoid the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Minimalism’s 
theoretical foundation is Sunstein’s doctrine of “incompletely theorised agreements”. In 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict,TPF315FPT Sunstein points out that there are three kinds of 
incompletely theorised agreements. The first one is the “incompletely theorised agreement on 
a general principle”, by which it means that people who accept the principle need not agree 
on what it entails in particular cases.TPF316FPT This phenomenon makes constitution-making and 
much law-making possible. The second phenomenon is that sometimes people agree on a 
mid-level principle but disagree with both general theory and particular cases.TPF317FPT Sunstein’s 
particular interest is in the third one, which is perceived by him as of special interest for law. 
That is, “incompletely theorised agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by 
agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that account for them.”TPF318FPT He believes when 
people diverge on some relatively high-level proposition, they might be able to agree when 
they lower the level of abstraction. He promotes strongly the constructive use of silence in 
legal process. “In law,” he indicates, “as elsewhere, what is said is no more important than 
what is left unsaid.”TPF319 FPT He also points out that the principle of stare decisis helps courts 
produce incompletely theorised agreements as people can agree to follow precedent when 
they disagree on almost everything else so that they do not need to constantly struggle over 
basic principle and “build the world again” every time a dispute arises.TPF320FPT 
 
To Sunstein, incompletely theorised agreements play a valuable part in a legal system. He 
lists the reasons that call for them as follows: First of all, incompletely theorised agreements 
could reduce the political cost of enduring disagreements. With it, losers in a particular case 
lose just a decision. Their own theory are not being rejected or ruled inadmissible. “When the 
authoritative rationale for the result is disconnected from abstract theories of the good or the 
right, the losers can submit to legal obligations, even if reluctantly, without being forced to 
renounce their largest ideals”. TPF321FPT Second, incompletely theorised agreements are valuable for 
us to seek for moral evolution over time by allowing a large degree of openness to new facts 
and perspectives. A completely theorised judgement would be too rigid to accommodate 
changes in facts and values. Thus, the Supreme Court tends to “decide[s] cases rather than to 
offer fully theorised accounts, partly because society’s understandings of facts and values, in 
a sense its very identity, may well shift in unpredictable ways.”TPF 322 FPT Third, incompletely 
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theorised agreements may be the best approach that is available for people of limited time 
and capacities, such as ordinary lawyers and judges, as they could resolve cases without 
spending too much energy to search for a full theorised legal conception. Fourth, 
incompletely theorised agreements are well-adapted to a system that should or must take 
precedents as fixed points. If a judge or a lawyer were to attempt to reach full theorisation, 
the unique role of precedents would be overlooked, resulting in many problems. Last but not 
least, incompletely theorised judgements are well-suited to a moral universe that is diverse 
and pluralistic. “Human morality recognises irreducibly diverse goods, which cannot be 
subsumed under a single ‘master’ value. The same is true for the moral values reflected in the 
law. Any simple, general, and monistic or single-valued theory of a large area of the law – 
free speech, contracts, property – is likely to be too crude to fit with our best understanding of 
the multiple values that are at stake in that area. It would be absurd to try to organise legal 
judgements through a single conception of value.”TPF 323 FPT Notably, although incompletely 
theorised agreements have so many significant advantages, Sunstein acknowledges that their 
virtues are partial. He admits that some cases cannot be decided at all or well without 
introducing a fair amount in the way of theory. Thus, he indicates, “If a good theory is 
available and if judges can be persuaded that the theory is good, there should be no taboo on 
its judicial acceptance. The claims on behalf of incompletely theorised agreements are 
presumptive rather than conclusive”.TPF324FPT 
 
Going further from his incompletely theorised agreements doctrine, Sunstein examines the 
minimalist method employed by the American Supreme Court. He finds that the judges 
frequently decide very little and leave things open when they answer some large 
constitutional questions. This practice of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, 
and leaving as much as possible undecided is described as “decisional minimalism”.TPF 325 FPT 
Sunstein believes that decisional minimalism has two attractive features. First, it is likely to 
reduce the burdens of judicial decision. Second, it is likely to make judicial errors less 
frequent and less damaging for a court that leave things open will not foreclose options in a 
way that may do a great deal of harm.TPF326FPT 
 
What Sunstein emphasises is the close connection between minimalism and democracy. He 
attempts to demonstrate that minimalism could produce democracy-promoting results. In his 
view, American constitutional system actually aspires to a system of deliberative democracy 
rather than simple majoritarianism. The most important characteristic of deliberative 
democracy is that it embodies a commitment to political equality and also to reason-giving in 
the public domain. “For the deliberative democrat, political outcomes cannot be supported by 
self-interest or force. ‘Naked preferences,’ in the form of legislation supported by power but 
not reasons, are forbidden. Existing judgments and desires must be made to survive a process 
of reflection and debate; they are not to be taken as sacrosanct or automatically translated into 
law.” TPF327FPT Sunstein suggests that certain forms of minimalism can be democracy-promoting, 
not only in the sense that they leave issues open for democratic deliberation, but also and 
more fundamentally in the sense that they promote reason-giving and ensure certain 
important decisions are made by democratically accountable actors. Sometimes, a court 
might decline to hear a case at all or to make a decision narrowly rather than broadly so as to 
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avoid foreclosure and allow democratically accountable bodies to function. Some other times, 
courts’ minimal decisions may provide spurs and prods to trigger or improve the process of 
democratic deliberation. Thus, Sunstein claims “democracy-promoting forms of minimalism, 
designed to promote both accountability and reason-giving, are appropriate and salutary 
judicial functions; they promote constitutional ideals without risking excessive judicial 
intervention into political domains.”TPF328FPT 
 
Sunstein also attempts to link the minimalist project with Bickel’s idea of “passive 
virtues”.TPF 329 FPT He thinks that the notion of “passive virtues” can be analysed in a more 
productive way if we see the notion as part of judicial minimalism and as an effort to increase 
space for democratic choice as well as to reduce the costs of decision and the costs of error. 
Passive virtues are exercised when a court refuses to assume jurisdiction based on the basic 
principles of justiciability such as mootness, ripeness, reviewability and standing. These 
principles serve to limit the occasions for judicial interference with political processes and 
thus minimise the judicial presence in public life. As a result, short-term decision costs and 
error costs will be reduced and the scope for democratic deliberation about the issue at hand 
will be increased. Sunstein believes that those who favour passive virtues, narrow decisions 
and incompletely theorised agreements tend to be humble about their own capacities. Since 
they know that they might be wrong, they attempt to decide cases in the hope that several 
different conceptions of the point can allow convergence on a particular outcome. Therefore, 
“judicial minimalism is rooted in a conception of liberty amid pluralism – a conception that is 
central to the democratic idea.”TPF330FPT 
 
In Sunstein’s view, judicial minimalism has a great deal in common with the form of political 
liberalism discussed by John Rawls, which is intended to ensure that diverse people, 
operating from their own foundational accounts, can converge on a range of basic principles, 
thus making it possible to achieve an “overlapping consensus” on those principles.TPF 331 FPT 
Sunstein believes that incompletely theorised agreements produced by minimalist courts 
allow people to live together amid intense disagreements. Thus social stability and a form of 
mutual respect in a heterogeneous society enjoying “reasonable pluralism” can be achieved. 
Political liberalism has similar goals. 
 
It must be noted that Sunstein also clearly acknowledges that there might be problems with 
minimalism. For instance, minimalism might be threatening the rule of law insofar as it does 
not ensure that decisions are announced in advance. It could also have negative effects on 
democracy. Thus, as Sunstein points out, minimalism is an appropriate course only in certain 
contexts. He points out that the choice between minimalism and the alternatives depend 
partly on pragmatic considerations and partly on judgments about the capacities of various 
institutional actors. 
 
Sunstein’s theory may provide a doctrinal foundation for Waluchow’s living tree model of 
Charter and judicial review. They both favour a way in which large issues are dealt with step 
by step and case by case. In other words, they embrace the “bottom up” methodology and are 
sceptics of the “top down” methodology. They value the process of moral evolution rather 
than merely staying at a fixed point in the process. They both seem to belong to the modest 
camp for they advocate being humble about what we do. They clearly know the limitation of 
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our capacity thus they do not think that pre-commitments or fully theorised judgements are 
favorable. However, minimalism seems not to be as limited as Waluchow’s common law 
conception. It can be employed beyond the common law system and be applied to the civil 
law system in an attempt to justify judicial review. It seems to me that Sunstein’s theory is of 
particular value for Hong Kong’s judicial practice. When first exercising its constitutional 
adjudication power in Ng Ka Ling,TPF332FPT the CFA appeared to be too ambitious. Rather than 
focusing on deciding the case at hand, the CFA attempted to produce a full theorised account 
of constitutional judicial review power of the courts of Hong Kong. Its controversial assertion 
of jurisdiction to scrutinise and strike down the actions of the National People’s Congress and 
its Standing Committee, which seems unnecessary for resolving the disputes at stake, 
provoked a constitutional crisis in Hong Kong and finally resulted in the CFA’s deference by 
clarifying that it had no intention to challenge the authority of the national legislature.TPF333FPT In 
my view, if the CFA could follow Sunstein’s suggestions of “incompletely theorised 
agreements” and “decisional minimalism”, it might play a better role in its constitutional 
interpretation activities, which would accord better with Hong Kong’s new constitutional 
order under China’s “one country, two systems” doctrine. 
 
Sunstein’s understanding of democracy, which could be promoted by minimalism and thus 
justify minimalism, is quite persuasive. To him, democracy does not necessarily mean simple 
majoritarianism. The conception of deliberative democracy introduced by him aspires not 
only to political equality but also reason-giving. Therefore, counter-majoritarianism is not 
necessarily equal to counter-democracy. Thereby the democratic legitimacy of judicial 
review might be saved as judicial review could in fact promote democracy despite it might be 
counter-majoritarian. In my opinion, the idea of deliberative democracy might be a 
constructive perspective from which Hong Kong’s on-going constitutional development – 
whose ultimate end is to achieve universal suffrage both in the election of the Chief 
Executive and the election of all the legislators, is observed. 
 
5 Ely’s Representation Reinforcing Approach 
 
Another theory defending judicial review by focusing on its function of democracy-ensuring 
is introduced by John Hart Ely in his famous book Democracy and Distrust.TPF334FPT Ely attempts 
to demonstrate the three popular avocations of judicial role in constitutional review, namely 
“interpretivism”, “originalism” and “textualism”, are impossible and might be harmful as 
strict construction would fail to do justice to the open texture of many of the Constitution’s 
provisions.TPF335FPT He also argues against the notion that judges may infer broad moral rights and 
values from the Constitution as he thinks that would be radically undemocratic.TPF336FPT Then Ely 
elaborates his own theory of judicial review which he believes is consistent with “the 
underlying democratic assumptions of our system” and “in fact constructed so as to enlist the 
courts in helping to make them a reality.”TPF337FPT 
 
Opposed to the traditional view of the function of judicial review which insists courts should 
provide a series of substantive goods or fundamental values, Ely’s argument suggests that 
courts’ decisions should be process-oriented – that is, to ensure that the political process 
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functions properly so that fundamental values could be properly identified, weighed and 
accommodated through it. Ely takes the Warren Court’s approach as an example. He points 
out that the themes of Warren Court’s famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co. TPF338FPT are concerned with participation. “They ask us to focus not on whether this or that 
substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the 
opportunity to participate either in the political processes by which values are appropriately 
identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has 
been unduly constricted.” TPF339FPT However, Ely acknowledges that these two sorts of participation 
may not be consistent, as “a system of equal participation in the processes of government is 
by no means self-evidently linked to a system of presumptively equal participation in the 
benefits and costs that process generates; in many ways it seems calculated to produce just 
the opposite effect.” TPF340 FPT To understand the ways they join together in a coherent political 
theory, he examines the American system of representative democracy. 
 
Ely indicates that a serious problem of representative democracy is that it does not ensure the 
effective protection of minorities and may lead to majority tyranny.TPF341FPT Thus, he thinks the 
documents of 1789 and 1791 adopt two major strategies in an attempt to overcome the 
problem. One is to list in the Bill of Rights things that cannot be done to anyone by the 
federal government. Another is a strategy of pluralism, one of structuring the government, 
and to a limited extent society generally, so that a variety of voices would be guaranteed to be 
heard and no majority coalition could dominate.TPF342 FPT However, these constitutional devices 
were still not sufficient for protecting minorities, as no finite list of entitlements can possibly 
cover all the ways majorities can tyrannise minorities and the informal and more formal 
mechanisms of pluralism cannot always be counted on either. Then the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was ratified, embodying the ideal that the 
representative should not sever his interests from those of a majority of his constituency and 
should also not sever a majority coalition’s interests from those of various minorities so that a 
refusal to represent minority groups could be precluded. In other words, the Fourteenth 
Amendment quite plainly imposes a judicially enforceable duty of virtual representation of 
the sort that Ely describes. Taking the landmark case of McCulloch v. MarylandTPF 343 FPT for 
example, Ely demonstrates that even before the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Supreme Court was prepared at least under certain conditions to protect the interests of 
minorities that were not literally voteless by constitutionally tying their interests to those of 
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groups that did possess political power and by intervening to protect such interests when it 
appeared that such a guarantee of “virtual representation” was not being provided.TPF344FPT In Ely’s 
opinion, the Court’s discussion in McCulloch “suggests by its reference to the property taxes 
the clear assumption of even that early day that representatives were expected to represent the 
entirety of their constituencies without arbitrarily severing disfavoured minorities for 
comparatively unfavourable treatment. And it suggests by its invalidation of the bank 
operations tax its further assumption that at least in some situations judicial intervention 
becomes appropriate when the existing processes of representation seem inadequately fitted 
to the representation of minority interests, even minority interests that are not voteless.”TPF345FPT 
Thus Ely believes the two conflicting American ideals – the protection of popular 
government on the one hand, and the protection of minorities from denials of equal concern 
and respect on the other – can be understood as arising from a common duty of representation. 
One of the courts’ significant functions is policing the process of representation. Therefore 
Ely asserts that judicial review should be participation-oriented and representation-
reinforcing. 
 
Ely provides three arguments in favour of the participation-oriented and representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review. First, he examines the nature of the American 
Constitution and reveals that the primary theme of the Constitution is not to state general 
values. Actually, Ely thinks the selection and accommodation of substantive values is left 
almost entirely to the political process. He indicates that instead the Constitution is 
overwhelmingly concerned both with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual 
disputes and with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of 
government.TPF346FPT In other words, the Constitution pursues its substantial concern of preserving 
liberty “by a quite extensive set of procedural protections, and by a still more elaborate 
scheme designed to ensure that in the making of substantive choices the decision process will 
be open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with the decision-makers held to a 
duty to take into account the interests of all those their decisions affect.”TPF347FPT Ely points out the 
underlying assumption of the Constitution’s strategy is that by structuring decision-making 
processes at all levels to try to ensure everyone’s interests to be actually or virtually 
represented, and the processes of individual application would not be manipulated, and 
majority tyranny could be effectively avoided therefore the interests of minorities could be 
protected.TPF 348 FPT Second, Ely argues that, unlike an approach of judicial review based on 
discovering fundamental values, the representation-reinforcing orientation approach is 
perfectly consistent with the American system of representative democracy. “It recognises the 
unacceptability of the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of 
conventional values than elected representatives, devoting itself instead to policing the 
mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually 
represent.”TPF 349 FPT Third and final, Ely thinks the representation-reinforcing approach assigns 
judges a role they are conspicuously well situated to fill. Lawyers and judges are experts on 
both process writ small and process writ larger. More importantly, unlike elected 
representatives, appointed judges are comparative outsiders in the governmental system and 
need not worry about continuance in office as much, and this puts them in a position 
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objectively to assess claims.TPF350FPT Therefore, Ely believes that by employing the approach he 
recommended, judges can play a significant role in resolving the inherent problems of 
representative democracy – that is, choking off the channels of political change and the 
danger of majority tyranny.TPF351FPT 
 
Interestingly, Ely’s theory can be compared with Waluchow’s common law conception. As 
we know, Waluchow’s analysis is based on the fact of Canada’s adoption of a Charter and its 
enforcement by the judiciary. This sort of judicial review is necessarily concerned with 
fundamental rights or values. Waluchow believes that courts can serve as an indispensable 
chain in the process of evolution of these substantive rights and values, TPF352FPT but he leaves a 
significant part of the constitution that is in relation to such provisions as structuring the 
government, distributing powers and relevant judicial review out of consideration. 
Conversely, Ely does not take into account the courts’ role in implementing a Charter or bill 
of rights, which is an essential element of modern constitutional law in many countries. He 
insists that judicial review can appropriately concern itself only with questions of 
participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack. Put 
simply, Ely’s analysis is process-oriented while Waluchow’s is centred on substantive rights 
enforcement. The main reason of Ely’s losing sight of this important respect of judicial 
review might be that in his times in the end of 1970s and early 1980s, courts did not play 
such an active part in safeguarding human rights as they do today. Nowadays, with the fast 
development of human rights awareness and adoption of bill of rights in constitutional law by 
more and more countries, to deal with human rights cases has become a significant task of 
judicial review. Although it seems that Ely’s theory does not provide a sufficient explanation 
to our concern in this regard of judicial review, his stressing of the role of courts in policing 
the political process may enlighten our later exploration of the role of the Hong Kong 
Judiciary in the political life of the HKSAR, such as what part the courts could and should 
play in Hong Kong’s democratisation process, and what relationship should be established 
between the courts of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong political branches, so on and so forth. 
Actually, Ely’s view seems in consistent with Bickel’s assertion of “passive virtues” and 
Sunstein’s “decisional minimalism” in the sense that they all believe that courts are by no 
means omnipotent and should focus on what courts should do. Their views about courts’ role 
may be illuminated by the famous saying of Jesus – “Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, 
and to God what belongs to God”.TPF353FPT 
 
6 From “Difficulty” to “Dialogue” 
 
So far the theories we have discussed which try to defend the legitimacy of judicial review by 
suggesting an appropriate judicial role are normative and based on an assumption that there 
actually exists such a thing as “counter-majoritarian difficulty” needs to be addressed. Now 
we move to a kind of arguments which attempts to subvert the very premises of “counter-
majoritarian difficulty”. They are the theories of constitutional dialogue. The dialogue 
theorists emphasise that “the judiciary does not (as an empirical matter) nor should not (as a 
normative matter) have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Rather, when exercising 
the power of judicial review, judge engage in an interactive, interconnected and dialectical 
conversation about constitutional meaning. In short, constitutional judgements are, or ideally 
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should be, produced through a process of shared elaboration between the judiciary and other 
constitutional actors.”TPF354FPT As Christine Bateup comments, theories of constitutional dialogue 
“offer an alternative way of filling the legitimacy lacuna, because if the political branches of 
government and the people are able to respond to judicial decisions in a dialogic fashion, the 
force of the countermajoritarian difficulty is overcome, or at the very least, greatly 
attenuated.”TPF355FPT Because the theories of constitutional dialogue abound, my discussion will 
focus on a descriptive and creative one represented by Professor Barry Friedman. Although 
Friedman’s account is set in the American constitutional context, in my view his 
argumentation and the essence of his discovery have the value of being applied to analysing 
the courts’ constitutional interpretative role in other jurisdictions. 
 
Friedman believes that the never ending attempts of legitimatising judicial review after 
Bickel raised the question have obviously failed to persuade, because “the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and the premise supporting it do not rest upon an accurate 
portray of the constitutional system we actually enjoy.”TPF356FPT Thus, he thinks such scholarly 
work has consumed the academy and distracted scholars from recognising and studying the 
actual constitutional system. Friedman offers a very different description of American 
constitutionalism. He points out that the process of constitutional interpretation that actually 
occurs does not set electorally accountable (and thus legitimate) government against 
unaccountable (and thus illegitimate) courts. Rather, to him, the everyday process of 
constitutional interpretation integrates all three branches of government: executive, legislative, 
and judicial. The Constitution is interpreted on a daily basis through an elaborate dialogue as 
to its meaning, and the actual role of judicial review is dialogic. Courts play a unique role in 
facilitating and molding a society-wide constitutional dialogue so that the document takes on 
meaning. TPF357FPT In other words, courts are seen as promoters of, and participants in, a national 
dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution. 
 
Friedman’s argument proceeds in three steps. First of all, he challenges the basic notion that 
courts and judicial review are counter-majoritarian and attempts to demonstrate that courts 
are not systematically less majoritarian than the political branches of government. In fact, he 
indicates “courts do not trump majority will, or remain unaccountable to majority sentiment, 
nearly to the extent usually depicted. Measured by a realistic baseline of majoritarianism, 
courts are relatively majoritarian.”TPF 358 FPT To start his examination, Friedman sets out some 
benchmarks of majoritarianism against which judicial review can be measured. They include 
substance majoritarianism and process majoritarianism. Substance majoritarianism in turn has 
two measures: results and sources.TPF359FPT His examination of source majoritarianism indicates 
that courts often rely on majoritarian sources in interpreting constitutional guarantee.TPF360FPT As 
for result majoritarian, Friedman points out public opinion polls establish that, contrary to 
common thought, judicial decisions often enjoy substantial public support; and even the most 
controversial judicial decisions often obtain popular support from a majority or a substantial 
plurality, although there may be sharp disagreement nationally on these issues.TPF 361 FPT When 
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assessing process majoritarianism question of accountability, Friedman reveals that the 
judiciary is much more accountable than it appears. He points out: many state judges in the 
United States are elected; although federal judges are not elected, they are appointed by the 
President who stands for popular election and judicial appointments often mirror the popular 
will that elected the President; the confirmation process for federal judges ensures that they 
are in the mainstream of popular views.TPF362FPT Responding to the complaint of judges’ life tenure, 
Friedman claims that this complaint makes the fundamental mistake of assessing institutional 
accountability with reference to the selection and retention of individual institutional actors, 
rather than looking at the institution as a whole. “True, judges decide individual cases (just as 
senators make individually important decisions). But for matters of serious public moment, 
decisions are made by the judiciary as a whole. Matters of policy treated by the judiciary 
bubble up through a judicial system until agreement is reached. Really important questions 
are decided not by one court, but by several – often many. As a question advances through 
tiers of review, the judicial bodies become less monolithic and more collegial, with individual 
district judges giving way to appellate panels. Decisions depend not on one judges, but on a 
collection of ‘representatives’”.TPF363FPT Therefore, he believes the judiciary as an institution does 
appear responsive to majoritarian will, not only with regard to substantive results, but from a 
process perspective as well. 
 
Friedman’s second strategy is to challenge the assumptions underlying the very foundations 
of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. He indicates that the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
rests on two premises: one is a bedrock principle that constitutional government is 
accountable to the people, and another is that judicial review conflicts with this principle. 
They in turn rely on two highly contestable assumptions: majority will which can be 
represented by government decisions does exist; and judicial decisions are final and thus 
trump such will. Friedman shows that neither of these assumptions is correct. Firstly, in his 
view, there is actually no identifiable majority will in reality. Majorities come and go as the 
public engages in debate. At best there is a constantly shifting tide of public opinion. “The 
political process cannot possibly reflect individuals’ and society’s constantly changing 
preferences. More likely, a governmental choice is the result of structured decision-making 
that represents ‘majority will’ only after ruling out many choices many people would have 
preferred.”TPF364FPT Therefore, Friedman claims the assumption that there is a majority whose will 
is embodied in governmental decisions is overstated and thus the first foundation of counter-
majoritarian difficulty sinks. Secondly, Friedman points out that the assumption of judicial 
finality seriously overstates the impact of a judicial decision. In his opinion, a judicial 
decision is an important word on any subject, but it is not necessarily the last word. He 
indicates that there is a continuum of non-enforecement of judicial decrees and he takes 
executive clemency and defiance as examples. As for the “lawsaying” function of the courts, 
Friedman thinks that civil disobedience can and does undermine the finality of the relevant 
decisions. Moreover, the function of state legislatures continually passing laws that slid 
around, sought to narrow, and even blatantly challenge the Supreme Court’s decision could 
make it change its mind.TPF365FPT Because the judicial word is not the last word, Friedman believes 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty loses forces. After accusing counter-majoritarian 
difficulty’s premises of inaccurately describing the American constitutionalism, Friedman 
puts forward his own ideas. They are: government operates not to represent a majority but to 
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hear and integrate the voices of many different constituencies;TPF366FPT the constitutional text is 
spacious enough to accommodate the several interpretations inevitably offered by shifting 
consitituencies; and that the process of constitutional interpretation is dynamic, not static, 
giving primacy to different interpretations at different times. TPF367FPT 
 
Finally, Friedman offers his own description of the judicial role in the U.S. constitutional 
system, that is, the dialogue theory. According to his opinions, the Constitution is not 
interpreted by aloof judges imposing their will on the people; rather, constitutional 
interpretation is an elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic.TPF368FPT Courts are 
not merely an active participant in the debate over the Constitution’s meaning. More 
importantly, they facilitate and shape the constitutional debate. Courts act as go-betweens in 
the dialogue, synthesising society’s views on constitutional meaning, causing, focusing, 
shaping, moderating and tending the debate, giving voice and body to the dialogue, and 
prodding other institutions to speak.TPF369FPT Courts mediate the views of various people in this 
dialogue process. The process is interactive, and the ultimate result depends on participation 
by all interested parties. Thus judicial review can hardly be accused of being against the 
people. As to the worry that the dialogic view permits judges to do anything, Friedman points 
out that the dialogue does constrain judges. The constraint is internal for it is produced by the 
political system surrounding judges. “When judges stray too far from the mark, pressures 
build – in judicial appointments and in political rhetoric – to bring them back into line. The 
dialogic protection is that the judiciary, or the people – always are struggling to achieve 
convergence. The constraint is inherent in the judicial process rather than external to it. The 
people will follow judicial decrees so long as the judges seem right. When the judges no 
longer appear to be correct, the people will press for judicial change. Intuitively, at least, the 
judges know this.”TPF370FPT Friedman believes his dialogue theory is a more accurate description of 
the reality of American constitutionalism, sidestepping the faulty premises of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty and integrating the triple virtues of spaciousness, dynamism, and 
constituency representation. In his belief, it can legitimatise judicial review with a solid 
foundation. 
 
Although Hong Kong’s constitutional context is very different from that of the United States, 
Friedman’s description can be used to reveal the similar role of the courts of Hong Kong to 
some extent and thereby justify their adjudicative activities. In fact, the courts of Hong Kong 
have played a significant part in provoking, facilitating or promoting public debates over 
many sensitive constitutional issues since the Basic Law came into force. The theory of 
constitutional dialogue does seem to be an appropriate articulation of the function of the 
courts of Hong Kong in the sense of “facilitating and molding a societywide constitutional 
dialogue so that the document takes on meaning.”TPF371FPT More importantly, from the angle of 
improving institutional dialogue, the theory may be a constructive standard for defining and 
building a cooperative relationship and harmonious interactions not only between the 
judiciary and other governmental branches in Hong Kong, but also between the Hong Kong 
judiciary and central government authorities in Beijing. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The above theoretical exploration of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and 
advisable judicial role from selected scholars will serve as doctrinal tools for the analysis of 
the performance of the CFA in Hong Kong under China’s “one country, two systems” policy 
in the next chapters. Although these theories may not fit the context of Hong Kong and China 
directly and exactly, and comprise just a selection of the thoughts about the contribution to 
the legitimacy debate, there are still apparent benefits from considering them, as they can 
provide us with a comparative theoretical framework and thus a fresh perspective to look at 
the case of Hong Kong. Analysis of existing theoretical explorations can help us to obtain a 
more apprehensive illumination and explanation not only of the CFA’s work but also of the 
constitutional order within which the CFA operates. A better understanding of the CFA’s 
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Jurisdictional Competence: Controversies over Constitutional Review,  





A court’s jurisdiction delimits its role in a constitutional order. What status the Court of Final 
Appeal (“CFA” or “the Court”) enjoys and what part it could play under the “one country, 
two systems” principle depend largely on the power and competence that can be actually 
enjoyed and employed by the Court in its legal practice. An exploration of issues relating to 
the Court’s jurisdictional competence of constitutional significance could therefore itself be 
an effective way of illuminating the Court’s constitutional role. It is also an appropriate 
starting point for our further investigation of the Court’s performance. Three issues will be 
discussed in the chapter. All concern the question of how the legal system of Hong Kong 
correctly positions itself properly with regard to the power of the central institutions. They 
can demonstrate the dilemma of the CFA standing at the interface between the two legal 
systems, namely, the common law system in a subordinate Hong Kong and the civil law or 
socialist system in the predominate mainland China. That dilemma might be an inherent 
problem faced by the CFA under China’s “one country, two systems” constitutional 
framework, as it is indeed a settlement based on a huge asymmetry between a tiny 
autonomous Hong Kong and an immense powerful mainland China.  
 
Firstly, we will debate the CFA’s capability of reviewing the constitutionality of the local 
legislation, executive actions, as well as the legislative acts of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC). We will begin by looking at Hong Kong 
courts’ previous practice of constitutional adjudication under British colonial rule. Then the 
development and change after the return to China will be investigated, primarily by looking 
at its new legal and constitutional foundation and the CFA’s relevant leading decisions. It 
will be argued that Hong Kong courts, including the CFA, have no competence to examine 
the NPC and NPCSC’s legislative acts while they do have jurisdiction to scrutinise the local 
legislative and executive acts’ consistency with the Basic Law provisions which are within 
the Region’s autonomy. The implications of constitutional judicial review for the Hong Kong 
internal political and constitutional order as well as the resulting question of legitimacy will 
be explored. Secondly, we will consider the CFA’s role in interpreting the Basic Law. Those 
will be analyzed include the constitutional rules, the interpretative approaches, the tests for 
judicial reference, and the attitude and philosophy which have been established and 
developed by the CFA, as well as the NPSCS’s stance, and the Chief Executive’s possible 
influence in this respect. Some European Union (EU)’s experiences, particularly the practice 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)’s preliminary reference procedure, will be 
investigated specifically, for that procedure is the origin of the drafting of the Basic Law’s 
interpretative mechanism and its actual function may thus offer some helpful insights for 
Hong Kong courts to deal with the reference issue of the Basic Law. Thirdly, the exclusion of 
the CFA’s jurisdiction by the concept of “acts of state” will be discussed. By comparing with 
English common law’s doctrine of “act of state”, it will prove that China’s version imposes 
much more restriction on the CFA’s capacity. By exploring these issues, I shall demonstrate 
that the CFA’s unique position under China’s “one country, two systems” constitutional order 
makes it extremely important for it to be modest and self-restrained when dealing with affairs 
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involving the constitutional relationship between the Central Government and the Region. In 
my view, Hong Kong courts, especially the CFA, should serve not only Hong Kong’s 
autonomy but also the national interest when exercising their constitutional jurisdiction. 
 
2 Constitutional Judicial Review 
 
The CFA’s jurisdiction of constitutional review, which refers to the Court’s competence to 
examine the compatibility of legislation or executive actions with the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong, is of great controversy, for there is no provision in the Basic Law expressly granting it 
such a power. However, to scrutinise the constitutionality of actions of the legislature and 
executive is a common practice in most of the common law jurisdictions with a written 
constitution. This may be the reason why the majority of Hong Kong judges, legal 
professions, academic lawyers and politicians are not opposed to Hong Kong courts’ claim 
and exercise of such a power. Even the Hong Kong government, whose actions are frequently 
challenged by various litigants through constitutional judicial review since reunification, has 
not shown any doubt about the courts’ jurisdiction in this regard when arguing its cases 
before them. Actually the Secretary for Justice, Mr Wong Yan Lung, attempted to defend and 
justify Hong Kong courts’ exercising this power before the officials of the Central 
Government during his first visit to Beijing.TPF 372 FPT Conversely, some leading scholars in 
mainland China tend to deny that the courts in HKSAR have this power.TPF373FPT Particularly, they 
firmly oppose the opinion that Hong Kong courts enjoy the competence to review the acts of 
NPC or its standing committee. However, notably, as for the Hong Kong commentators, most 
of them acknowledge that the courts in HKSAR do have the jurisdiction of constitutional 
review over the local legislation and executive actions, but there is no consensus among them 
on whether the courts are competent to examine the acts of the national legislature.TPF374FPT 
 
2.1 The Practice before Handover 
 
Those denying Hong Kong courts’ power of constitutional review support their argument by 
claiming that before 1997 when governed by Britain Hong Kong courts were not allowed to 
strike down legislation, especially the legislation passed by British Parliament due to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. After 1997, they argued, the courts in HKSAR should 
have the same jurisdictional restriction according to art.19 of the Basic Law.TPF375FPT So in order to 
clarify the question, it is necessary to find out the actual history of Hong Kong courts’ 
relevant jurisdiction in the era of British rule, which would be inherited by the courts of 
HKSAR after handover.  
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Under British colonial rule, especially before 1991 when the Bill of Rights was enacted, in 
practice Hong Kong courts did not claim and exercise the so-called jurisdiction of 
constitutional review to strike down legislation or executive acts according to Hong Kong’s 
written constitutional documents of that time, although they did examine and invalidate 
executive acts in accordance with statute or common law standards. In theory, however, 
Hong Kong courts did have the jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of local 
legislation and executive acts by reference to the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, which 
served as a constitution for colonial Hong Kong.TPF376FPT Hong Kong courts could also strike down 
any Ordinance passed by the local legislature which was repugnant to a British Act of 
Parliament applicable to Hong Kong.TPF377FPT However, in practice, no significant case on the issue 
actually arose probably because of the lack of normative content in the Letters Patent and 
Royal Instructions, that is, without detailed and enforceable provisions, the two documents 
appear to be too simple and vague to be employed by litigants to argue for their cases before 
the courts.  
 
The situation changed significantly after 1991 when a Hong Kong bill of rights ordinance 
was enacted by Hong Kong Legislature to adopt the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Letters Patent were accordingly amended to provide that no 
local law could be made to restrict the rights and freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong in a 
manner which was inconsistent with the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. TPF378FPT This played a 
significant role in awaking the courts to start performing their constitutional review function 
actively and substantially by providing them with the newly more practical constitutional 
standards. With these weapons, the courts boldly invalidated some provisions in local 
legislation, such as in the Dangerous Drug Ordinance, the Fire Arms and Ammunition 
Ordinance and Election Law 1994, on the ground that these provisions were not in 
conformity with the criteria provided by Hong Kong Bill of Rights and ICCPR.TPF379FPT By doing 
so the courts confirmed their constitutional review jurisdiction, claiming they had the power 
to examine and strike down any Hong Kong regional legislation breaching the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance and ICCPR. 
 
The more difficult question is whether the colonial Hong Kong courts were allowed to 
examine the validity of legislation passed by British Parliament which was applied to Hong 
Kong. It seems unimaginable for Hong Kong courts to do that as generally even the British 
courts themselves lacked such jurisdiction due to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.TPF380FPT Based on this doctrine and Hong Kong’s colonial status as well, in HKSAR v 
David Ma,TPF381 FPT the counsel for HKSAR government argued that prior to 1st July 1997 the 
Hong Kong courts could not have determined the constitutionality of either UK metropolitan 
or imperial legislation vis-à-vis either the unwritten British Constitution or the Hong Kong 
Letters Patent, and if the British Parliament legislated on a topic, the colonial courts were 
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bound by that. Chan CJHC was convinced and agreed that Hong Kong courts had no power 
to challenge the validity of acts passed by the British Parliament or acts of the Queen in 
Council. However, he believed that they did have the jurisdiction to “at least examine 
whether such legislation or imperial act existed, what its scope was and whether what was 
done in Hong Kong was done in pursuance of such legislation or imperial act.”TPF382 FPT Chan 
CJHC’s acceptance of the counsel’s arguments was criticised. Professor Yash Ghai pointed 
out that it was not true that colonial courts could not review legislative acts of Britain by 
providing examples of Abeyeskera v Jayatalike TPF 383 FPT and Sammut v StricklandTPF 384 FPT .TPF 385 FPT Mr. 
Johannes Chan further pointed out that before changeover the doctrine of supremacy of 
parliament did not apply fully to Hong Kong and since the promulgation of the Hong Kong 
(Legislative Power) Orders 1986 and 1989, Hong Kong courts may declare an UK Act 
applied to Hong Kong repealed if it was inconsistent with a Hong Kong statute in certain 
defined areas such as civil aviation, merchant shipping, admiralty jurisdiction and 
implementation of an international treaty which applies to Hong Kong.TPF386FPT In fact, it seems 
that, although in theory there did exist some rare exceptions as Professors Ghai and Chan 
mentioned, generally Hong Kong courts in the era of British rule did not have, or at least did 
not exercise, the power of reviewing British legislation. This must be the case. Otherwise the 
experienced Chief Judge of the Court of Appeal in Ma would not have made a conclusion 
that “It would be difficult to imagine that the Hong Kong courts could, while still under 
British rule, challenge the validity of an Act of Parliament passed in U.K. or an act of the 
Queen in Council which had effect on Hong Kong.” TPF387FPT 
 
When we look at the previous constitutional jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts, an important 
element must be borne in mind. That is, the courts of colonial Hong Kong had no power of 
final adjudication. The British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London served as 
Hong Kong’s court of final appeal. That means, even if the Hong Kong courts were bold 
enough to assert and employ the constitutional review power to examine and repeal the 
legislation enacted by the British Parliament applied to Hong Kong, such power and the 
results of its exercise were still subject to the Privy Council’s examination. In other words, 
the Privy Council had the privilege, subject to the law of course, to confirm, alter, restrict or 
even abolish Hong Kong courts’ such jurisdiction and their decisions based on it when a 
relevant case was appealed to the Privy Council. 
 
2.2 Are Hong Kong Courts Competent to Review Acts of the NPC and NPCSC? 
 
After 1997 Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of China, being granted a 
high degree of autonomy. The Basic Law was enacted by NPC to serve as a written 
constitution for HKSAR. The Court of Final Appeal was established to replace the role of 
Privy Council as the supreme court of HKSAR to exercise the power of final adjudication 
which was newly gained by the Region. The previous common law system was maintained. 
Under the new constitutional order, what are the changes in Hong Kong courts’ constitutional 
review jurisdiction?  
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Shortly after reunification, the question was raised in David Ma.TPF388FPT In this case the litigant 
contended that the common law had not survived the handover by arguing that its survival 
required a positive act of adoption by the NPC or NPCSC but there was no such an act at all. 
Moreover, the validity of the Reunification Ordinance, which had been enacted by Hong 
Kong’s Provisional Legislative Council (PLC) and served to adopt the previous laws, 
including the common law, was also challenged primarily on the ground that the NPC’s very 
decision of establishing the PLC itself was unconstitutional. To handle these sensitive issues, 
the courts (the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal) must first ensure their own 
competence. Relying on art.19 of the Basic Law, the courts assumed the jurisdiction to 
examine the constitutionality of laws enacted by Hong Kong Legislative Council, without 
any objection from HKSAR government. Conversely, as far as the acts of central legislature, 
namely, the NPC and NPCSC, was concerned, the Court of Appeal (not the CFA) was 
convinced by government counsel and held that the courts in HKSAR had no power to 
challenge the validity of the NPC Decisions or Resolutions or the reasons behind them, on the 
ground that there was no legal basis for regional courts to query the validity of any legislation 
or acts passed by the sovereign.TPF 389 FPT It came to this conclusion from an analogy of the 
relationship between HKSAR and China with that between colonial Hong Kong and the UK. 
However, the court took the view that the HKSAR courts do have the jurisdiction to examine 
the existence (as opposed to the validity) of the acts of the Sovereign or its delegate.TPF390FPT 
 
Two years later, the Court of Appeal’s opinion in David Ma was reversed by the CFA in Ng 
Ka Ling. TPF391FPT In its decision, the CFA unequivocally asserted the constitutional jurisdiction of 
the courts in HKSAR. It declared that the courts “undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to 
examine whether legislation enacted by the legislature of the Region or acts of the executive 
authorities of the Region are consistent with the Basic Law and, if found to be inconsistent, to 
hold them to be invalid. The exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter of obligation, not of 
discretion…” TPF392FPT As for the constitutional jurisdiction over the legislative acts of NPC and its 
Standing Committee, the CFA thought that the Court of Appeal’s view in Ma was wrong as 
its analogy with the old order was misconceived because the new constitutional order of 
HKSAR was fundamentally different from that prior to its return to China.TPF 393 FPT While 
acknowledging acts of NPC and NPCSC were acts of sovereignty, the CFA claimed that the 
jurisdiction of the Region’s courts to examine their acts to ensure consistency with the Basic 
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Law was derived precisely from the Sovereign in that the NPC had enacted the Basic Law for 
the Region pursuant to Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution. Thus the restrictions of Hong 
Kong courts’ jurisdiction in the colonial era could not apply to HKSAR’s courts after July 1, 
1997. Therefore, the CFA held, the courts of the Region did have jurisdiction and indeed the 
duty to examine any legislative acts of the NPC or NPCSC to ensure their consistency with 
the Basic Law and to declare them to be invalid if found to be inconsistent.TPF394FPT  
 
The CFA’s bold assertion seemed to be a gamble. If it was lucky enough to attract no serious 
reaction from the sensitive central authorities, the judgment would stand as one of great 
historic significance in Hong Kong’s legal history. It may thus be called Hong Kong’s 
“Marbury v. Madison”TPF395FPT, a leading case decided by the Supreme Court of USA in 1803 and 
creating the system of constitutional judicial review in America. However, the CFA’s venture 
was unacceptable to Beijing. Under great political pressure, the CFA eventually had to, 
unprecedentedly, give a clarification of its judgment to state that it cannot question the 
authority of the NPC and NPCSC to “do any act which is in accordance with the provisions 
of the Basic Law and the procedure therein [emphasis added]” TPF 396 FPT Thereby the central 
government’s unhappiness was appeased. However, it could be argued that the clarification 
had no substantial change to what the CFA had said in Ng Ka ling regarding its constitutional 
jurisdiction over the national legislature. Indeed, it did not recede from its original position as 
it apparently implied that it had the power to question any act of NPC or its Standing 
Committee which was not in accordance with the Basic Law. Although there were no clear 
words about who had the power to determine whether an act of the NPC or its Standing 
Committee was in accordance with the Basic Law or not, it seemed that the CFA presumed 
that this jurisdiction would be logically enjoyed by the courts in HKSAR. 
 
Actually, we cannot say that the CFA’s reasoning for its assertion of constitutional 
jurisdiction over the acts of the NPC and NPCSC is flawless. Firstly, its legal basis appears 
fragile. The CFA’s conclusion is mainly based on its understanding of the nature of the Basic 
Law. It pointed out that the Basic Law was enacted by the sovereign, namely, the NPC, for 
HKSAR pursuant to Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution. The Basic Law is a national law 
but the constitution of the Region. No law should be allowed to be inconsistent with the Basic 
Law. The courts in HKSAR had the jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the Basic Law. 
These points, to the CFA, entailed the courts’ jurisdiction to scrutinise whether acts of the 
NPC and its Standing Committee were consistent with the Basic Law.TPF397FPT However, it must be 
noted that in fact there is no provision in the Basic Law expressly granting such a jurisdiction 
to the courts of HKSAR or any other court. The Basic Law is a law of devolution. TPF398 FPT It 
delegates authority from Beijing to the Special Administrative Region. The powers enjoyed 
by the Hong Kong authorities must be clearly listed in the text of the Basic Law.TPF399FPT Unlike 
federal constitutional arrangements, Hong Kong’s new constitutional order under China’s 
“one country, two systems” does not recognise that the Region possesses any residuary 
power. TPF400FPT On the contrary, the so called residuary powers are claimed to be enjoyed by the 
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Central Government.TPF401FPT Additionally, it is firmly believed in China that under a unitary state 
a regional court has certainly no competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-
Kompetenz). So, if there is no provision in the Basic Law plainly granting Hong Kong courts 
the constitutional jurisdiction over the acts of NPC and NPCSC, it points very persuasively to 
the direction that Hong Kong courts do not have that power indeed.  
 
Moreover, the actual status of the Basic Law within China’s legal system may further 
demonstrate the weakness of the CFA’s claim. As we mentioned, the CFA inferred its 
constitutional jurisdiction over the acts of the sovereign from the provisions of Basic Law. 
But within the Chinese legal order, the Basic Law, an ordinary statute, is incompetent to 
distribute such an important power as to restrict acts of NPC and its Standing Committee. 
Despite enjoying a constitutional law status in HKSAR, the Basic Law is merely an ordinary 
national statute within the national system of laws. It possesses the same status as other 
ordinary national basic statutes enacted by the NPC, such as the Criminal Law, the Civil Law, 
and the Administrative Law, so on and so forth. Under Chinese constitutional order, the NPC 
is the highest organ of state power and NPCSC is its permanent body.TPF402FPT They are above all 
the other state institutions, including the Central Government (the State Council), the 
Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Central Military 
Commission. The functions and powers of the NPC and NPCSC are enumerated by Chinese 
Constitution.TPF403 FPT That means any attempt to change or restrict their functions and powers 
cannot be realised by merely enacting an ordinary statute. Instead, you must amend the 
Constitution. To give the courts of HKSAR the constitutional jurisdiction over acts of NPC 
and NPCSC apparently amounts to a substantial restriction of the functions and powers of the 
NPC and NPCSC granted by Chinese Constitution. Except by amending the Constitution, the 
Basic Law as an ordinary basic statute cannot make such a distribution of powers. Otherwise, 
it would usurp the role of the Chinese Constitution. Thus, it seems impossible that the 
drafters of the Basic Law might have intended to give constitutional jurisdiction to the courts 
in HKSAR to examine and invalidate the acts of NPC and NPCSC. The CFA’s reliance on 
the Basic Law to claim the courts of HKSAR enjoy that jurisdiction therefore seems wrong 
due to its misunderstanding of the status of the Basic Law within China’s legal order and 
ignorance of the legislative intent of the Basic Law. 
 
However, some may argue that rather than substantial restrictions, the Basic Law can provide 
manner and form requirements for the acts of NPC or NPCSC such as the procedures for 
interpreting or amending the Basic Law. TP F404 FPT Yes, that is the case indeed, but it does not 
necessarily mean that the NPC and NPCSC’s observance of those manner and form 
requirements should be subject to Hong Kong courts’ examination. If that had been the 
intention of the drafters, they should have written it expressly in the Basic Law. Even if they 
have put that in the Basic Law expressly, as an ordinary national statute provision, its 
constitutionality is still questionable due to China’s principle of congressional supremacy 
(discussed in Chapter 2), under which Chinese judiciary is not capable of reviewing 
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legislative acts of the national parliament,TPF405FPT say, the NPC and the NPCSC. Interestingly, 
there is indeed a provision in the Basic Law, art.159(3), attempting to substantially restrict 
the NPC’s competence by providing that “[n]o amendment to this Law shall contravene the 
established basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong”.TPF 406 FPT 
Actually, as Mr. Bing Ling has argued, the NPC represents the sovereign will of the people of 
China and thus the NPC of today has no power to so limit the will of the people of tomorrow 
that a future NPC cannot repeal or amend a particular law, “[t]o allow the NPC to bind its 
future successors on substantive matters would be repugnant to the sovereign status of the 
people who must be absolutely free to make whatever decisions on whatever matters the 
people (through the NPC) may deem appropriate at any given time.” TPF 407 FPT Therefore, the 
constitutionality of art.159 (3) is questionable. It appears to be of no legal binding effect on a 
future NPC when it deals with such an issue. 
 
 The other important element which has been largely ignored by the commentators is that, 
under the Chinese constitutional framework, legal and political culture, and reality, to allow 
regional courts to question the acts of sovereignty is just as unrealistic as a day dream, for in 
the eyes of the mainland China authorities and even Chinese academia, it is naturally wrong 
and absolutely unacceptable to do that. Therefore, how could it be the intent of the Basic Law 
which was enacted by the Chinese highest legislature to allocate such an important power to 
the courts of HKSAR without any signs of clearly saying so? You can imagine, if the CFA 
really persistently declares an act of NPC or NPCSC invalid by alleging it contravenes the 
Basic Law, will the central authorities accept that and act according to what the CFA decides? 
The answer is certainly negative. In China, a correct political stance is probably more 
important than legal correctness to courts. According to China’s dominant socialist legal 
jurisprudence, law is conceived as the instrument to realise political ends.TPF408FPT It is still hard for 
law to prevail over politics. In China, we may say that politics is the master of law and law is 
the servant of politics. Therefore, regarding such important political principles as the 
superiority of the NPC and the dignity of acts of sovereignty, there seems to be little space for 
Beijing to compromise. It can be expected that such a judgment of the CFA could not be 
respected, implemented and tolerated by the central authorities. The Central Government 
would use its entire means to strike down the challenge of the CFA. In extreme cases, 
arguably, even the power of final adjudication could be taken back by the Central 
Government by amending the Basic Law. Under such a political reality, for Hong Kong 
courts to deal with this kind of sensitive issue, therefore, disclaiming jurisdiction, rather than 
expanding its power with rigid stance and aggressive attitude which will inevitably attract 
attack from the central authorities, would be more favourable for the independence of the 
judiciary and the autonomy of the Region. 
 
2.3 Constitutional Review of Regional Legislation and Executive Actions 
 
The constitutional jurisdiction of the courts in HKSAR over regional legislative and 
executive acts raises fewer legitimacy questions. In fact, there have been many decisions of 
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the CFA and other Hong Kong courts assuming and exercising the power to review and 
invalidate regional legislation and executive acts since 1997. The Hong Kong Government 
and Legislative Council have not expressed any opposition to the courts’ assertion and 
employment of this jurisdiction. On the contrary, they have shown their respect for it.TPF409 FPT 
There is, therefore, no doubt that this jurisdiction has been established firmly and developed 
well through case law in HKSAR. According to the latest official figures available, the 
number of judicial review applications stands at 132 in 2006, and around 150 in the previous 
two years.TPF410FPT Many of them involve Basic Law interpretations and constitutional review. As 
the Chief Justice recognised, “judicial review is an established and vital feature of our legal 
system”,TPF411FPT and “has redefined the legal landscape”TPF412FPT. Thus, although the Basic Law does 
not expressly grant the courts such jurisdiction, now its actual existence and being frequently 
exercised in the practice of the Hong Kong courts cannot be easily ignored. In addition, if we 
deny Hong Kong courts’ competence of constitutional review over the regional legislation 
and executive acts, especially the latter, it may amount to an infringement of Hong Kong 
people’s fundamental right guaranteed in art.35 of the Basic Law, which says, “Hong Kong 
residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the acts of the 
executive authorities and their personnel”. However, some may reject that and insist on their 
denial of Hong Kong courts’ constitutional review power over regional legislation by 
invoking art.84 of the Basic Law which provides that Hong Kong courts “shall adjudicate 
cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the Region”. This, according to them, can be 
read as that the courts merely have the power to use the existing laws to decide cases and 
have no jurisdiction to question the applicable laws, for the validity of the laws has been 
established since they go through all the legislative procedures provided by the Basic Law. TPF413FPT 
The flaw of the argument is that it ignores the courts’ constitutional responsibility of 
interpreting the Basic Law and their role as the guardian of the Basic Law, which disable 
them from applying local laws inconsistent with the Basic Law. In fact, art.84 does not 
exclude the courts from identifying the applicability of a local law according to the Basic 
Law. On the contrary, it may imply that the courts should have a responsibility to ensure and 
determine whether a relevant local law is actually applicable in Hong Kong before applying it 
to the resolution of a concrete dispute at hand. Constitutional review of local legislation is 
thus necessary for the courts to discharge their adjudicative function. 
 
A relevant question worthy of discussing here is that whether all the provisions regarding 
autonomy affairs in the Basic Law can be used by the courts as standards to review and 
invalidate the local legislation and executive actions. In other words, are all those provisions 
of the Basic Law justiciable? Besides the political structure and fundamental rights of the 
residents, the provisions of the Basic Law regarding the autonomy of the Region cover 
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almost all the social and economic matters, from education, science, culture, sports, religion, 
labour and social services to public finance, monetary affairs, trade, industry, commerce, land 
leases, shipping and civil aviation. Most of them concern the relevant policies of the HKSAR 
Government in those areas. Some of these provisions are binding (setting restrictions or 
obligations on the government) while some are guiding (not compulsory).TPF414FPT If all of them are 
justiciable, namely, they could be invoked by litigants to launch judicial challenges and used 
by the courts to examine the constitutionality of government’s actions, the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the courts would extend to almost all the policy issues. That may threaten the 
principle of separation of powers and blur the boundary between the executive and the 
judiciary. The courts’ caseload would perhaps rocket too. So some scholars, represented by 
Professor Ghai, tend to allow only some of the provisions of the Basic Law to be justiciable, 
excluding those articles which“are not written in a language that would easily lend itself to 
judicial interpretation (e.g. low tax policy or creating an environment conductive to 
investment, etc.) and areas “where courts might themselves regard judicial intervention as 
inappropriate”.TPF415 FPT This seems appropriate at first glance. However, a dilemma will ensue 
from it for it goes with a potential conflict with the role of the Hong Kong judiciary as the 
authoritative interpreter of the Basic Law defined by art.158 of it, which authorises the Hong 
Kong courts to interpret all the provisions of the Basic Law falling within Hong Kong’s 
autonomy. TPF416FPT If some provisions are not justiciable, the courts will lose the opportunity to 
produce interpretations of those provisions. This could constitute a restriction or divestment 
of the courts’ constitutional power of interpretation. Additionally, in practice it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify which articles of the Basic Law are justiciable and 
which are not, given that the Basic Law provisions cover issues so broadly and the 
accompanying questions of how, who and why to make that identification are not easy to 
answer. An artificial distinction of the nature of the provisions of the Basic Law in terms of 
justiciability would complicate the situation. Therefore, I am of the view that Hong Kong 
courts, with appropriate restraints, could use all the provisions which fall within the scope of 
the Region’s autonomy to examine the constitutionality of the regional legislation and 
executive acts. 
 
An important question is then what those appropriate restraints are when Hong Kong courts 
exercise their jurisdiction of constitutional review at the local level. It seems that the answer 
could be found in the UK model of judicial review in dealing with human rights cases. The 
UK model’s key feature is that, unlike the US style, the courts have no power to strike down 
a law found unconstitutional or in breach of a fundamental right.TPF417FPT Under the Human Rights 
Act 1998, the judges are required to interpret legislation “in so far as it is possible” in a way 
which is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. If a compatible 
interpretation is not possible, the higher courts have, in respect of primary legislation, the 
right to make a “declaration of incompatibility”,TPF418 FPT which does not affect the continuing 
validity of the legislation.TPF 419 FPT It is left to the Parliament to amend such a declared 
incompatible law. Similarly, in Hong Kong, although no similar statute requirement exists, 
when the courts exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to examine a piece of local 
legislation, they had better, in my opinion, interpret it in so far as it is possible in a way which 
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is consistent with the Basic Law. Only when a consistent interpretation is not possible, the 
courts can make a declaration of incompatibility. Such a declaration has no the effect of 
invalidating the law. It is the Government and the Legislative Council’s responsibility to 
correct this legislation. This type of practice, despite no special legislation, could be achieved 
through the case law of the CFA. Unfortunately, the CFA, as an heir of the British Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council after Hong Kong’s returning to China, has not inherited the 
British humble style of judicial review. Some may doubt the humility of the British way of 
judicial review by indicating the fact that the Judicial Committee may exercise power of 
striking down overseas jurisdiction’s legislation when it acts as the final constitutional court 
for various commonwealth dependencies and colonies. However, that was not the case for 
Hong Kong. In Hong Kong’s colonial era, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council took a 
restrictive approach towards local official decisions and seldom exercised its review power to 
correct Hong Kong Administration’s mistakes,TPF420FPT not to mention to scrutinise legislation. The 
point here is that as the Hong Kong legal system was an integral part of British imperial legal 
system before 1997, it might be more appropriate for Hong Kong courts to learn judicial 
review experience from British practice. Rather, the CFA has adopted an American model by 
claiming that Hong Kong courts have full power to strike down not only regional legislation 
but also the legislative acts of the national parliament as unconstitutional.TPF421 FPT Although it 
seems that it has retreated from the latter assertion as to reviewing the national legislative acts, 
its claim of the power of invalidating regional law which is found unconstitutional by the 
courts remains unchanged. With the continuing enhancement of the democratic mandate of 
the Legislative Council through the constitutional reform and the final realisation of the aim 
of electing all the legislators through direct election, the Court, as an legal institution lacking 
of democratic legitimacy, had better reconsider its stance as to the constitutional review of 
local legislation. To adapt from American style to the more modest UK model may be a good 
option. 
 
Another point may deserve stressing is that Hong Kong courts’ constitutional review can only 
be concrete review, which requires “a genuine adversary proceeding, the existence of a case 
or controversy inter partes”.TPF 422 FPT They cannot render a judgment on a purely abstract or 
hypothetical question unaccompanied by a specific fact-setting. In other words, unlike some 
European constitutional courts, Hong Kong courts, including the CFA, are not competent to 
render advisory opinions on legal questions not directly arising from concrete cases. In the 
controversy over the term of a successor of a resigned Chief Executive in 2005, when the 
Hong Kong government decided to refer the issue to the NPCSC for an interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the Basic Law and submitted a bill to the Legislative Council to amend 
the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, legislator Albert Chan Wai-yip filed in the Hong 
Kong High Court a judicial review application, asking the court to declare that the true effect 
of art.46 of the Basic Law is that the length of office should be five years whether or not the 
Chief Executive resigns before the end of his term and also declare that the proposed 
government bill to amend the Chief Executive Ordinance covering the length of office for the 
successor of a resigned Chief Executive is a revision of the Basic Law and therefore 
unlawful.TPF423FPT However, soon after the NPCSC’s delivering of an interpretation on the relevant 
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Basic Law provision,TPF424FPT Mr. Chan withdrew his application. Thus we cannot investigate the 
court’s attitude on the issue as it did not actually deal with that. But it seems to me that there 
was little chance for Mr. Chan’s application to be approved by the court largely because his 
application appeared to be more like request for abstract constitutional review or advisory 
opinion, rather than concrete review. Moreover the bill challenged by him was still under 
deliberation by the Legislative Council.TPF425 FPT In other words, it was half way the legislative 
process and not an enacted law yet. Under such a circumstance, it is doubtful that the court 
could interfere without constituting an abstract review or advisory opinions giving. The case 
will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Here my purpose is just to point out that being limited 
to only concrete constitutional review is an inherent feature of Hong Kong courts’ 
constitutional review over the local legislation. It places a restraint on the judicial interference. 
This restraint is a reasonable and appropriate one which is in line with Hong Kong’s legal 
history and legal order. It would be desirable that Hong Kong courts continue to exercise only 
concrete constitutional review, rather than step into the area of giving advisory opinion which 
constitutes abstract review. 
 
We have argued that Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction, in adjudicating cases, to examine a 
regional law’s conformity to the provisions of the Basic Law which are within the limits of 
the autonomy of Hong Kong. However, as far as the compatibility of a regional law with the 
provisions of the Basic Law beyond the autonomy of the Region is concerned, the courts, in 
my view, have no competence to scrutinise, for that is the power of the NPCSC which is 
granted by art.17 of the Basic Law. Art.17 requires all the laws enacted by the legislature of 
HKSAR to be reported to the NPCSC for the record and authorises the NPCSC to examine 
their consistency with the provisions of the Basic Law regarding affairs which are the 
responsibility of the Central Government or concerning the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region. If a breach is found, the NPCSC would invalidate these laws by 
returning them.TPF426FPT As for the laws which are not returned, their constitutionality, in terms of 
their consistency with the non-reginal provisions of the Basic Law above mentioned, should 
be seen as having been confirmed by the NPCSC. If inconsistency has not been detected by 
the NPCSC at that time, individuals or institutions who notice or concern the issue could 
inform or request the NPCSC to determine at any later time. The possibility of a failure to 
detect does not necessarily mean Hong Kong courts could therefore exercise the review 
power. Actually, in my opinion, the courts in HKSAR cannot question the recorded 
legislation’s conformity with these provisions of the Basic Law any more (but, of course, still 
can examine their consistency with those provisions of the Basic Law concerning regional 
affairs), for, as argued earlier, Hong Kong courts’ competence of challenging the authority of 
the NPCSC is questionable. Even if just seen from a procedural perspective, it is also 
appropriate to exclude Hong Kong courts from scrutinising those laws. Otherwise, if the 
courts have the power to review their compatibility with non-regional provisions of the Basic 
Law and strike down the contents of the laws found inconsistent according to the American 
model mentioned earlier, that would mean the versions of those laws that have been reported 
to and recorded by the NPCSC are altered by the courts for the courts’ invalidation of the 
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provisions in question would apparently constitute a deletion of the original text of the 
relevant laws. The SAR has, arguably, to report these new versions of laws to the NPCSC for 
record again under its constitutional duty. Accordingly the NPCSC would again exercise its 
constitutional review responsibility over these laws’ new versions. Serous problems would 
arise when the NPCSC is in disagreement with the courts’ alteration of the laws. If the 
NPCSC denies the constitutionality of the new versions, invalidates them by returning, and 
insists on the effect of the previously recorded laws regardless of the fact that certain 
provisions of them have been struck down by the courts, this would damage the authority of 
the Hong Kong courts greatly and place them in a very difficult position. To avoid such a 
direct confrontation with the NPCSC and its negative consequences, limiting Hong Kong 
courts’ constitutional jurisdiction within issues concerning mere autonomous constitutional 
provisions without touching the NPCSC’s affairs seems to be necessary. Indeed, this kind of 
demarcation of constitutional review jurisdiction between the NPCSC and the courts of 
HKSAR subject to the nature of various provisions of the Basic Law is consistent with the 
double-track interpretation mechanism of the Basic Law designed in art.158, which 
authorises the Hong Kong courts to interpret all the provisions of the Basic Law except for 
those concerning the Central Government and the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and HKSAR, which should be referred by the CFA to the NPCSC for 
interpretation when a final judgement is pending. According to this arrangement, if Hong 
Kong courts doubt a reginal law’s conformity to the non-regional provisions of the Basic Law, 
they may choose to refer the issue to the NPCSC for resolution because of its inevitably 
involvement of the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law in relation to the 




Hong Kong courts’ exercise of constitutional jurisdiction over regional legislative and 
executive acts has significant implications for Hong Kong’s constitutional order. It places the 
courts in a special position within the Region’s governmental structure and gives rise to a 
tendency of judicial supremacy, making the question of democratic legitimacy, which has 
been explored in the former chapter, more difficult to answer. Although it is officially 
claimed that Hong Kong’s polity is a kind of executive-led system, it does appear to embrace 
the principles of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”, according to the political 
structure framed by the Basic Law. However, if the courts follow the bold US style of 
constitutional review rather than the much modest UK model we suggested, the checks and 
balances of the political system within HKSAR would be broken. While the courts are 
capable of scrutinising and striking down not only the executive actions but also the local 
legislation, sometimes can even question the legislature’s procedure of making laws,TPF427FPT or 
even directly amend laws by adding or deleting words, the executive and the legislature in 
Hong Kong lack effective constitutional means to check and balance the courts’ power of 
constitutional review so as to maintain it under the final control from the democratic will 
possessed by the other two governmental branches. TPF 428 FPT Even in the US, the courts’ 
constitutional interpretation could at least in theory be remedied by the Congress and 
Government through amending the constitution. In fact, in other democratic states amending 
the constitution is usually a last remedy which could be employed to place a check and 
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balance on the courts’ constitutional review behaviour and ensure the will of people is not 
usurped by the unelected judges. As a result the courts’ legitimacy of review might be 
defended for they are not beyond the last control of democracy indeed. However, 
interestingly, this is not the case in Hong Kong as the Legislature of HKSAR has no power to 
amend the Basic Law. The power of amending the Basic Law is exclusively enjoyed by the 
NPC which is a national institution outside Hong Kong.TPF429FPT Although the Legislative Council 
and Chief Executive may play a part in initiating the process of amending the Basic Law, it is 
very difficult for them to do that to rectify a court’s constitutional interpretation as the 
relevant requirement TPF430FPT is very strict and complex and the whole amending process is lengthy 
and may be full of uncertainty, not to mention the huge political cost of doing that. Therefore, 
the executive and legislature tend to show their compliance with the courts’ constitutional 
decisions even when they are unhappy or in disagreement with the courts’ holdings. 
Consequently, the authority of the courts to make constitutional decisions through 
interpreting the Basic Law is secured. 
 
Moreover, the trend of judicial supremacy is strengthened by the phenomenon of 
“judicialisation of law-making” and “judicialisation of policy-making”, which is carefully 
analyzed by Professor Sweet in his study of the European constitutional politics.TP F431FPT Applying 
his theory to Hong Kong, we can expect that when the executive makes a policy or drafts a 
legislation proposal, it would do its best to predict and evaluate the courts’ likely opinion 
about the issue and adopt them in advance in order to minimise the possibility of future 
intervention from the courts through constitutional review. So would the legislature during its 
process of making laws. In other words, when discharging their own functions, the officials 
of government and the legislators would act as a constitutional judge to preview the actions 
they are deliberating. Therefore, constitutional judicial review changes not only Hong Kong’s 
legal culture and practice but also its political landscape, making the tendency of judicial 
supremacy coexist with the claim of executive leading and the rising of legislature dominance. 
Further discussion in the regard will be made in Chapter 6. 
 
However, it must be pointed out that, in some extreme cases, the executive or legislature may 
be reluctant to submit to the judges’ will. Without the means to check and balance at the local 
level, they may tend to invite the Central Authorities to interfere so as to make the order 
come back to a balance. Take the immigrant children cases for example, the government of 
HKSAR feared that the decisions of the CFA would result in an influx of 1.6 million 
mainland immigrants into Hong Kong, but it was unable to change the CFA’s constitutional 
decisions through enacting a regional statute. And the chance of amending the Basic Law was 
also tiny due to the complicated procedures. Moreover, the power to amend the Basic Law is 
enjoyed by the NPC which is only in session in March for about two weeks every year, it was 
unpractical for the Hong Kong government to launch that process in the time available. 
Therefore, under such circumstances, the Hong Kong government was actually forced to opt 
to seek assistance from the Central Government. Consequently, the NPCSC adopted Hong 
Kong government’s opinion and delivered an interpretation of the Basic LawTPF432FPT to rectify the 
CFA’s constitutional interpretation and avoid the influx of immigrants. The CFA’s 
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constitutional ruling was effectively reversed. This shows that the external force, particularly 
the intervention from the Central Government, can play a crucial role in maintaining or 
changing the checks and balances of constitutional order between and among the judiciary, 
the legislature and the executive within HKSAR. However, to invite the Central Government 
to interfere may threaten the autonomy of the Region and the independence of the judiciary. 
From a realistic view, therefore, it is desirable to form a coordinated relationship, a 
constructive dialogical interaction, between the judiciary and other governmental branches, 
minimising the confrontation and excluding the likelihood of external force’s coming in. This 
coordinative relationship needs the courts to adopt a modest style of constitutional review, 
without robustly invalidating the statutes as they usually do, and embrace a self-restrained 
approach when exercising their power of scrutiny. 
 
Fortunately, the Chief Justice has realised the necessity of reminding his colleagues and the 
public of the limits of judicial review and its boundary with the political process.TPF433 FPT The 
Chief Justice’s caution and humility are further demonstrated by his discarding of the 
potential arguability test for granting leave for application for judicial review in Po Fun 
Chan. TPF434FPT Under the potential arguability test which was previously adopted by Hong Kong 
courts, the applicant need not demonstrate an arguable case. It is sufficient for him merely to 
satisfy the court that on further consideration at a subsequent hearing an arguable case might 
be demonstrated. To the Chief Justice, it is the time to impose a higher threshold so as to 
more effectively serve the leave mechanism’s function of filter. He adopted the arguability 
test. Under this test, arguability means reasonable arguability. “A claim for relief which is not 
reasonably arguable could not be regarded as arguable. A reasonably arguable case is one 
which enjoys realistic prospects of success. Whilst the test adopted represents a higher 
threshold than the potential arguability test, claims which are reasonably arguable would be 
given leave to go forward under it. It is in the public interest that challenges which are not 
reasonably arguable should not be given leave to proceed.”TPF435FPT The Chief Justice’s adoption of 
the test perhaps indicated his worry about the abuse of judicial review and the increasing 
tendency of the public’s blindly reliance on judicial review to resolve a broad range of social, 
economic and political problems. 
 
Anyway, constitutional judicial review has been a primary feature of Hong Kong’s 
development of constitutionalism and may be of great significance to Hong Kong’s transition 
to modern constitutional democracy. It gives the judiciary a new role to play in Hong Kong’s 
constitutional politics. Judges must be cautious and modest when performing their new role 
as constitutional rule makers if they want to reduce the problem of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability. As a matter of principle, building a coordinative relationship, that is, a 
relationship of constructive dialogical interaction instead of a tension of constant conflicts, 
between the judiciary and other governmental branches in Hong Kong may benefit not only 
the autonomy of the Region but also the independence of judiciary and the rule of law. 
 
3 Interpreting the Basic Law 
 
As mentioned, to the CFA, Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction of constitutional review stems 
from their power of interpreting the Basic Law. A proper understanding of that power and its 
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application is crucial to defining the CFA’s constitutional role under the “one country, two 
systems” principle, since the interpretative mechanism of the Basic Law serves to be an 
interface bridging Hong Kong’s common law legal system with mainland China’s communist 
legal system.TPF436FPT 
 
In the common law tradition, producing authoritative interpretations of law is the exclusive 
prerogative of courts, but under Chinese legal system it is the NPCSC, the national legislature, 
that discharges the function of interpreting law.TPF437FPT In practice the NPCSC allows the Supreme 
People’s Court to make abstract judicial interpretation of law to guide the judiciary’s concrete 
application of law in their work of adjudication. TPF438FPT But when adjudicating cases, all courts, 
including the Supreme People’s Court, have no capacity of interpreting law in the sense of 
forming binding rules for future cases. They just apply law to the concrete cases they are 
dealing with. Therefore, we may say, in China judges are merely the user or consumer of the 
law produced by the legislature; unlike their common law brethren, they are not the maker of 
rules. However, the mechanism of interpreting the Basic Law, which is a Chinese national 
statute and also serves as the constitution for HKSAR, is significantly different from both the 
interpretation doctrine in the common law tradition possessed by Hong Kong and the legal 
practice in mainland China. Actually, it is some kind of compromise between, or a 
combination of, the two. 
 
Under article 158 of the Basic Law, while the NPCSC has the final say on the interpretation 
of all provisions of the Basic Law, the courts of HKSAR, in adjudicating cases, are also 
vested with the power to interpret all the provisions within the autonomy of HKSAR and 
other provisions outside the autonomy (the Excluded Provisions) subject to certain 
prescriptions. As for the Excluded Provisions, when four conditions are satisfied the courts of 
HKSAR must refer them to the NPCSC for interpretation: (1) an interpretation is necessary 
for resolving the case at hand; (2) the controversial provisions fall within the responsibility of 
the Central Government or concern the relationship between the Central Authorities and the 
Region; (3) the interpretation of the provisions will affect the judgment on the case; (4) the 
courts’ hearing of the case must be final, by which it means the decision of the courts on this 
case will be unappealable. Procedurally, it is through the CFA that the courts refer such an 
interpretation issue to the NPCSC.TPF439 FPT The lower courts cannot refer issues directly to the 
NPCSC. In other words, the CFA is the only institutional channel connecting Hong Kong 
judiciary with the national legal system. It deserves noting that there is an interesting 
situation. That is, the CFA has no chance of delivering its opinion on the meanings of the 
Excluded Provisions because it is obliged to refer those provisions to the NPCSC for 
interpretation due to the finality of its judgment, while other lower courts could interpret 
Excluded Provisions for most of their judgments are still appealable and thus do not need to 
be referred. Nonetheless, the interpretative mechanism gives the CFA a unique constitutional 
status under the constitutional order of “one country, two systems”, which requires it to 
define its constitutional role not only from a regional perspective but also from a national 
angle. 
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However, in its actual exercise of the interpretative power, the CFA seems to have placed 
much importance on the Region’s autonomy and paid little attention to the nation’s sovereign 
interests. The CFA has positively established and developed philosophies, approaches and 
tests to regulate Hong Kong courts’ interpretation of the Basic Law. In so doing, it attempts 
to avoid the influence of the Central Government and reduce the chance of referring issues to 
the NPCSC for interpretation. By now there is not one case that has been referred by the CFA 
to the NPCSC although in several disputes the parties actually made such requests.TPF440FPT 
 
3.1 The CFA’s Approaches to Interpretation 
 
The CFA dealt with the interpretation issue in Ng Ka Ling TPF441FPT for the first time and it took 
this opportunity to state its philosophy of interpreting the Basic Law unequivocally. Two 
significant approaches for constitutional interpretation, the purposive approach and the 
generous approach, were established by the CFA for the construction of the Basic Law. The 
Court believed that in general the purposive approach should be applied in the interpretation 
of a constitution such as the Basic Law. It pointed out, “[g]aps and ambiguities are bound to 
arise and, in resolving them, the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and 
purposes declared in, and to be ascertained from, the constitution and relevant extrinsic 
materials. So, in ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, the courts must consider 
the purpose of the instrument and its relevant provisions as well as the language of its text in 
the light of the context…” TPF442FPT Specifically, as to articles in Chapter III of the Basic Law which 
provide the fundamental rights of the Hong Kong residents, the CFA asserted that a generous 
interpretation should be given to them as it conceived that such constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights and freedoms “lie at the heart of Hong Kong’s separate system.” TPF443FPT The 
CFA’s establishment of the two approaches is very important and significant in the legal 
history of HKSAR because they form the basic principles guiding all the courts of HKSAR, 
including the CFA itself, to exercise their newly gained power of interpreting a mini-
constitution under Hong Kong’s new constitutional order. 
 
Commentators have shown little doubt about the CFA’s adoption of the purposive approach 
in interpreting the Basic Law, for the approach is widely recognised as an important criterion 
for legal interpretation not only in the common law world but also in continental legal 
systems.TPF 444 FPT However, the difficulty is how to identify the real purpose of a particular 
provision of the Basic Law under the constitutional context of “one country, two systems.” Is 
it the exact intention of the drafters or the purpose indicated by the text that we should look 
for? What are the differences between the two? Or the purpose of a constitutional provision is 
what judges say? The CFA declared, “the purpose of the Basic Law is to establish the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region being an inalienable part of the People's Republic of 
China under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ with a high degree of autonomy in 
accordance with China’s basic policies regarding Hong Kong as set out and elaborated in 
the Joint Declaration. The purpose of a particular provision may be ascertainable from its 
nature or other provisions of the Basic Law or relevant extrinsic materials including the Joint 
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Declaration.” TPF445FPT However, when discussing the purpose of art.158 of the Basic Law, the CFA 
emphasised that the aim of the constitutional interpretative mechanism is to safeguard the 
autonomy of the HKSAR by looking merely at art.158(2), without analysing all the contents 
of the art.158 as a whole.TPF446FPT Actually, safeguarding the SAR’s autonomy is by no means the 
sole objective of the Basic Law. Clearly, another important purpose of the Basic Law is to 
safeguard the interests of sovereignty. That is the inherent logic of the doctrine of “one 
country, two systems” and indicated in the Preamble of the Basic Law.TPF447FPT Accordingly, as 
Professor Albert Chen rightly argued, the true purpose of art.158, then, is to achieve an 
appropriate balance between the respective powers of interpretation of the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong courts on the one hand and the NPCSC on the other hand.TPF448FPT Based on it, in my 
opinion, Hong Kong courts, especially the CFA as the sole institutional link between the two 
legal systems, therefore, should define their role in constitutional interpretation as not only 
regional tribunals but also national legal institutions, looking after, without bias, both 
regional autonomy and the sovereign interest while making constitutional rules, for they are 
the primary interpreters of and the guardians for the Basic Law, a national statute which 
serves as the Region’s constitution and aims at not only maintaining the prosperity and 
stability of Hong Kong but also upholding the national unity and territorial integrity.TPF449FPT 
 
The CFA emphasised the importance of considering relevant extrinsic materials for 
ascertaining the purpose of a specific provision of the Basic Law. But as for what extrinsic 
materials are relevant, its approach appears confusing. Whilst requiring to use Sino-British 
Joint Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to aid 
interpretation, the CFA showed a cold-shoulder to the Opinion of the Preparatory Committee 
of the NPCSC for the establishment of the HKSAR (the Opinion). It refused to consider that 
Opinion when ascertaining the purpose of a provision in the right of abode cases by alleging 
that the Opinion was made after the promulgation of the Basic Law and thus could not 
represent the purpose of the Basic Law. However, the NPCSC’s interpretation in 1999 
confirmed that the legislative intent of art.24 (2) of the Basic Law had been reflected in the 
Opinion.TPF450FPT But the CFA did not regard this view as binding when dealing with the issue 
concerning art. 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law in Chong Fung YuenTPF451FPTfor it thought this view was 
obiter. Thus it refused to identify the intention of art. 24(2)(1) subject to the Opinion. Instead, 
it stated, “The courts are bound to give effect to the clear meaning of the language. The 
courts will not on the basis of any extrinsic materials depart from that clear meaning and 
give the language a meaning which the language cannot bear.”TPF 452 FPT Ironically, the CFA 
seemed to have forgotten what it had said in Ng Ka Ling when introducing the principle of 
purposive approach, that is, “As to the language of its text, the courts must avoid a literal, 
technical, narrow or rigid approach. They must consider the context. The context of a 
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particular provision is to be found in the Basic Law itself as well as relevant extrinsic 
materials…”TPF453FPT 
 
It may be curious that the CFA swung sometimes between the purposive approach and the 
natural meaning of the text. However, this seems to be a common feature of courts’ 
constitutional interpretative behaviour. The CFA’s counterparts in Europe have shown a 
similar tendency. As Roberto Gargarella demonstrates, “Courts do not choose one single 
interpretative theory and then stick to it in all subsequent decisions. In contrast, the tribunal 
tends to adopt many different interpretative theories at the same time, and make use of them 
more or less at will, depending on the case at hand. Thus, what usually happens is that the 
Court decides one case taking into account one particular interpretative theory, and the 
following by using the same or a different method.”TPF454FPT The key factor that makes the CFA 
choose to apply purposive approach or insist on the plain meaning of a text seems largely 
dependent upon whether there is a possibility of referring to a document made by the Central 
Authorities. If there is such a possibility, the CFA would be more likely to stick to the literal 
meaning of the Basic Law so that the use of the mainland’s material to aid its interpretation 
work could be avoided, as it did in Chong Fung Yuen; If there is no question of the use of 
mainland materials, the CFA might tend to apply the purposive approach to interpret the 
Basic Law so that it could play a more creative role in its adjudication, as it did in Ng Ka 
Ling. This contradictory attitude of the CFA seems to reflect its worry, suspicion, fear and 
resistance of the influence from the mainland China’s communist legal system. Avoiding as 
much as possible the legal influence from the Central Authorities might be a natural reaction 
of the CFA given it defines itself as mere a highest regional court. By doing so, it believes the 
autonomy of HKSAR could be safeguarded as much as possible. This kind of defensive 
attitude is also reflected in the CFA’s analysis of the reference issue to which we now turn. 
 
3.2 The Reference Issue 
 
3.2.1 Rules for Referring 
 
Under the mechanism framed by art.158 of the Basic Law, which was modelled on TPF455FPT the 
EU’s preliminary rulings procedure to the European Court of Justice,TPF456FPT the CFA has a duty 
to refer some Basic Law provisions to the NPCSC for interpretations when the conditions 
prescribed are satisfied. This can be called “the reference issue”. In Ng Ka Ling the CFA 
managed to establish operable rules for regulating its discharge of this constitutional duty. In 
its opinion, two conditions must be considered before referring an issue to the NPCSC. TPF457FPT 
The first one is “the classification condition”, meaning that the provisions in question must be 
the excluded ones which concern the affairs of the Central Government or the relationship 
between the Central Authorities and the Region. The second one is “the necessity condition”, 
which means that in adjudicating the case such excluded provisions need to be interpreted 
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and their interpretation will affect the final judgment. The CFA stressed that only when both 
of the conditions are satisfied will it be obliged to refer. Moreover, the CFA emphasised that 
it is for the Court itself alone, not the NPCSC, to judge whether the conditions are met.TPF458FPT In 
other words, the CFA claimed itself had, during dealing with a case, the sole power of 
determining whether a provision of the Basic Law should be referred to the NPCSC, placing 
the NPCSC in a passive position in exercising its interpretation power. Consequently, the 
NPCSC’s interpretative function would have to depend largely on the CFA’s supply of 
caseload. For considering the classification condition, the CFA introduced a predominant 
provision test.TPF459FPT According to it, when two provisions of the Basic Law are concerned in a 
case and only one of them is an excluded provision, it does not necessarily lead the CFA to 
refer this excluded provision to the NPCSC for interpretation. The Court must decide which 
provision is predominant in the adjudication of the case. If the excluded provision cannot be 
identified as predominant, then the CFA need not to refer it to the NPCSC and the courts in 
the Region can interpret it themselves. 
 
While the CFA’s establishment of the two terms of the “classification condition” and the 
“necessity condition” to deal with the reference issue itself has not been questioned by 
commentators, the predominant provision test created by it to aid its consideration of the 
classification condition is of more controversy. It was severely criticised by Professor Albert 
Chen.TPF460FPT He argued that the test might violate art.158 (3) of the Basic Law, for applying it 
would result in an exclusion of the NPCSC’s opportunity to interpret an excluded provision, 
even when that provision would affect the case substantially, due to the Court’s identifying it 
as non-predominant. To him, the right order of reasoning should be to consider the “necessity 
condition” before the “classification condition” rather than the reverse as the CFA did. 
Reasoning in this order, he believed, could avoid the incorrect result of not referring an 
Excluded Provision, which was necessary for and would affect the judgment of the case, to 
the NPCSC for interpretation. 
 
Professor Chen rightly pointed out the problem of the CFA’s decision, but he seemed to 
complicate unnecessarily the reasoning model by highlighting the order of those two 
conditions. The order of the CFA’s considering of the two conditions could be of no problem 
if the predominant provision test for determining the classification condition is discarded. 
The test is artificial and unnecessary. Its application can only lead to a considerable reduction 
of the possibility of referring a relevant provision to the NPCSC. That may be exactly the 
CFA’s intention of creating the test. However, the test’s constitutionality is questionable, for 
it could amount to an exemption of the CFA’s constitutional obligation of referring under 
certain circumstances and the CFA itself seems to lack competence of making such an 
exemption. If the unnecessary predominant provision test is put away, the Court’s two 
conditions model might be perfect. According to it, when any Excluded Provision identified 
by the classification condition is necessary for and affects the judgment of the case 
(determined by the necessity condition), it must be referred by the CFA to the NPCSC for 
interpretation, regardless of whether it is predominant or not compared with other provisions 
involved in the case. 
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Alternatively, based on Mr. Qiao Xiaoyang’s explanatory speech to the NPCSC when it made 
the interpretation in 1999,TPF461FPT we may also suggest a “close relationship” test, by which it is 
meant when an Excluded Provision has such a close relationship with other non-excluded 
provisions that they are inseparable in dealing with the dispute, then the excluded provision 
would “absorb” other provisions and all the inseparable provisions should be referred to the 
NPCSC for interpretation if such an interpretation is necessary for handling the case. It seems 
therefore appropriate for the CFA to reconsider its predominant prevision test some day. 
 
The questionable predominant provision test was established by the CFA to determine 
whether to refer an issue to the NPCSC in the situation where more than two provisions, at 
least one Excluded Provision and one provision within autonomy, are involved. The decisive 
factor lies in the relationship between them. To the Court, only when the Excluded Provision 
is predominant, should the question be referred. If not so, it need not be referred and should 
be interpreted by Hong Kong courts. However, when there is just one provision of the Basic 
Law needed to be classified and no question of predominance can be asked due to the 
singleness of the provision, what should be the proper legal test? The CFA handled this 
question in Chong Fung Yuen. TPF462FPT In that case, the Director of Immigration contended that the 
legal test to decide whether a provision of the Basic Law was an Excluded Provision that 
satisfied the classification condition and thus might need to be referred to the NPCSC for 
interpretation, would be whether its implementation would have a ‘substantive effect’ on 
affairs which were the responsibility of the Central People’s Government or the relationship 
between the Central Authorities and the Region. The CFA rejected that suggestion on the 
ground that art.158 (3) of the Basic Law did not refer to the effect of its implementation and 
thus the use of such a test was not justified on the language of art.158(3).TPF463FPT Moreover, it 
worried, this test would mean that most if not all the articles in the Basic Law could be 
potentially excluded provisions and this would spell the end of Hong Kong’s judicial 
autonomy. Instead, the CFA thought, it was the character of the provision that art.158 (3) 
required the Court to consider and therefore the right question to be asked should be whether 
the provision disputed had the character of one which concerned affairs which were the 
responsibility of the Central People’s Government or the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region, but the CFA did not further put forward any general guidance for 
ascertaining the character of a Basic Law provision.TPF464FPT 
 
Indeed, the character of a provision is by no means static. Rather, it may change with the 
varying of context. Take art. 24(3), the disputed provision in Ng Ka Ling, for example. It 
defines one category of Hong Kong’s permanent residents and ostensibly concern no element 
of the Central Government’s responsibility, but when it is interlocked with another provision, 
art.22, which is an Excluded Provision and would qualify art.24 (3), then art.24 (3) would get 
“infected” by the character of art.22 and should be referred together with art.22 to the 
NPCSC for interpretation. Here the test advised by Mr. Po-Jen Yap seems more appropriate. 
He suggests that the proper question the CFA should ask is whether the disputed provision 
concerns a matter that falls within or conflicts with a power expressly retained by the central 
government under the Basic Law. When the answer is negative, then the matter falls within 
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the limits of autonomy delegated to the regional courts and a judicial reference to the NPCSC 
is unnecessary. If the answer is yes, the Court must refer.TPF465FPT 
 
It must be noted that, whether in Ng Ka Ling or Chong Fung Yuen, the CFA took 
considerable energy to analyze and establish the approaches and tests for the application of 
art.158 of the Basic Law, which provides the mechanism of interpreting the Basic Law. In 
fact, in my view, this has constituted a substantial interpretation of art.158 itself, which 
should be exclusively interpreted by the NPCSC for the article distributes powers of 
interpreting the Basic Law between the NPCSC and the courts in HKSAR and is thus 
obviously an Excluded Provision concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities 
and the Region over which the CFA has no jurisdiction of interpretation. Moreover, 
interpretation of art.158 is of course necessary to dealing with the two cases faced by the 
CFA, otherwise, the CFA should not have spent so much time in discussing it. Certainly, the 
interpretation of it would also affect the judgment of the cases, as the interpretation would 
give guidance for the CFA’s determination of which substantive provisions involved should 
be referred to the NPCSC for interpretation and this would consequently have substantial 
impact on the final result of the judgments. In other words, interpretation of art.158 would 
provide a foundation for determining the reference issue itself. In fact, the CFA’s opinion in 
the two decisions is a kind of constitutional rule-making of art.158 and has formed a binding 
precedent in Hong Kong. The approaches and tests (such as “classification condition”, 
“necessity condition” and “predominant provision”, especially the last one) created by the 
CFA for the application of art.158, without referring to the NPCSC, would effectively affect 
the relevant jurisdiction of the CFA and the NPCSC provided in art.158. Therefore the CFA’s 
interpretation of art.158 of the Basic Law does constitute a violation of China’s constitutional 
principle that to ensure the unitary character of the state regional courts are deprived of 
competence to decide theirs own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). It is indeed a 
usurpation of the interpretative power of the NPCSC granted by art.158 itself. 
 
3.2.2 The Chief Executive’s Role 
 
So what could we do if the CFA refused to make a reference to the NPCSC for interpretation 
where it should have been made? In fact, a very controversial practice has been used by the 
Chief Executive of HKSAR (CE) to tackle this problem in the event of right of abode 
litigation in 1999, that is, the CE may invite the assistance from the Central Authorities to 
rectify the CFA’s refusal. The Government of HKSAR disagreed with the CFA’s 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law in its judgments, believing the 
implementation of that would lead 1.6 million immigrants from mainland to flood into Hong 
Kong.TPF466FPT This would be beyond the bearing capability of Hong Kong. To resolve the problem, 
the CE chose to report to the State Council, the Central Government of PRC, suggesting it 
ask the NPCSC to interpret the relevant provisions.TPF 467 FPT Eventually, the State Council 
submitted a request to the NPCSC and the NPCSC delivered an interpretation which 
confirmed the HKSAR Government’s understanding of the relevant provisions and thus 
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strike down the CFA’s interpretation.TPF468FPT The CE legitimated his action by basing it on art.43 
and art.48 (2) of the Basic Law, which provide that the CE is accountable to the Central 
Government and one of his functions is to be responsible for the implementation of the Basic 
Law in HKSAR. TPF469FPT 
 
The CE’s action was severely criticised by many commentators. He was accused of having 
damaged the rule of law and autonomy of Hong Kong as he had no power to seek 
interpretation from NPCSC.TPF470FPT The critics claimed that art.158 allocates the power or duty of 
referring a provision to NPCSC for interpretation solely upon the CFA and it is none of the 
CE’s business. The CE employing art.43 and 48(2) to legitimate his action was alleged to be 
artificial. In my view, although these commentators rightly pointed out that there is no 
express constitutional arrangement in the Basic Law for the CE to seek for interpretation 
from the NPCSC, they seemed to ignore the fact that actually the CE did not apply directly to 
the NPCSC for an interpretation. He just reported to his boss, the State Council, the problems 
he was facing and sought its assistance. This action is constitutional and guaranteed by the 
Basic Law. It was the State Council that formally initiated the interpretation process after its 
receiving of the CE’s report by submitting a bill to the NPCSC according to the provision of 
Chinese Constitution. It must be borne in mind that even when there is no bill from the State 
Council, the NPCSC can still make an interpretation on its own initiative. That means, in 
principle, not just the CE, but even an ordinary individual in Hong Kong could take 
appropriate actions to persuade the NPCSC to deliver an interpretation on its own as the 
NPCSC’s interpretative authority is a free-standing one, say, procedurally the NPCSC’s 
making of an interpretation of the Basic Law does not necessarily need a formal request from 
other bodies or individuals. Therefore, it seems that the attack on the CE’s action lacks a legal 
basis. Of course, this might be an inherent flaw of the Basic Law, as the procedures for 
amendment of the Basic Law may also be avoided by using a similar method. The Basic Law 
vests the power to propose bills for amendment to it in the NPCSC, the State Council and the 
HKSAR. But it prescribes a very strict and complicated procedural requirement for HKSAR 
to propose a bill.TPF471FPT However, as what he did in the right of abode case, the CE could also 
avoid this procedural requirement by persuading (formally or informally, publicly or 
privately) the State Council or NPCSC to use its own power to propose such a bill for an 
amendment of the Basic Law to the NPC. 
As analyzed earlier, the CE’s seeking for assistance from the Central Authorities may be the 
result of the lack of checks and balance of the power of the CFA within HKSAR’s own legal 
and political structures. The intervention from the central level may recover the check and 
balance of Hong Kong domestic political order. Of course, the interference may also have the 
effect of distorting and unbalancing the power order in HKSAR. Thus, the CE must be 
extremely cautious and prudent when considering whether to invite the Central Government 
to interfere. Normally, he should respect and implement the CFA’s decision. Only in highly 
exceptional cases, he may seek assistance from the Central Government. 
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3.2.3 The Court’s Retreat 
As discussed, in Ng Ka Ling the CFA refused to refer the Excluded Provision to the NPCSC 
for interpretation and on the one hand created the referral test to minimise the NPCSC’s 
opportunity of interpretation, and on the other hand established significant interpretative 
approaches to guide local courts’ constitutional interpretation. After the NPCSC’s 
intervention, the CFA retreated from its previous judicial overreach and began showing 
deference to the national legislature’s authority. In two key subsequent cases, Lau Kong Yong 
v. Director of Immigration TPF472FPT and Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung YuenTPF473FPT, the CFA 
explicitly acknowledged that the NPCSC’s power of interpreting the Basic Law was 
essentially unlimited, stating in Lau Kong Yong that “the power of interpretation of the Basic 
Law conferred by art.158(1) is in general and unqualified terms”TPF474FPT and that “that power and 
its exercise is not restricted or qualified in any way by art. 158(2) and 158(3).”TPF475FPT In Chong 
Fung Yuen, the CFA reiterated that “the power of the Standing Committee extends to every 
provision in the Basic Law and is not limited to the excluded provisions referred to in 
art.158(3).” The CFA’s change of attitude was viewed by some commentators as not 
“excessive deference”, but “strategic retreat” which has strengthened its ability to act as a 
protector of human rights, “in part by ensuring its attentions and strength were not diverted 
by regular run-ins with Beijing over exactly where the line between the CFA and the NPCSC 
lies.”TPF476FPT It seems to me, the CFA’s restraint is a kind of self-rectification of its overreach in 
Ng Kg Ling and an awakening from its previous impulse when first dealing with 
constitutional interpretation issue. Its realisation of the limits of its competency and adoption 
of a modest stance would, under the political reality, avoid direct confrontation with the 
NPCSC and thus safeguard the autonomy of the region and its own authority. 
3.2.4 Lessons from the EU 
 
Besides negatively showing its respect for the NPCSC’s interpretative power so as to avoid 
conflicts, the Court should also be expected to act positively to refer cases to the NPCSC for 
interpretation so as to facilitate and improve the integration and interaction of the two 
systems. In this regard, as the interpretative mechanism of article 158 of the Basic Law was 
actually learned from the ECJ’s preliminary reference procedure and the constitutional order 
of the EU has some similar features to China’s “one country two systems” settlement 
(primarily, that is, within a unified polity, various subunits with distinct constitutional and 
legal systems function parallelly and harmoniously), the EU’s experience could, therefore, 
certainly offer some useful lessons for Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, to define 
their constitutional role in interpreting the Basic Law, especially in making judicial reference 
to the NPCSC. 
 
According to Article 269 EC (previously 234) , three types of issues can be dealt with by the 
ECJ through delivering preliminary rulings, including questions in relation to interpreting the 
EU Treaty, reviewing and interpreting acts of the EU institutions and of the European Central 
Bank, and interpreting the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council. It must be 
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noted that the initiators of the procedure should be the courts or tribunals of the member 
states. When any such question is raised before them and a decision on the question would be 
necessary to enable them deliver a judgment, these courts or tribunals may refer the issue to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling at their discretion. However, if a decision of such question 
will lead member judiciary make a final judgment under national law, that court or tribunal 
must bring the matter before the ECJ. It must be pointed out that the preliminary rulings 
procedure is not an appeals procedure. Unlike appeal courts, the ECJ cannot decide facts of 
cases or overrule the decisions of national courts. Article 269 merely provides a means 
whereby national courts, when questions of EC law arise, may apply to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling on matters of interpretation or validity prior to themselves applying the 
law. Under the Basic Law’s interpretation arrangement, China’s NPCSC enjoys a role in 
interpreting analogous to the ECJ’s part in delivering preliminary rulings; and Hong Kong 
courts, including the CFA, have a duty of making reference to the NPCSC which similar to 
that of the courts of the EU member states. 
 
The primary purpose of article 269 is to secure a uniform EU legal order throughout the 
member states. As the ECJ pointed out, “Article 177 [now 269] is essential for the 
preservation of the Community character of the law established by the Treaty and has the 
object of ensuring that in all circumstances the law is the same in all states of the 
Community.”TPF477FPT The preliminary reference procedure provides an interface between the ECJ 
and the national courts by which the EU legal system is interlocked with the legal systems of 
all member states. In a sense, Article 269 effectively turns national courts into EU courts 
which serve as judicial institutions of the EU responsible for the implementation of EU law in 
their own states. This is apparently a cheap and efficient way to develop a uniform legal order 
in the EU. The interaction created by the procedure between the ECJ and national courts is 
important not only to the substantive development of the EU law, but also to the relationship 
between EU law and national law. Almost all the major principles securing the uniformity of 
the EU legal order, such as the crucial concepts of direct effects and the supremacy of EU law, 
established by the ECJ, were decided in the context of a reference to that court for a 
preliminary ruling under Article 269.TPF478FPT 
 
As mentioned, another important function of the reference procedure is the development of 
EU law. About 45 percent of the cases that come to the ECJ are referred through this 
procedure.TPF479FPT These cases provide the ECJ opportunities to develop new interpretations of EU 
law, resolve uncertainties, correct injustices, and enunciate principles. Almost all the 
significant rulings concerning EU law have resulted from such cases. TPF 480 FPT Moreover, the 
mechanism devised by Article 269 also allows the ECJ to review the validity of the acts of 
the EU institutions. The ECJ’s dealing with private parties’ challenges to constraints imposed 
upon them by the EU institutions could maintain institutional balance. Additionally, the 
preliminary reference procedure has an administration of justice function. It enables national 
courts to decide disputes that involve EU law by allowing them to tap into the expertise of the 
ECJ.TPF481FPT The point here is not to assess the actual effectiveness of these EU procedures in 
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detail. The value is as a model for the assessment of the Basic Law’s interpretative 
mechanism provided by art.158 of the Basic Law and the CFA’s performance under that 
mechanism. 
 
The smooth running of the preliminary reference procedure which leads to the ECJ’s 
significant contributions to the integration of the EU relies heavily on the cooperation of the 
national courts, which would provide the ECJ with caseload and enforce loyally what the ECJ 
has decided. As the ECJ itself pointed out, “That obligation to refer a matter to the Court of 
Justice is based on co-operation, established with a view to ensuring the proper application 
and uniform interpretation of Community law in all the Member States, between national 
courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of Community law, and the 
Court of Justice. More particularly, the third paragraph of Article 234 [now 269] seeks to 
prevent the occurrence within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions on 
question of Community law. The scope of the obligation must therefore be assessed, in view 
of those objectives, by reference to the powers of the national courts, on the one hand, and 
those of the Court of Justice, on the other, where such a question of interpretation is raised 
within the meaning of Article 234 [now 269]”.TPF482FPT In practice, generally, most of the national 
courts, except for last instance courts with constitutional powers, tend to support the 
reference procedure positively.TPF483FPT They voluntarily make themselves be a part of the EU legal 
system despite that would result in some revolutionary consequences, such as to abandon the 
deeply entrenched principle of the prohibition against judicial review of legislation and to set 
aside whole class of traditional rules governing their jurisdiction and procedures. On the other 
hand, it must be noted that the ECJ has also shown sensitivity to the national constitutional 
courts’ concerns about the Union institutions staying within the competences conferred upon 
them. It repealed a Community measure of political importance on the ground of lack of 
competence; TPF484FPT it refused to extend horizontal direct effect to directives;TPF485FPT it found that the 
EU has no competence to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights without a 
prior Treaty amendment.TPF486 FPT So the relationship between the ECJ and national courts has 
come to be described as “judicial dialogues” or “co-operative constitutionalism”, which has 
been based on a structured and ongoing “conversation”, co-operation and mutual trust.TPF487 FPT 
Then an important question emerges: Why do they, particular the national courts who are 
loyal to the sovereignty of their states, behave in a cooperative manner rather than a resistant 
or competitive way? This question is important to me because I assert in the thesis a 
harmoniously cooperative relationship being developed between the CFA and the NPCSC 
under the principle of “one country and two systems”. In order to achieve that kind of 
relationship European courts’ experience in the EU’s evolution may provide us with some 
lessons. As for the EU national courts’ incentives to cooperation, scholars provide the 
following answers. 
 
The first one is the “judicial empowerment thesis”, which assumes that through actively 
employing the procedure provided by Article 269 most national courts, except the supreme 
courts, could acquire powers they did not enjoy previously. These powers mainly concern 
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reviewing the validity of national legislation, enhancing their own authority to control legal 
outcomes and reducing the control of other institutional actors.TPF488FPT Alter has demonstrated that 
national lower courts are often more willing to make references because a reference bolsters 
their authority in the national legal system and allows the court a way to escape national legal 
hierarchies and challenge higher courts’ jurisprudence.TPF 489 FPT As Weller indicates, “Even in 
countries which knew fully fledged judicial review, such as Italy and Germany, the EC 
system gave judges at the lowest level powers that had been reserved within the national 
system only to the highest courts in the land.”TPF490FPT Through the mechanism of Article 269, the 
lower courts and their judges of the member states also get a facility to engage with the 
highest jurisdiction in the EU. Moreover, it is the national courts themselves that Article 269 
gives the discretion to decide whether refer a question to the ECJ. Thus they may not feel that 
the empowerment of the Court is at their expense. It seems that these elements encourage 
most of the courts make wide and enthusiastic use of the Article 269 procedure in many 
member states. 
 
Another important dynamic could be found in the private actors’ enthusiastic participation in 
the process. The doctrines of supremacy and direct effect established by the ECJ through 
preliminary reference procedure opened up the European legal system to private litigants. 
Motivated by their own interests, private litigants provided a steady supply of litigation 
capable of provoking the Article 269 procedure. Furthermore, with the expansion of the 
actors involved, a whole community of interests, by individuals, lawyers, and courts 
developed a stake – professional, financial, and social – in the successful administration of 
Community law by and through the national judiciary and have thus acted as an agency for its 
successful reception.TPF491FPT 
 
Thirdly, the legal formalism, which remains a very substantial power in European 
jurisprudence, seems to play a considerable part in facilitating national courts’ compliance to 
the ECJ.TPF492FPT As Weiler points out, “The constitutional interpretations given to the Treaty of 
Rome by the European Court carried a legitimacy deriving from two sources: first from the 
composition of the European Court which had as members senior jurists from all Member 
States; and, second, from the legal language itself, the language of reasoned interpretation, 
‘logical deduction’, systemic and temporal coherence, the artifacts which national courts 
would partly rely upon to enlist obedience within their own national courts.”TPF493FPT Put simply, 
the high quality of the Court and its works can be one explanation of the national courts’ 
willingness to comply. 
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Last but not least, according to Weiler’s analysis, national courts’ cooperation may be rooted 
in the transnational horizontal nature of the process.TPF494FPT Sometimes courts in one member state 
tend to respect and accept what their counterparts in other member states are doing. In order 
to keep its own professional pride and prestige, a court may feel obligatory to accept a new 
doctrine when other similarly positioned courts have committed themselves. Especially when 
the court is satisfied that it is a part of a trend, its acceptance facilitated considerably. 
 
All in all, these elements make national courts “has [have] come to accept the constitutional 
doctrines, structural and material, of the European Court.”TPF495 FPT It seems that to understand 
these elements may play a role in helping us to explore whether a similar harmoniously 
cooperative relationship could be build between the Hong Kong judiciary, especially the CFA, 
and the NPCSC under the interpretation mechanism established by article 158 of the Basic 
Law. 
 
Notably, EU member states enjoy sovereignty, but their national courts show a cooperative 
attitude to the ECJ’s authority in interpreting the EU law, and make reference to the ECJ 
quite voluntarily, happily turning themselves into the role of EU judicial institutions; As a 
result, the uniformity of EU legal order was ensured. The integration of EU has been thereby 
enhanced considerably. Hong Kong, as a special administrative region of China, has no 
sovereign status; it should thus be much easier for its courts, particularly the CFA, to adopt a 
coordinative, dialogic attitude to the NPCSC’s authority in interpreting the Basic Law. They 
should be happy to refer cases to the NPCSC, rather than being reluctant, resisting or 
competing. However, the difference between the EU’s preliminary reference procedure and 
the Basic Law’s interpretation arrangement is that in Hong Kong only the CFA has the 
reference obligation: Unlike the national lower courts in EU member states which can initiate 
the reference procedure, Hong Kong lower courts have neither duty nor discretion to make a 
reference to the NPCSC. They can interpret all the provisions of the Basic Law themselves so 
long as their judgement will not be final. As examined, the CFA, like some EU member 
states’ national supreme courts, has shown its unwillingness to refer issues to the NPCSC. 
However, from the EU’s experience, I do believe that Hong Kong courts, particularly the 
CFA, should define themselves not only as regional tribunals, but also national judiciary 
enforcing a national statute, the Basic Law, which serves at the same time as HKSAR’s 
constitutional law. Moreover, it seems appropriate here to suggest an amendment to article 
158 of the Basic Law to confer Hong Kong lower courts the discretion of directly referring 
provisions of the Basic Law which are outside the autonomous scope to the NPCSC for 
interpretation. In addition, private litigants may have a role to play in persuading courts to 
make reference as well. As for the NPCSC, it should place a heavier emphasis on the legal 
formalism aspect, inter alia, giving itself a quasi-judicial role and producing the text of 
interpretation with quality legal reasoning, so that its attractiveness for reference from Hong 
Kong courts would increase considerably. In a word, the EU lessons tell us that a structured 
and ongoing conversation, co-operation and mutual trust are desirable for Hong Kong courts, 
especially the CFA, and the NPCSC to achieve a harmonious relationship between the two 
legal systems and a uniform constitutional order required by the “one country” aspect of the 
“one country, two systems” formula. 
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4 Acts of State 
Acts of state are excluded from the CFA’s jurisdiction. While confirming and guaranteeing 
extensive jurisdiction of HKSAR’s judiciary, the Basic Law also explicitly provides that all 
the courts in HKSAR have no jurisdiction over “acts of state such as defence and foreign 
affairs.”TPF496FPT Moreover, it designs a mechanism to make the restriction executable, requiring 
that when an issue concerning an act of state arises in the adjudication of a case, the court 
must obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive (CE) on questions of fact and the 
certificate should be binding on the court. The CE is obliged to obtain a certifying document 
from the Central Government before issuing such a certificate. TPF497FPT As we know, the Basic 
Law is an elaboration and legalisation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984. However, 
in the Joint Declaration there is no such restriction. This provides an excuse for the opponents 
to question the exclusion of acts of state from the jurisdiction of the courts in HKSAR.TPF498FPT But 
the Joint Declaration does clearly proclaim that foreign and defence affairs are exclusively 
the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government. TPF499FPT Some scholars thus conceive that 
the phrase “foreign and defence affairs” in the Joint Declaration modifies the whole 
administration in HKSAR, including the judiciary. In their view, this inclusion makes the 
Basic Law’s restriction of the Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction by “acts of state” seem 
consistent with the Joint Declaration.TPF500FPT In order to smoothly carry out the preparatory work 
of the establishment of Hong Kong’s new supreme judiciary in the transitional period, Britain 
and China concluded the Court of Final Appeal Agreement in June of 1995. In the Agreement, 
Britain agreed to amend the draft of the Court of Final Appeal Bill and add the formulation of 
“acts of state” provided by Article 19 of the Basic Law into the bill to restrict the jurisdiction 
of the CFA.TPF501FPT Finally paragraph 3 of article 19 of the Basic Law was copied into section 4 of 
the bill and passed by the Legislature as the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Court 
Ordinance, which served as a domestic legal foundation for the future establishment and 
operation of the CFA. 
 
The issue of “acts of state” was a controversial question from the beginning of drafting the 
Basic Law. As we know, China is extremely sensitive to issues concerning its sovereignty. It 
always holds a firm or even rigid stance on those issues. Clearly, “acts of state” is exactly 
such an issue, and thus we could imagine what attitude China would naturally have when 
dealing with it. Indeed, in the initial 1988 version of the draft of article 19 a much broader 
restriction on the jurisdiction of HKSAR’s courts was suggested, which reflected China’s 
great concern of the sensitive sovereignty elements in the issue. The 1988 draft said, “Courts 
of the HKSAR shall have no jurisdiction over cases relating to defence and foreign affairs, 
which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, and cases relating to the 
executive acts of the Central People’s Government. Courts of the HKSAR shall seek the 
advice of the Chief Executive whenever questions concerning defence, foreign affairs or the 
executive acts of the Central People’s Government arise in any legal proceedings. A 
statement issued by the Chief Executive regarding such questions shall be binding on the 
courts. Before issuing such a statement, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certificate from the 
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Standing Committee of the NPC or the State Council” (emphasis added). This version was 
strongly criticised and opposed by many commentators and members of the drafting 
committee, particularly Martin Lee, a barrister and the leader of Hong Kong Democratic 
Party, as they thought such a broad exclusion would encroach on the promised autonomy and 
the rule of law in the future HKSAR. As a result of their efforts, the 1989 version of the draft 
deleted the formulation of “the executive acts of the Central People’s Government” and 
narrowed the exclusion considerably. In a more succinct way, the draft provided, “Courts of 
the HKSAR shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state. Courts of the HKSAR shall obtain a 
statement from the Chief Executive on questions concerning the acts of state whenever 
questions arise in any legal proceedings. This statement shall be binding on the courts. 
Before issuing such a statement, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certificate from the 
Central People’s Government”. However, this version did not receive the necessary two-
thirds votes of the drafters and thus failed to be adopted. Based on it, after some revisions 
were made, the final version eventually was formed and passed.TPF502FPT 
 
What worries the critics most is the definition and scope of the “acts of state”. The Basic Law 
and the CFA Ordinance do not define what acts of state exactly are. Do they just refer to 
defence and foreign affairs? The answer seems to be negative as in art.19 of the Basic Law 
and section 4 of the CFA Ordinance the words “defence and foreign affairs” merely serve as 
giving examples to what may be acts of state. They follow the words “such as”, appearing to 
be not exhaustive. Then what else may be considered to be acts of state? Can they be hung 
together with the common law conception of “act of state”? Some commentators, particularly 
Jared Leung, Simon Holberton and Frank Ching, believe that the conception of acts of state 
in common law “typically relate[s] to the making of treaties with foreign countries, 
declarations of law and the seizure of land and goods in right of conquest”.TPF 503 FPT But the 
common law definition was not adopted to be written in the Basic Law and the CFA 
Ordinance despite suggestions from some drafters. This fact, conceived by the mentioned 
commentators, implies there is actually difference between the “acts of state” in the Basic 
Law and those in common law doctrine. TPF504FPT 
 
Conversely, Professor Yash Ghai argues that it is possible to interpret art.19 of the Basic Law 
and s.4 of the CFA Ordinance as consistent with the common law doctrine of act of state.TPF505FPT 
In his opinion, although art.19 says that acts of state are not within Hong Kong courts’ 
jurisdiction, it does not necessarily mean the courts cannot consider cases which involve acts 
of state at all. Nor does an executive certificate which is conclusive only on points of fact 
relevant to the act of state do so. Indeed, it is the courts’ responsibility to decide whether 
there is actually an act of state in existence. To Ghai, this is the same position as common law. 
Ghai also believes that the act of state in common law is not just limited to defence and 
foreign affairs and this perhaps can match the scope of acts of state implied in art.19 and s.4. 
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Based on these considerations, he concludes that the provisions about acts of state in art.19 
and s.4 seem superfluous and unnecessary, for the provisions of continuing the common law 
in HKSAR and that the courts’ must be subject to the jurisdiction restrictions imposed on 
them by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong could be enough to 
ensure the Central Government’s concern with issues of acts of state. In other words, he 
thinks writing the formulation of acts of state into art.19 and s.4 does not provide additional 
safeguards to the Central Government’s interest. 
 
However, with respect, I have to disagree with Professor Ghai’s view. Actually, there are 
differences between the common law doctrine of act of state and that in the Basic Law. The 
gap is so deep that makes it difficult to reconcile them. In fact, the formulation of “acts of 
state” in the Basic Law and the CFA Ordinance makes the scope of the CFA’s jurisdiction 
considerably narrower than the common law concept of “act of state” would do. In other 
words, China’s “acts of state” would exclude more affairs from the purview of the courts than 
the common law “act of state” could do. 
 
In English common law, the expression of “act of state” is generally used to describe “an act 
done by the Crown as a matter of policy in relation to another State or to an individual who is 
not within the allegiance to the Crown.”TPF506FPT Dr. E. C. S. Wade defined it as “an act of the 
executive as a matter of policy performed in the course of its relations with another state 
including its relations with the subjects of that state, unless they are temporarily within the 
allegiance of the Crown”,TPF507FPT a definition formula recognised by the House of Lords in Nissan. 
TPF
508
FPT Put another way, acts of state in common law appear to fall into two groups. “First, they 
may be acts in relation to foreign States such as the declaration of war or the annexation of 
territory. Secondly, in certain classes of case, an act of sovereign power relating to an 
individual may be claimed to be an act of State in order to prevent the grieved person 
claiming redress for damage done.”TPF509FPT Act of state cannot be pleaded by the Crown against 
its own subjects and alien friends within its jurisdiction. As reiterated by the House of Lords, 
an act of state “presupposes an activity outside the country, since there is no such thing as an 
act of state in this country. It must be judged on a geographical basis.”TPF510FPT o the Lords, that 
explains why enforcement of treaties which may affect persons within the jurisdiction must 
be authorised by Parliament through enacting new statutes.TPF511FPT The foundation of act of state 
in the English common law is: allegiance carries protection. The Crown has the duty to 
protect those who owe allegiance to it, including its subjects and alien friends within its 
territory. They should be treated differently from enemy aliens. As for British subjects, their 
right to compensation and the Crown’s inability to plead act of state arise even outside the 
jurisdiction of the state, for the subjects owe allegiance in any part of the world and the 
obligation of the Crown is reciprocal.TPF512FPT In a word, the act of state doctrine cannot be used 
against a British subject anywhere, neither in his/her own country nor abroad. 
 
It is worth noting that, even as far as the foreigners abroad are concerned, the rapid 
development of human rights law in recent years makes it more difficult to oust a court’s 
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jurisdiction by employing the doctrine of act of state. In Regina (Al-Skeini and others) v. 
Secretary of State for Defence,TPF513FPT the House of Lords held that the Human Rights Act 1998 
could be applied to a public authority acting not only in the United Kingdom but also within 
its article 1 jurisdiction outside its territory and the European Human Rights Convention may 
also bind a state or its military bases, embassies and consular agents outside its territory under 
certain circumstances. The significance of this decision is that the House of Lords implies 
that an action violating human rights, despite being in the name of act of state, could not be 
allowed to escape from the examination of a court. As a result, it seems that under English 
common law to exclude courts’ jurisdiction by pleading the doctrine of act of state may face 
increasingly challenge from the Human Rights Act in the future. 
 
The Basic Law is a Chinese national statute although it enjoys a semi-constitutional status in 
HKSAR. The definition of acts of state in art.19 of the Basic Law should be determined by 
the relevant doctrine in Chinese law. The interpretation mechanism designed in art.158 of the 
Basic Law guarantees the final power of the NPCSC in interpreting the provisions which 
concern the affairs outside the autonomy of HKSAR and relations between HKSAR and the 
Central Government.TPF 514 FPT Apparently, act of state in art.19 belongs to this category. 
Unfortunately, however, in China there is little development of the doctrine of acts of state 
either in practice or in theory. Among all China’s effective national legislation, so far there 
are only three pieces clearly mentioning the expression of “acts of state.”TPF 515 FPT One is the 
Administrative Procedure Law, of which art.12 provides that the people’s courts shall not 
accept cases against acts of state in areas such as national defence and foreign affairs.TPF516FPT The 
other two are the Basic Law of HKSAR we are discussing now and the Basic Law of Macao 
SAR. All the three pieces of legislation do not define what acts of state exactly are. There are 
also no interpretations issued by the People’s Supreme Court or the NPCSC to define the 
concept, since in practice no cases concerning this issue have actually arisen so far. In spite of 
the lack of authority in practice, one thing is sure. It can be reasonably concluded that all the 
terms of acts of state in the three laws should be interpreted coherently and consistently as 
they all are national statutes enacted by the same national legislature, the NPC. If the 
formulation of acts of state in art.19 of the Basic Law of HKSAR is interpreted with the 
doctrine of common law while the term of acts of state in the Administrative Procedure Law 
is determined in accordance with Chinese law, how to ensure the uniformity of Chinese legal 
system demanded by its Constitution? TPF517FPT 
 
It must be noted that in Chinese language, there is no distinction between “acts of state” and 
“acts of the state”. Both are called “Guojia Xingwei (国家行为)” and tend to cover all actions 
made by the state. Chinese scholars have no consensus on the precise definition of acts of 
state and its legal meaning. The mainstream of academia in China puts acts of state into two 
categories: one is international, another is domestic. At the international level, acts of state 
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relate to a state’s dealing with the relationships with other states; in the domestic aspect, acts 
of state concern the acts of using state power by state’s institutions to govern the state.TPF518FPT 
According to Mr. Hu Jingguang, the primary element of acts of state is their highly political 
nature and it is this which makes the court unsuitable to handle them.TPF519FPT However, although 
acts of state are not justiciable, Chinese courts do in principle have the power to judge 
whether one governmental action is an act of state. If the answer is yes, then the courts should 
stop dealing with the matter. In fact, it must be pointed out that probably only the People’s 
Supreme Court may exercise the judging power because the primary actors of acts of state in 
China are conceived to be the national congress, the state president and the State Council,TPF520FPT 
over which the lower courts have no jurisdiction according to China’s legal practice. In 
principle, only the national highest judicial institution might be competent to examine certain 
of their actions.TPF521FPT 
 
Under the “one country, two systems” principle, do the courts in HKSAR also have the 
power to judge whether an act of Central Government is indeed an act of state over which the 
courts enjoy no jurisdiction? It seems that unlike their counterpart in mainland China, the 
People’ Supreme Court, the Hong Kong courts’ similar power has been considerably 
restricted by the mechanism in art.19 of the Basic Law, which makes the courts subject to the 
certificate provided by the Chief Executive after consulting the Central Government.TPF 522 F PT 
Moreover, even without this kind of certificate issuing arrangement, as required by art.158 of 
the Basic Law the CFA still has to refer the issue to the NPCSC for interpretation if there is a 
need to clarify the meaning of “acts of state”. Based on the Chinese version of the concept, 
acts of state which are excluded from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts may consist of 
more than merely the defence and foreign affairs exemplified in art.19 of the Basic Law. 
Arguably, besides them, other actions of the Central Government, such as the State Council’s 
appointing of the Chief Executive and Primary Officials in HKSAR, the decisions of the 
NPCSC to add or reduce the national laws listed in Annex III of the Basic Law to make them 
enforceable in HKSAR, and the declarations of the NPCSC to invalidate those laws 
previously enforced in HK due to its lack of conformity to the Basic Law, might be identified 
as “acts of state” from Chinese jurisprudence, which not only defines the concept from the 
angle of the international element, but also stresses its domestic aspect. 
 
All in all, the concept of act of state in Chinese law is much broader than that in the common 
law doctrine. Differently from the common law, acts of state in China can be employed by 
the state against its own citizens on its own land. The scope of them covers not only defence 
and foreign affairs but also other internal affairs which involve the state’s exercise of 
governing power. A greater emphasis is placed on the political nature of the act opposed to 
the allegiance which is grounded by the common law. Local courts, arguably including the 
CFA in SAR, have no competence to judge whether a state action is indeed an act of state.TPF523FPT 
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Anyway, the formulation of acts of state in art.19 of the Basic Law has to be determined by 
Chinese law, which would give a higher degree of restriction over the jurisdiction of the 
courts in HKSAR on the relevant issues than the common law would. As a result, the Central 
Government’s concern of safeguarding national interest may be provided much greater sense 
of satisfactory. However, this could also give rise to some degree of uncertainty in the area 
due to the fact that China lacks well-developed theory and judiciary practice on the doctrine. 
Fortunately, no cases concerning acts of state have actually arisen in HKSAR until now 
despite the SAR has been established more than 12 years. But we cannot exclude the 
possibility that one day this issue would face the CFA and the NPCSC. At that time, deferring 





The “one country, two systems” doctrine promises the Hong Kong judiciary’s enjoyment of 
independence, power of final appeal and extensive jurisdiction on the one hand. It imposes 
significant restrictions on their competence to deal with affairs concerning national sovereign 
interest on the other hand. These restrictions are primarily reflected in certain controversial 
jurisdictional issues such as constitutional judicial review, interpreting the Basic Law and 
acts of state, which largely define the CFA’s constitutional role. The Hong Kong courts’ 
exercise of constitutional review actually started from 1991 when the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance was enacted. After Hong Kong returned to China and the Basic Law took into 
effect in 1997, Hong Kong courts’ constitutional adjudication flourished, reflected 
significantly in the CFA’s active performance in Ng Ka Ling. The CFA’s assertion of 
competence to scrutinise legislative acts of the NPC and its Standing Committee was an 
attempt to establish Hong Kong judiciary’s authority and strengthen the region’s autonomy 
under its new constitutional order. However, this is incorrect and unacceptable from the 
perspective of Chinese legal system, which should, inherently required by the “one country, 
two systems” framework, be taken seriously by Hong Kong courts when handling issues 
concerning national elements. Rather, disclaiming jurisdiction over the national legislature’s 
acts might be beneficial to the Hong Kong judiciary’s independence and authority for that 
would not provoke the Central Authorities to employ their constitutional power and political 
means, which is too powerful to be resisted by Hong Kong judiciary, to interfere. However, 
there is no doubt that Hong Kong courts do have full jurisdiction to review the 
constitutionality of regional legislative and executive acts. They can examine whether these 
acts are compatible with the provisions of the Basic Law which fall within the autonomy of 
the region; but it is not suitable for them to scrutinise these local acts’ consistency with 
provisions of the Basic Law concerning the responsibility of the Central Government and the 
relationship between the Central Authorities and the region, which should be exercised by the 
NPCSC in accordance with art.17 of the Basic Law. Constitutional judicial review changes 
Hong Kong’s legal and political landscape, making a trend of judicial supremacy coexist with 
the officially claimed executive-led feature of the polity and the emergence of legislature 
dominance. Due to the fact that the power of amending the Basic Law is not enjoyed by Hong 
Kong institutions, Hong Kong’s legislative and executive branches are unable to put the 
courts in ultimate control of the democratic will by amending its constitution and in extreme 
circumstances may only invite the Central Government’s intervention to rebalance the local 
political order. Both the question of democratic legitimacy or accountability and the need to 
                                                                                                                                                        
adjudication of cases. This certificate shall be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief 
Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the Central People’s Government.” 
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maintain its independence and authority require the judiciary to be modest and restrained. In 
this regard, the UK model of judicial review in human rights cases, rather than the US way of 
constitutional review currently imitated by Hong Kong courts, seems more appropriate for 
Hong Kong judiciary to adopt. Essentially, that means the courts can only declare a law’s 
incompatibility with a constitutional standard but cannot invalidate the law under 
examination. Additionally, the courts should be careful not to exercise abstract constitutional 
review. In fact, the CFA seems have realised the courts’ limits and the necessity of being 
cautious and humble in constitutional adjudication. 
 
The mechanism of interpreting the Basic Law provided by art.158 excludes the CFA’s 
constitutional jurisdiction in relation to the Excluded Provisions and imposes on it a duty to 
refer these provisions to the NPCSC for interpretation, making the CFA the mere institutional 
channel connecting Hong Kong’s common law legal system with the national, socialist and 
civil law legal system. This requires the CFA to define its role beyond a local perspective. 
The concerns of the other system should be taken into account and taken seriously. However, 
in practice the CFA has indeed indicated a defensive attitude towards the NPCSC’s 
interpretative power probably because of its pride in its own common law tradition and the 
distrust and fear of the communist legal practice in mainland China. It established the 
purposive interpretation approach for guiding Hong Kong courts’ constitutional interpretative 
activities. But its construction of the purpose of art.158 of the Basic Law cannot be seen as 
absolutely correct due to its focus solely on the regional autonomy and ignoring of the 
national sovereign aspect which underlies art.158’s division of interpretative power. When 
using extrinsic materials to help identify the real intent of a Basic Law provision, the Court 
refused to adopt certain documents of the Preparatory Committee of the NPCSC for the 
establishment of the HKSAR. Indeed, there were signs that show the CFA oscillating 
between its assertion of purposive interpretation and sticking to the originalist approach. The 
decisive element seems to be whether there is a chance of invoking materials made by the 
authorities of the Central Government. If there is, the Court may tend to insist on the natural 
meaning of the Basic Law text. If there is not, purposive interpretation might prevail. As for 
the referral issue, the CFA established “classification condition” and “necessity condition” as 
the general tool to judge whether to refer an Excluded Provision to the NPCSC for 
interpretation. Specifically, it put forward the predominant provision test for dealing with the 
issue when both Excluded Provisions and non-Excluded Provisions are concerned. It further 
pointed out that it was the character of a provision, rather than the effect of its 
implementation, that should be considered when determining whether a provision is indeed 
an Excluded Provision. Notably, the CFA declared that it is for itself alone to decide whether 
to refer an issue. In my opinion, the appropriateness of the predominant provision test should 
be reconsidered, for it might have the effect of reducing the chance the NPCSC’s exercise of 
its interpretative power in certain circumstances. Moreover, the character of a Basic Law’s 
article may vary with the context. An appropriate test I suggest to replace the predominant 
provision test is the close relationship test or the absorbing test, which means where both 
Excluded Provisions and non-Excluded Provisions are concerned, if a close relationship 
exists between them in the context of the concrete case at stake, both of them should be 
referred to the NPCSC for interpretation as the Excluded Provision “absorbs” the non-
Excluded Provisions. To establish these interpretative approaches and tests, the CFA has 
actually interpreted art.158 of the Basic Law, which is apparently an Excluded Provision and 
should be interpreted by the NPCSC, and thus usurped the national authority’s constitutional 
power. The CFA’s refusal to refer issues to the NPCSC forced the Chief Executive to seek 
assistance from the State Council, who subsequently requested the NPCSC’s interpretation to 
rectify the CFA’s decision. Arguably, this can be seen as a constitutional convention forming 
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a correcting mechanism to the CFA’s behaviour. After Ng Ka Ling, the CFA retreated 
considerably from its bold stance by repeatedly acknowledging its respect for the NPCSC’s 
final authority on interpreting the Basic Law. This is a kind of self-adjust, which could avoid 
direct confrontation with the Central Authorities and reduce the chance of their intervention. 
In this regard, a lesson can be learnt from the EU experience. That is, in order to achieve a 
uniform legal order, a relationship of coordination, dialogue and mutual trust should be built 
between the CFA and the NPCSC; Hong Kong courts, especially the CFA, like their brethren 
in EU member states, should define themselves not only regional interests’ guardian but also 
national judicial institution. 
 
The concept of “acts of state” is an important exclusion of the CFA’s jurisdiction. One major 
problem is that there is no precise meaning of it provided in the Basic Law and the CFA 
Ordinance. This may have negative effects on the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction and give 
rise to certain degree of uncertainty. It is argued that the meaning of “acts of state” should be 
interpreted in accordance with Chinese jurisprudence, rather than the common law doctrine. 
Actually, there are significant differences between the two. In English common law, act of 
state involves mainly foreign elements. Usually it cannot be employed to against its own 
subjects and applied in its own territory. With the development of modern human rights law, 
the doctrine of act of state faces further restrictive requirements. However, in Chinese 
jurisprudence, much concern is placed on the political nature of the concept. Its scope covers 
not only the international level but also, notably, domestic aspect. That means state actions 
which could be identified as “acts of state” are not merely limited to foreign and defensive 
affairs. Lower courts, arguably including the CFA in Hong Kong, are of no competence to 
judge whether an activity is indeed an act of state. They are merely able passively to accept 
the relevant claim of the Central Authorities. Therefore, the Chinese version of acts of state 
tends to impose much more restrictions on Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction than the English 
Common Law doctrine could. That seems to be exactly the intent of the drafters of the Basic 
Law, who were greatly concerned with China’s sovereign interest in this regard. As the 
guardian of the Basic Law in Hong Kong, the CFA should abide by such constraints whether 
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Protection and Promotion of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
 
“…a written charter of rights, enforced by an independent judiciary, is central to the 
protection of personal liberty.”TPF524FPT 
 





When the issue of return to China was raised in the late 1970s and during the transitional 
period before 1997, especially after 1989’s Tiananmen Square event, one of the major 
concerns of the Hong Kong people and international community was how to ensure Hong 
Kong’s human rights would not be oppressed under communist China’s rule after 1997. 
Establishing the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) was perceived as an important institutional 
arrangement to maintain the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law and thus 
facilitate the protection of human rights in Hong Kong. Thus the local people had great 
expectations of the CFA.TPF525FPT Now Hong Kong has been governed by China for more than 
twelve years. Although during this period there have been several events and some facts 
viewed by certain observers as threats to human rights,TPF526FPT no human rights tragedy actually 
occurred and in daily life human rights are protected well generally. As the British 
Government acknowledges, after Hong Kong’s reunification with China, the rights and 
freedoms promised to Hong Kong in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law continue to be 
upheld.TPF527FPT The U.S. authority has delivered a similarly positive comment. TPF528FPT Of course this 
achievement results from many factors. Among them the courts, especially the CFA, play a 
significant part. It will be seen that the Court has not failed the people’s expectations. As a 
modern court with constitutional function, like its counterparts in other jurisdictions, one 
most important job of the CFA is to provide individuals with effective rights protection. The 
protection and promotion of human rights, as mentioned in Chapter 3, has been seen by many 
scholars as an important legitimisation of a constitutional court. In this chapter the CFA’s 
contributions to protecting fundamental rights and freedoms in Hong Kong will be 
investigated. There will be the following sections. The first one explains the legal and 
constitutional framework for human rights protection in Hong Kong. Then we will discuss 
                                                 
TP
524
PT Margaret H. Marshall, “ ‘Wise Parents do not Hesitate to Learn from the Children’: Interpreting State 
Constitutions in An Age of Global Jurisprudence”, (2004) 79 New York University Law Review, p1639 
TP
525
PT This can be, to some extent, reflected by Hong Kong pro-democrats’ struggle for a better settlement of the 
establishment of the CFA in 1990s. See James V. Feinerman, “Hong Kong Faces 1997: Legal and 
Constitutional Issues” in Warren I. Cohen and Li Zhao (eds), Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: the Economic 
and Political Implications of Reversion (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp79-84 
TP
526









PT U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macao), 25 
February 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm#hong_kong 
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the CFA’s generous interpretative approach and open-minded attitude in this respect, which 
demonstrate the CFA’s continuous efforts in improving human rights protection level in 
Hong Kong under the new constitutional order. After that, some leading cases decided by the 
CFA concerning certain fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression, 
demonstration and the right to equality, will be examined so that a clearer picture of the 
Court’s role in the area will emerge. Last, a brief conclusion will be drawn. 
 
2 The Legal and Constitutional Framework 
 
Britain did not adopt a rights charter for Hong Kong during its colonial rule. Nor were 
sufficient democratic rights conferred. However, Hong Kong residents did enjoy a degree of 
freedom safeguarded by the rule of law in this period. Under British governance, the 
protection of human rights in Hong Kong relied heavily on the common law system 
transferred from England. The judiciary based on the common law played a significant role in 
protecting individual freedoms in Hong Kong. In the early 1980s, the question of China’s 
resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong was put on the agenda. Hong 
Kong faced a historic change. To smooth Hong Kong’s transition and maintain its future 
stability and prosperity, many important arrangements were negotiated, agreed and adopted 
by China and Britain. Britain also took certain unilateral precautions in an attempt to prevent 
the perceived threats to human rights from mainland China after 1997. In the process, human 
rights were entrenched and constitutionalised by a series of legal documents, including the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984 (the Joint Declaration), the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (the Basic Law), and the 
Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 (BRO). These documents formed the legal and constitutional 
basis for human rights protection in Hong Kong after its reversion to China. 
 
The Joint Declaration encompasses the formal agreement of China and Britain on Hong 
Kong’s return to China on 1 July 1997, China’s basic policies regarding Hong Kong, and the 
two sides’ assurance of a smooth transfer. According to the basic policies declared by China, 
a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication, would be established, the existing legal, 
socio-economic and political structure were to survive the transfer of governance, the laws 
currently in force in Hong Kong would be basically unchanged, and rights and freedoms 
would be ensured by law. TPF529FPT These policies listed in the Declaration laid a foundation for the 
future protection of human rights in Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration also clearly provided 
that protecting human rights is an obligation of HKSAR Government and then elaborated 
such rights. It stated that: TPF530FPT 
 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall protect the rights and 
freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain 
the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, 
including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form 
and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, 
of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the 
freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely. 
 
                                                 
TP
529
PT Para.3 of the Sino-British Declaration. 
TP
530
PT The Section XIII of the Annex I of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 
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It also assured that the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong 
Kong would remain in force.TPF531FPT  
 
It must be noted that, although the Joint Declaration played a crucial role in ensuring the 
stable transition of Hong Kong, its legal status in the HKSAR is not completely solid. This 
may diminish its role in Hong Kong’s rights protection. The Joint Declaration is an 
international agreement between the Central Governments of China and Britain. Rather than 
being a party to the Declaration, Hong Kong is merely a “subject matter” of it. Despite the 
fact that the Joint Declaration was duly registered by both parties with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations, it has no direct effect in the HKSAR as Hong Kong practises a dualist 
approach toward international law, which requires that in order to be binding, international 
obligations must be incorporated into domestic law through enabling or implementing 
legislation. The Joint Declaration has not been adopted by the HKSAR legislature through an 
ordinance. Therefore, Hong Kong residents cannot directly invoke the provisions of the Joint 
Declaration to claim their rights before courts. However, judges always use the Declaration 
as valuable historical material to assist their interpretation of the Basic Law, a constitutional 
document elaborating the Joint Declaration and containing a rights charter for Hong Kong 
residents.TPF532 FPT Thus, the Joint Declaration is an important legal document for human rights 
protection in Hong Kong. In addition, it could also serve as a legitimate basis for the 
international community to oversee China’s commitments to Hong Kong’s human rights 
guarantee. 
 
The Basic Law, a mini constitution for HKSAR, is the most important legal foundation for 
achieving human rights in the Region. First of all, based on the Joint Declaration, the Basic 
Law puts a new constitutional order in place for Hong Kong, under which the rule of law, the 
core foundation for the protection of human rights, is ensured. As far as the legal system is 
concerned, the Basic Law provides that: the common law and laws previously in force are to 
be maintained, unless found inconsistent with the Basic Law or amended by the 
legislature;TPF 533 FPT the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed, and judges are given full 
security of tenure;TPF534FPT Hong Kong residents are assured of the right to bring legal proceedings 
against acts of the executive authorities.TPF535FPT These, and other guarantees, ensure that the rule 
of law prevails in Hong Kong and thus provide a solid foundation for protecting human rights. 
An exclusive chapter on fundamental Rights and freedoms of the residents (Chapter III) is 
written into the Basic Law to enshrine various human rights, including: freedom of speech, of 
the press and of publication, of assembly (art.27); freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, 
detention or imprisonment (art. 28); freedom from arbitrary or unlawful search of, or 
intrusion into, a resident’s home or other premises (article 29). Notably, article 39 in the 
Chapter III of the Basic Law creates a framework for domestic application of international 
human rights law in Hong Kong: 
 
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as 
applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 






PT The Basic Law, Chapter III 
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PT Art.8 of the Basic Law 
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PT Art.2, 80,85,and 89 of the Basic Law 
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The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as 
prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph of this Article. 
 
There are also provisions in other chapters of the Basic Law relating to rights or means to 
exercise them.TPF536 FPT For example, the right of property and of the ownership of enterprises 
appears in Chapter V (Economy),TPF537FPT and the presumption of innocence and the right to trial 
by jury are in Chapter IV (Judiciary).TPF538FPT 
 
As the Basic Law serves as a constitutional document for Hong Kong and no law applied in 
Hong Kong is allowed to be inconsistent with it, the extensive rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by it obtain a constitutional status. The Basic Law also provides a much larger 
scope for judicial challenge of government actions than before reunification, primarily by 
giving the courts in Hong Kong the possibility to exercise constitutional judicial review 
power, one critical element in improving the level of protection of human rights in a modern 
society committed to constitutionalism. 
 
The third important legal document is the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, which was 
enacted by the Legislature of Hong Kong in June 1991 to codify and incorporate the 
provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as a domestic law 
of Hong Kong. Accordingly, the British authority amended the Letters Patent, the 
constitution of Hong Kong of the day, to entrench constitutionally the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance, making it superior to all other subsequent primary legislation passed by the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council. The Legislative Council was banned from enacting law 
inconsistent with the Ordinance.TPF539FPT There were provisions in the Ordinance itself making it 
enjoy a special status as well. For example, section 2(3) spells out the purpose of the Bill as 
the domestication of the ICCPR and thus requires the courts to take the history, purposes and 
international jurisprudence of the ICCPR into consideration in interpreting the Bill; Section 3 
states that all pre-existing legislation that admits of a construction consistent with this 
ordinance shall be given such a construction, and that all pre-existing legislation that does not 
admit of such a construction consistent with the Ordinance is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, repealed; Section 4 states that all legislation enacted on or after the 
commencement dates shall, to the extent that it admits of such a construction, be construed so 
as to be consistent with the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. 
 
It must be pointed out that the ICCPR, along with the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, was extended to Hong Kong by the United Kingdom as long ago 
as 1976. But no legislation was made to incorporate them into Hong Kong’s domestic law 
and thus those rights were not legally enforceable in Hong Kong for a long period. However, 
why did Britain suddenly decide to domesticate and even constitutionise the Bill of Rights for 
Hong Kong in 1991? The primary reason seemed to be a response to the consequences of the 
Tiananmen Square Event on the 4Pth P June 1989, which provoked the Hong Kong people’s 
great fear of the likely oppression of human rights after Hong Kong’s reunification with 
                                                 
TP
536
PT Michael C. Davis, “Constitutionalism and Political Culture: the Debate over Human Rights and Asian 
Values”, (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal, p109. 
TP
537
PT Article 105 of the Basic Law. 
TP
538
PT Article 86, 87 of the Basic Law. 
TP
539
PT Hong Kong Letters Patent, No.2 1991, reprinted in Public Law and Human Rights: A Hong Kong Source 
Book 19 (Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan eds., 1993) 
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mainland China.TPF540FPT Due to its distrust of the Chinese authorities of the day, the British side 
unilaterally adopted some important policies regarding Hong Kong, such as to speed the 
democratisation process and enact the Bill of Rights Ordinance, in an attempt to take 
precautions against the anticipated abuse of rights from China in the future and thus ease 
people’s worry. 
 
The Chinese government opposed the Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991, claiming it breached the 
Basic Law and the Joint Declaration and would have negative impact on the future 
application of the Basic Law in HKSAR.TPF 541 FPT China’s arguments primarily included: the 
“automatic repeal” in Section 3, inter alia, gave the Ordinance a special quality which placed 
it above other law; the Ordinance restricted the legislative capability of the Legislative 
Council; and it changed the previous judicial practice by providing courts with the power of 
reviewing legislation. In February 1997, prior to the handover, when reviewing the law 
previously in force in Hong Kong in accordance with art.160 of the Basic Law, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) of China amended the Ordinance by 
deleting section 2(3), 3 and 4 from it. TPF542FPT The original provisions of the Societies Ordinance 
and the Public Order Ordinance, which had been amended or repealed by Hong Kong 
legislature on the ground of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991, were 
restored to the statute book by the NPCSC. TPF543FPT 
 
Beijing’s action worried many people. They, typically represented by Martin Lee, lamented 
“It [the Ordinance] would in name still be a bill of rights, but it would offer no real protection 
against the passage of law by a Beijing-controlled legislature. Without these sections, a 
Beijing-appointed legislature could clearly introduce and pass laws that would be in blatant 
contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
Hong Kong courts would have no choice but to enforce these repressive laws.”TPF544FPT Has his 
anticipation come true? The answer is certainly not. It seems he had forgotten the Basic Law. 
The Basic Law guarantees a democratic legislature, rather than “a Beijing-appointed” one, for 
Hong Kong. This legislature, of which Martin Lee himself had been a member for about ten 
years since reunification, consists of various political forces and it is thus hard for it to pass 
laws “in blatant contravention of” human rights. More importantly, the Basic Law entrenches 
extensive rights and freedoms. Most significantly, art.39 of the Basic Law domesticates and 
constitutionalises all the rights contained in ICCPR, ICESCR and international labour 
conventions. Relying on the power of interpreting the Basic Law, Hong Kong courts gain the 
jurisdiction of constitutional review over local legislation and executive actions. They can 
scrutinise their compatibility with the rights not only guaranteed in the Basic Law itself but 
also contained in the mentioned international treaties. This has become a powerful weapon 
for the protection of human rights indeed. Now, let us look at the courts’ role, particularly the 
CFA’ performance, in this regard. 
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540
PT Martin C. M. Lee, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Implications for 1997”, (1996) 547 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, p169.  
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541
PT The Talk of the Spoksperson of the Foreign Ministry on 6 June 1991 on the Enactment of the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance by the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, at http://www.humanrights-
china.org/china/rqlc/C3052001117145428.htm (visited on 6 March 2008)  
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542
PT Section 7, Annex II, The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the 
Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, at 
http://www.locpg.gov.cn/big5/fvfg/jbxgwj/200702/t20070224_1643.asp (visited on 6 March 2008) 
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PT Ibid, at section 9, 10. 
TP
544
PT Martin C. M. Lee, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Implications for 1997”, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.547 (Sep. 1996), p168. 
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3 Generous Interpretation Approach 
 
Basically, the CFA may be marked as a liberal court in terms of its positive attitude towards 
human rights protection and promotion. So far the CFA does not seem to disappoint those 
who expected it would play a pivotal role in safeguarding the rule of law and human rights in 
post-handover Hong Kong. The most important principle developed by the CFA, which 
serves as the foundational approach for the courts in HKSAR to deal with human rights cases, 
might be the test of generous interpretation firstly adopted in Ng Ka Ling.TPF545FPT Ng Ka Ling was 
heard by the CFA in January 1999, just about one and a half year after reunification. It was an 
appropriate time for the CFA to set out certain authoritative guidelines regarding rights 
protection for all the courts in HKSAR. 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, there are considerable controversies about the CFA’s decision 
in Ng Ka Ling, mainly concerning the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction and the reference 
issue. The CFA’s holdings involving these issues have been considerably amended by the 
subsequent interpretation of the NPCSC. However, notably, there is little controversy about 
the generous interpretation approach affirmed by the CFA to deal with rights provisions of 
the Basic Law and this approach is not touched by the interpretation of the NPCSC either. 
Thus it remains an effective instrument for all the courts in Hong Kong to employ when 
determining human rights disputes. 
 
The CFA stated its generous interpretation approach in Ng Ka Ling as follows: TPF546FPT 
 
Chapter III of the Basic Law begins by defining the class constituting Hong Kong residents 
including permanent and non-permanent residents and then provides for the rights and duties 
of the residents, including the rights of abode in the case of permanent residents. What is set 
out in Chapter III, after the definition of the class, are the constitutional guarantees for the 
freedoms that lie at the heart of Hong Kong’s separate system. The courts should give a 
generous interpretation to the provisions in Chapter III that contain these constitutional 
guarantees in order to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights 
and freedoms so constitutionally guaranteed. 
 
Regarding the CFA’s statement, three points should be addressed. First of all, it must be kept 
in mind that, literally speaking, the scope of applying a generous interpretation approach is 
limited by the CFA merely to the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Basic Law, which 
is entitled “Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents”. As we mentioned earlier, 
however, other chapters of the Basic Law also have provisions guaranteeing certain rights 
such as the rights of propertyTPF547FPT, the presumption of innocence and the right to trial by juryTPF548FPT. 
It is hard to say that these rights do not “lie at the heart of Hong Kong’s separate system”. 
They are of course constitutionally guaranteed rights although ostensibly they are not 
identified as fundamental rights and freedoms by being placed in Chapter III. Actually, these 
rights do not appear to be less fundamental or less important than those provided in Chapter 
III. Contrarily, in certain cases they may even be more fundamental or more important than 
some rights entrenched in Chapter III. Then the question should be raised here is whether the 
generous interpretation approach could also be applied to construing these provisions outside 
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Chapter III? If not, then what test should be established for their interpretation? The CFA did 
not touch the question in Ng Ka Ling. Curiously, I find no commentators discussing the issue. 
But the question is so important for human rights protection that the CFA would have to 
address it some day. In my opinion, there seems to be no reason to treat these provisions 
differently from those stated in Chapter III. It seems inappropriate to make certain articles of 
the Basic Law enjoy a higher status than other articles of the same Basic Law, especially 
among those concerning the similarly constitutionalised rights. Therefore to apply the 
generous interpretation approach equally to the rights guaranteed by provisions of the Basic 
Law beyond Chapter III might be a proper answer. 
 
The second issue deserving consideration here is the implication of the generous 
interpretation approach to the domestical application of international human rights law in 
Hong Kong. Notably, art.39, a provision contained in Chapter III of the Basic Law, affirms 
the continuation of the effectiveness of the ICCPR, ICESCR and the international labour 
conventions and their implementation in Hong Kong after 1997.TPF549FPT It can be argued further 
that these international human rights laws are in fact constitutionalised by art.39 of the Basic 
Law as art.39 limits the legislative capacity of the legislature of HKSAR to pass laws which 
contravene the provisions of these international documents.TPF550FPT Therefore, art.39 can be seen 
as a door, through which the rights provided by the ICCPR, ICESCR and the international 
labour conventions are able to, in one sense, come into the Basic Law and become a part or at 
least an attachment of Chapter III of the Basic Law. If the argument is convincing, then one 
subsequent question should be asked, that is, can the CFA’s generous interpretation test 
regarding articles in Chapter III of the Basic Law be equally applied to the interpretation of 
the provisions of the above mentioned international human rights instruments which are 
incorporated by HKSAR law?TPF551FPT There seems to be no hint in Ng Ka Ling. In fact, the answer 
appears three years later in Shum Kwok Sher.TPF552FPT In this case the CFA expressly states that the 
purposive and generous approach established in Ng Ka Ling for interpretation of fundamental 
rights is to be adopted to the provisions of Hong Kong Bill of Rights,TPF553FPT which is set out in 
Part II of the Hong Kong Bill of Right Ordinance and serves to incorporate the provisions of 
the ICCPR into Hong Kong laws. 
 
Another point should be noted is that, although the CFA limits the scope of the application of 
the generous interpretation approach to the provisions in Chapter III of the Basic Law, this is 
by no means to say that all the articles in Chapter III would be subject to this approach. 
Generally there are three types of provision in Chapter III. Besides those directly pointing to 
fundamental freedoms and rights, the other two are the articles defining the class of Hong 
Kong residentsTPF554FPT and the provision setting out the constitutional duties of the residentsTPF555FPT. In 
the CFA’s view, only the provisions in Chapter III that contain constitutional guarantees for 
the freedoms, rather than all the articles of the Chapter, should be given generous 
interpretation.TPF556FPT One of the major issues of the Ng Ka Ling was to deliver an appropriate 
interpretation of article 24(2) in Chapter III, which concerns identifying permanent resident 
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status. The CFA pointed out, “when interpreting the provisions that define the class of Hong 
Kong residents, including in particular the class of permanent residents (as opposed to the 
constitutional guarantees of their rights and freedoms), the courts should simply consider the 
language in the light of any ascertainable purpose and the context.” TPF557FPT However, the CFA 
recognised that the right of abode stated in art. 24(3) is a fundamental right and thus should 
be generously interpreted. But obviously, enjoying the permanent resident status is the 
prerequisite to exercise the right of abode. So cutting the contents of art.24 into two parts, one 
of which is given generous interpretation and another is not, seems inappropriate. 
 
It must be pointed out that the CFA’s generosity towards the protection of human rights is 
also reflected in its attitude to restrictions on rights. In Gurung Kesh Bahadur v. Director of 
Immigration, TPF558 FPT while restating that a generous approach should be adopted to make the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights and freedoms, the Court held that restrictions to these 
rights and freedoms should be narrowly interpreted. TPF559 FPT In another case, the Court further 
stresses that “Needless to say, in a society governed by the rule of law, the courts must be 
vigilant in the protection of fundamental rights and must rigorously examine any restriction 
that may be placed on them.”TPF 560 FPT The Court also believes that the burden is on the 
Government to justify any restriction.TPF561FPT 
 
4 Open-mindedness: Comparative Approach, Amicus Curiae, and Adaptation of 
Traditional Tests 
 
The CFA’s liberal stance to the protection and promotion of fundamental rights can be further 
demonstrated by its open-minded attitude in the using of international human rights 
jurisprudence and other jurisdictions’ experience to assist its analysis of rights issues. This 
attitude is reflected in the Chief Justice’s highlighting of the importance and significance of 
the comparative jurisprudence to judicial work.TPF 562 FPT It can also be proved by the CFA’s 
decision on Shum Kwok Sher.TPF563FPTIn that case the Court had to determine whether the common 
law offence of public misconduct contravened the ICCPR due to its vagueness, uncertainty 
and ill-defined-ness alleged by the appellant. As the provisions of the ICCPR were 
incorporated into Hong Kong domestic law by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 
accordingly, the CFA acknowledged that the provisions of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
were the embodiment of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. Then the CFA, as already 
mentioned, confirmed that the generous interpretation given to the Chapter III of the Basic 
Law should also be given to the provisions of the Bill as the object of those provisions was to 
guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of the residents of the HKSAR. Notably, the 
CFA went further and significantly developed a new approach. It stated that “In interpreting 
the provisions of Ch. III of the Basic Law and the provisions of the Bill, the Court may 
consider it appropriate to take account of the established principles of international 
jurisprudence as well as the decisions of international and national courts and tribunals on 
like or substantially similar provisions in the ICCPR, other international instruments and 
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national constitutions.”TPF 564 FPT Based on this open-minded comparative approach, the CFA 
referred to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which equated the expression 
“prescribed by law” to the principle of legal certainty, set out the requirements of that 
principle and held that these requirements were applicable to the provisions in the Basic Law 
and the Bill of Rights which corresponded to the relevant provisions in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.TPF565FPT 
 
This approach, being heavily relied upon by the CFA in Shum Kwok Sher, seems to be able to 
enhance considerably the level and quality of protecting the constitutional rights enjoyed by 
Hong Kong residents, through incorporating and applying the advanced jurisprudence of 
human rights law in other jurisdictions. Moreover, it considerably, in one sense, broadens the 
sources of Hong Kong law in this area. That would provide people with more options and 
weapons when presenting their arguments before the courts. However, there might also be a 
risk of causing uncertainty and inaccessibility of law, since the scope of authoritative 
references set out here by the CFA is extremely wide and almost unlimited, covering all other 
jurisdictions from national tribunals to international courts and including not only judicial 
decisions but also international jurisprudence. In practice litigants might find themselves 
drowned by the sea of authority. Thus it might be difficult for them to ascertain or predict the 
law due to the impossibility of access to all the jurisprudence and judgments in all the 
jurisdictions above mentioned. 
 
Arguably, this open-minded approach established by the CFA, which would have the effect 
of broadening the sources of Hong Kong human rights law significantly, seems lack a solid 
constitutional ground. The CFA merely declared that the approach should be adopted, 
without giving any reason and legal analysis to support. There is no provision in the Basic 
Law expressively upholding it. Although art.84 of the Basic Law authorises the courts in 
HKSAR “may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions” when adjudicating 
cases, the established principles of international jurisprudence as well as the decisions of 
international and national courts and tribunals referred to by the CFA in Shum Kwok Sher 
seem unlikely to fall within the meaning of “other common law jurisdictions” stated in art.84. 
It is apparent that European continent countries, such as France and Germany, are not 
common law jurisdictions. Their courts get their guidance mainly from the legislation and the 
courts’ judgments, unlike in common law jurisdictions, need not to be followed by future 
courts as an authoritative source of law. Moreover, not all the international courts embrace 
common law practices. Strictly speaking, even the European Court of Human Rights whose 
decisions are heavily relied upon by the CFA in the case can hardly be viewed as a common 
law jurisdiction allowed by art.84 of the Basic Law. Therefore the constitutional foundation 
of the CFA’s open-minded comparative approach for handling human rights cases appears 
weak. 
 
One of the major benefits of referring to other jurisdictions’ authorities seems to be that the 
quality of courts’ application of fundamental rights law could be enhanced greatly by the 
assistance provided by such authorities. In other words, the CFA probably realises that 
keeping an open mind and acquiring assistance from extrinsic sources in the course of 
adjudication would be essential to facilitating its efforts in safeguarding human rights in 
HKSAR. This attitude is further indicated in Chan Wah,TPF566FPTa case in which the government’s 
arrangements for electing village representatives were challenged primarily on the grounds of 
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sex discrimination and violation of the right to participate in public life. As far as the issue of 
discrimination is concerned, under the election arrangements, non-indigenous women 
married to indigenous villagers had the right to vote, but non-indigenous men married to 
indigenous villagers were excluded from voting. This was alleged to be discrimination 
against men. During the course of litigation, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), a 
statutory body created by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance with the task of working towards 
the elimination of discrimination, applied to the CFA for leave to appear as an amicus curiae 
at the hearing of these appeals. After careful consideration, the CFA delivered a ruling to give 
leave to the EOC to provide the Court with services of counsel who would make submissions 
as an amicus.TPF567FPT It was affirmed that the role of an amicus curiae was to help the court by 
expounding the law impartially, or if one of the parties were unrepresented, by advancing the 
legal arguments on his behalf. The implication of this ruling is that it opens a channel for 
human rights organisations to show their concerns and provide opinions to the courts. Just 
like the decision of Shum Kwok Sher opens a door for authorities from other jurisdictions, this 
would be of great help to the protection of human rights. Notably, although in this case the 
EOC was merely allowed to provide counsel service to the Court, the CFA realised with a 
clear mind that there might be future cases in which the EOC would seek to intervene to 
advocate a particular result. However, it is unclear whether the CFA would continue to be so 
liberal as to admit the EOC to act as an intervener at that time. 
 
Moreover, the CFA also showed its open-mindedness in Sin Hoi Chu, TPF 568 FPT in which the 
plaintiffs claimed right of abode on the ground, inter alia, of breach of their legitimate 
expectations. The CFA indicated its readiness of developing and reforming traditional legal 
test when constitutional rights are concerned. When discussing the standard of judicial review 
where legitimate expectations were disappointed, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ tended to welcome 
an adaptation and development of conventional TWednesbury testTTPF569FPTT when the test would be 
used to analyze a case concerning fundamental rights. He observed, 
 
T“…where human rights are engaged there can be such a thing as … ‘the conventional 
Wednesbury basis adapted to a human rights context’. I am by no means committed to the 
Wednesbury test. In particular, I am mindful of Lord Cooke of Thorndon’s caveat … that ‘It 
may well be …that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a 
finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd’. My purpose in discussing 
the Wednesbury test is to pave, or at least leave open, the way for its reformulation and 
adaptation as may be appropriate in the event of it being applied.” TTPF570FPTT 
 
Then he asserted that the standard of judicial review in legitimate expectation cases ought 
always to be intense, and it ought to be particularly intense in a case where the legitimate 
expectation concerned was in respect of an entrenched constitutional right.TPF571FPT He cited T.R.S. 
Allan’s words in Constitutional JusticeTPF 572 FPT to support his position: “Where important 
constitutional rights are at stake, the boundaries of rationality are naturally drawn more 
tightly, the extent of judicial deference to administrative expertise and convenience being 
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reduced accordingly”TPF573FPT. To further strengthen his argument, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ referred 
to the Daly caseTPF 574 FPT, which concerned a prisoner’s right (under art.8(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 as set out 
in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998) to respect for his correspondence. In the Daly 
case Lord Steyn pointed out that the difference in approach between the traditional grounds 
of judicial review and the proportionality approach may sometimes yield different results. To 
him, it is therefore important that cases involving Convention rights must be analysed in the 
correct way. And he believed that it is possible to do so without a shift to merits review or 
any erosion of the fundamental distinction between the role of judges and the role of 
administrators.TPF 575 FPT Mr Justice Bokhary PJ seemed to completely agree with Lord Steyn’s 
opinion, and in his view, what was true of Convention rights in European cases was also true 
of Basic Law rights in Hong Kong cases.TPF576FPT 
 
Adopting the comparative approach, allowing amicus assistance, and asserting the flexibility 
of traditional judicial review tests prove the CFA’s open-mindedness in dealing with 
constitutional rights cases. Like its generous interpretative approach, its open-mindedness 
demonstrates its commitment to giving Hong Kong people a high quality of human rights 
protection. Although there might be some drawbacks, especially in its comparative approach 
of broadening Hong Kong human rights authoritative sources hugely, generally speaking, the 
CFA’s open-mindedness would benefit Hong Kong’s human rights condition significantly by 
providing Hong Kong people with a world-class protection of individual rights. As Margaret 
H. Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed, 
 
“Consideration of the work of other courts with a differently inflected jurisprudence might 
allow us to unearth our deep-seated but often unstated assumptions, to expose our legal and 
normative constructs to the penetrating light of fresh scrutiny, and to examine our analyses 
and conclusions against a broader background of possibilities. Such acute reevaluation, 
wherever it leads, can only make our jurisprudence stronger.”TPF577FPT 
 
After articulating the CFA’s general attitude and approaches regarding individual rights, now 
we turn to discussing the CFA’s concrete views on several important constitutional rights, 
including freedom of demonstration, freedom of expression and the right to equality and non-
discrimination, which were analyzed by the CFA in a few leading cases. These rights are of 
civil and political nature, being essential to a modern democratic society. Our exploration of 
the CFA’s performance in dealing with them may make us get a better understanding of its 
significant role in safeguarding the constitutionally enshrined fundamental liberties in the 
Region. 
 
5 Freedom to Demonstrate 
 
The CFA’s attitude towards people’s freedom of demonstration is well reflected by its 
declaration at the beginning of the judgment on Yeung May-Wan. TPF578FPT It states,  
                                                 
TP
573
PT Sin Hoi Chu v. Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561,para.373; also see T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional 
Justice: A liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), p131 
TP
574
PT Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001]UKHL 26 
TP
575
PT Sin Hoi Chu v. Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561,para.373; also see Regina v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001]UKHL 26 para.28 
TP
576
PT Sin Hoi Chu v. Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561 para.373, 374 
TP
577
PT Margaret H. Marshall, “ ‘Wise Parents Do not Hesitate to Learn From Their Children’: Interpreting State 
Constitutions in An Age of Global Jurisprudence”, (2004) 79 New York University Law Review, p1650 
TP
578
PT Yeung May-Wan v. HKSAR [2005] 2 HKLRD 212 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 116 - 
 
“The freedom to demonstrate is a constitutional right. It is closely associated with the 
freedom of speech. These freedoms of course involve the freedom to express views which may 
be found to be disagreeable or even offensive to others or which may be critical of persons in 
authority. These freedoms are at the heart of Hong Kong’s system and it is well established 
that the courts should give a generous interpretation to the constitutional guarantees for 
these freedoms in order to give to Hong Kong residents their full measure.” 
 
It appears quite unusual for the CFA to make such a statement at the very beginning of its 
decision. The reason perhaps lies in the politically sensitive facts of the case, which 
concerned a protest against the Central Government and the Communist Party’s leaders. The 
demonstration was held outside the main entrance of the Central Government’s Liaison 
Office in Hong Kong by members of Falun Gong, a banned quasi-religious group in 
mainland China. The Falun Gong had been banned by the Central Government on the ground 
that it “had been engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, 
hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbance, and jeopardising social stability.”TPF579FPT 
The mainland authority further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political 
group and illegal system “opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central 
government. It preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition.”TPF 580 FPT Then a nationwide 
crackdown ensued with the exception of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and 
Macau. In late 1999 legislation was created by China’s National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee to outlaw “heterodox religions,” and applied to Falun Gong retroactively. TPF581FPT It is 
against this background that we can understand the significance of the CFA’s decision. How 
the Court handled the case would be a parameter to measure the equality of all before the law, 
the independence of the judiciary, the autonomy and, of course, the legal protection of human 
rights in the region. 
 
As the demonstration involved in Yeung May-wan was a small-scale one, with only sixteen 
participants, there was no need to notify the police as required by the Public Order Ordinance, 
which stipulated that to hold an assembly with more than fifty participants or procession with 
more than thirty participants the organiser must notify the police beforehand or to comply 
with procedural requirements.TPF582FPT The intervention of the police into this demonstration was 
triggered by the complaints made by the staff of the Central Government’s Liaison Office. 
The police tried to make the demonstrators leave on the basis of the law of obstruction of 
public places,TPF583FPT which was traditionally used in Hong Kong against illegal hawkers in the 
street. The demonstrators refused. Then the police arrested them. Some of them performed 
physical resistance during and after the arrests. 
 
As a result, all of the demonstrators were charged with the offence of public place obstruction. 
The appellants in this case were additionally charged with wilfully obstructing police officers 
acting in the due execution of their duty. Two were also charged with assaulting police 
officers acting in the due execution of their duty. The magistrate convicted on all charges. 
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The Court of Appeal quashed the public place obstruction convictions but upheld the wilful 
obstruction and assault convictions. The appeal to the CFA was against those remaining 
convictions. 
 
The CFA confirmed the Court of Appeal’s quashing of the public place obstruction 
convictions and pointed out that not every obstruction of a public place is an offence. It held 
that a balance between possibly conflicting interests of different users of the public place 
should be struck, based on a requirement of reasonableness. In the CFA’s view, it was only 
where the obstruction was an unreasonable use of the public place given its extent and 
duration, the time and place where it occurred and the purpose for which it was done, that it 
was “without lawful excuse” and so amounted to an offence.TPF584FPT As far as demonstration was 
concerned, the CFA stressed, 
 
“Where the obstruction in question results from a peaceful demonstration, a constitutionally 
protected right is introduced into the equation. In such cases, it is essential that the 
protection given by the Basic Law to that right is recognised and given substantial weight 
when assessing the reasonableness of the obstruction. While the interests of those exercising 
their right of passage along the highway obviously remain important, and while exercise of 
the right to demonstrate must not cause an obstruction exceeding the bounds of what is 
reasonable in the circumstances, such bounds must not be so narrowly defined as to devalue, 
or unduly impair the ability to exercise, the constitutional right.” TPF585FPT 
 
The CFA agreed with the Court of Appeal that the police and the magistrate had not 
adequately considered the question of reasonableness. The minor obstruction caused by this 
small demonstration, in the view of the CFA and the Court of Appeal, could not be regarded 
as unreasonable and so did not constitute an offence. Then the CFA moved on to determine 
the lawfulness of the arrests in order to deal with the remaining convictions, wilfully 
obstructing police officers acting in the due execution of their duty and assaulting police 
officers acting in the due execution of their duty. Here, the arresting officers acted on the 
basis of information given to them at police briefings before the arrest operation and also on 
the basis of what they saw at the scene. The CFA held that while the officers had genuinely 
suspected that a public place obstruction offence had been committed, they did not have 
reasonable grounds for that suspicion. At the briefing, no consideration had been given to the 
material element of whether the demonstrators, in exercising their constitutional right to 
demonstrate, were creating an obstruction which was unreasonable and so without lawful 
excuse. Nothing evident at the scene supported such a conclusion. The arrest was therefore 
unlawful and subsequent acts done by officers while holding the appellants in custody were 
not done in the due execution of their duty. Therefore the Court allowed the appeal and 
quashed the remaining convictions. 
 
Although the jurisprudence of the decision may not seem very far-reaching, it is still worthy 
of special noting, because it shows the CFA’s commitment to fundamental rights protection. 
In its eye, even the Central Government’s enemies deserve an equal protection. To achieve 
the protection, the Court successfully, as Professor Albert Chen indicates, employed the 
familiar techniques of statutory construction for the purpose of advancing a constitutional 
right.TPF 586 FPT To Chen, it is particularly significant in enhancing the right to assembly and 
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procession in Hong Kong where the number of demonstrators does not exceed fifty (in the 
case of an assembly) or thirty (in the case of a procession) as stipulated in the Public Order 
Ordinance.TPF587FPT It also exemplifies the Court’s active role in using comparative materials for 
the purpose of a better protection of rights. By reviewing several cases from the United 
KingdomTPF588FPT and the European Court of Human RightsTPF589FPT, the Court reached the conclusion 
that the Hong Kong police were not acting in the due execution of their duties when they 
arrested the defendants and therefore the defendants had every right to use a certain amount 
of force to resist their unlawful arrest.TPF590FPT This decision would considerably improve the level 
of rights protection for it confirmed that protesters, when exercising their constitutional right 
to demonstrate, need not to comply with arbitrary orders given by the police.TPF591FPT It has been an 
important constraint on police use of excessive force. 
 
Another case deserving exploration here is Leung Kwok Hung v. HKSARTPF592 FPT, which bears 
much greater significance to the right of demonstration. It concerned the constitutionality of 
the provisions of the Public Order Ordinance which, as mentioned above, imposed a prior 
notification requirement on assemblies and processions exceeding a certain number of 
participants. It was contended that the statutory discretion conferred on the Commissioner of 
Police to restrict the right of peaceful assembly by objecting to a notified public procession or 
by imposing conditions for the purpose of “public order (ordre public)” was too wide and 
uncertain to satisfy the requirements of constitutionality. The implications of the CFA’s 
decision on the case can be primarily found in the following points. 
 
Firstly, the Court acknowledged that the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly might be 
subject to restrictions provided that two requirements were satisfied, that is, the restriction 
must be prescribed by law, and the restriction must be necessary in a democratic society for a 
legitimate purpose such as the interests of national security or public safety, public order 
(ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
Secondly, the Court pointed out that the right of peaceful assembly involved a positive duty 
on the part of Government to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful 
assemblies to take place peacefully. Therefore, it confirmed that the statutory requirement for 
a prior notification to the Commissioner of Police was constitutional. 
 
Thirdly, as for the Commissioner’s statutory discretion to restrict the right of peaceful 
assembly on the ground of “public order (ordre public)”, the Court drew a distinction 
between the concept of “public order (ordre public)” as a constitutional norm and the same 
concept in the law and order sense. For the former, the Court thought, the concept was an 
imprecise and elusive one for a constitutional norm was usually and advisedly expressed in 
                                                 
TP
587
PT Ibid.  
TP
588
PT Such as O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286, Clarke v Chief 
Constable of North Wales Police [1997] EWCA Civ 2432, Chapman v DPP (1988) 153 JP 27, Mohammed-
Holgate v Duke [1984] AC 437, and Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey (1998) 138 NLJ 180, etc. 
TP
589
PT Such as Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1990) 13 EHRR 157 and O’Hara v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 32 
TP
590
PT Yeung May-Wan v. HKSAR (FACC19/2004), para.59-123 
TP
591
PT On the other hand, perhaps the case also indicates that the Central Government’s willingness to respect the 
independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary as there was no sign of the Central Government’s placing pressure on 
the courts during the whole legal proceedings, from the magistrate to the Court of Appeal and to the Court of 
Final Appeal.  
TP
592
PT Leung Kwok Hung v. HKSAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 164 
 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 119 - 
relatively abstract terms. Its boundaries beyond public order in the law and order sense, that 
is, the maintenance of public order and prevention of public disorder, could not be clearly 
defined. The concept of “public order (ordre public)” as a constitutional norm used in the 
ICCPR had been incorporated into the Public Order Ordinance in relation to the 
Commissioner’s discretion to restrict the right of peaceful assembly. In the Court’s view, the 
Commissioner’s statutory discretion to restrict the right of peaceful assembly for the purpose 
of “public order (ordre public)” provided by the Ordinance did not give an adequate 
indication of the scope of that discretion due to the concept’s vagueness as a constitutional 
norm. Therefore, the Court concluded, the Commissioner’s discretion to restrict derived from 
the constitutional concept of “public order (ordre public) did not satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of “prescribed by law” which mandated the principle of legal certainty. However, 
the Court pointed out, public order in the law and order sense was sufficiently certain. The 
Commissioner’s discretion to restrict the right of peaceful assembly for this purpose would 
give an adequate indication of its scope. It would satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
“prescribed by law” and would be constitutionally valid. Then the Court suggested to refer to 
the public order in law and order sense simply as “public order”, being distinguished from the 
constitutional term, “public order (ordre public)”.Thus the Court held that the appropriate 
remedy was to sever the public order in the law and order sense from “public order (ordre 
public)” in the relevant statutory provisions. After severance, only the concept of “public 
order” remained in the Ordinance. Consequently, the Court believed, the Commissioner’s 
discretion in relation to public order in the law and order sense was constitutional as it 
satisfied both the constitutional requirement of “prescribed by law” and the constitutional 
requirement of “necessary in a democratic society” for the relevant constitutionally legitimate 
purpose. 
 
Fourthly, the Court emphasised that “the Commissioner must, as a matter of law, apply the 
proportionality test”TPF593FPT in exercising his statutory discretion to restrict the right of peaceful 
assembly. He must, the Court required, consider whether a potential restriction was rationally 
connected with one or more of the statutory legitimate purposes and whether it was no more 
than was necessary to accomplish such purposes. His discretion was thus not an arbitrary one 
but was a constrained one. As a result, to the Court’s mind, the full protection of the 
fundamental right of peaceful assembly against any undue restriction would be ensured. 
 
The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. However, Mr. Justice Bokhary 
delivered a dissenting judgment. He agreed with the majority that the Commissioner’s 
entitlement to prior notification of public meetings and procession was constitutional, but 
disagreed with the view that the requirement could be enforced by criminal sanctions. 
Moreover, he held that the Commissioner’s powers of prior restraint were unconstitutional. 
 
The primary contribution of the Court’s decision in Leung to the advancement of the freedom 
of demonstration in Hong Kong, in Professor Albert Chen’s opinion, was that “it goes beyond 
the ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ principle of judicial review of administrative action in 
English administrative law, and enunciates clearly the application of the ‘proportionality’ 
principle to police decisions on any restriction of the citizen’s right to demonstrate.” TPF594FPT The 
decision was also noteworthy for, again, the CFA’s reliance on the ICCPR and relevant 
international human rights law jurisprudence.TPF595FPT Its cited interpretative materials were very 
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broad and extensive, including the Hong Kong government’s Second Periodic Report to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Siracusa Principles, Nowak’s commentary on 
the ICCPR, and numerous judgments from jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and South 
Africa.TPF 596 FPT However, notably, there are strong criticisms on the majority’s upholding the 
constitutionality of the Commissioner’s statutory powers of prior restraint and the underlying 
legal reasoning. The sharpest one may be represented by Po-Jen Yap’s words, “The CFA 
merely obliterated one vague concept from the impugned regulatory scheme and upheld the 
rest without explaining why. This is a serious omission. In fact despite the court’s opening 
roar about the ‘cardinal importance’ of the ‘precious’ right to freedom of assembly and how it 
lies at the foundation of a democratic society, the rhetoric rang hollow in light of the actual 
result reached by the court.”TPF597FPT It seems to me that the comment is too severe and unfair. 
Indeed the CFA’s confirmation of the Police Commissioner’s power of prior restraint and its 
imposition on him the duty of abiding the proportionality test proves the Court’s effort of 
seeking a balance between the safeguarding of fundamental freedoms and the need of public 
order. Although its analysis of the concept of “public order (ordre public)” and “public order” 
might be artificial, it does reflect the CFA’s stance of acknowledging rights should be subject 
to legitimate controls. This stance has to be welcomed. However, the real problem of the 
Court’s decision in Leung, in my view, is its remedy to sever public order from “public order 
(order public)” in ss.14(1), 14(5) and 15(2) of the Ordinance. As I argued in the former 
Chapter, in adjudicating constitutional cases, the appropriate model the CFA should adopt is 
the practice of the courts in United Kingdom. That is, courts only have the power to declare a 
statute’s incompatibility with the constitutional provisions when consistent interpretation 
cannot be achieved. Whether to amend the declared unconstitutional statute provisions is left 
to the legislature to determine. It is inappropriate for courts to directly amend law enacted by 
the legislature in their judgments. Therefore, the CFA’s amendment of the Ordinance in 
Leung, in my view, is not an appropriate exercise of judicial power. It does not seem to 
conform to its judicial role defined by the principle of separation of powers in a democratic 
society. However, on the other hand, the adopting of the remedy of severance might, arguably, 
improve the Court’s capability of achieving better protection of human rights because that 
remedy could have the effect of extending its power in dealing with human rights cases. 
 
6 Freedom of Expression (Speech) 
 
Undoubtedly, the freedom of expression is one of the most important fundamental rights in 
modern democratic society. It is seen to be crucial for participatory democracy, the discovery 
of truth and promoting tolerance. These are the basic values in a civilised society such as 
Hong Kong. Freedom of expression is especially cherished by Hong Kong people, being 
regarded as one of the major advantages of HKSAR compared to mainland China. There 
were considerable worries about the fate of the Hong Kong people’s freedom of expression 
after reversion to China. However, freedom of speech and press freedom have been enshrined 
in art.27 and art.4 of the Basic Law. According to the University of Hong Kong’s 
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independent surveys, the ratings for freedoms of speech and press have in fact upgraded since 
1997.TPF598FPT In this context, let us look at the CFA’s contribution in this respect. 
 
So far the most significant case dealt with by the CFA concerning the freedom of expression 
may be Ng Kung Siu,TPF599FPT the flag desecration case. The question in Ng Kung Siu was whether 
the statutory provisions which criminalise desecration of the national flag and the regional 
flag were inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of expression. The 
defendants participated in a public demonstration for democracy in China during which they 
displayed a defaced national flag of the P. R. China and a defaced regional flag of the 
HKSAR. Subsequently they were charged with violation of s.7 of the National Flag and 
National Emblem Ordinance and s.7 of the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance. 
Both Ordinances were passed by Hong Kong Legislative Council, but the former one was to 
incorporate the same national laws of China into the HKSAR legal system in accordance with 
the Basic Law. In its decision on Ng Kung Siu, while acknowledging that the freedom of 
expression, as a fundamental freedom in a democratic society, “lies at the heart of civil 
society and of Hong Kong’s system and way of life”TPF600FPT, the CFA unanimously upheld the 
justification and constitutionality of the restrictions to the freedom of expression imposed by 
the two Ordinances through criminalising certain desecration behaviours. 
 
The Court pointed out that the restriction was merely a limited one for it banned just one 
mode of expression. It did not interfere with the person’s freedom to express the same 
message by other modes. Then the Court moved to examine the justifications of this limited 
restriction. It was held that the freedom of expression was not absolute. “…the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities and it may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions.”TPF601FPT The Court agreed with the Government that the 
restriction was necessary for the protection of public order (ordre public). It held that, like 
what it did in Leung Kwok Hung, the concept of public order (ordre public) at constitutional 
level was not limited to, but wider than, the public order in terms of law and order. In the 
Court’s view, to understand the constitutional concept of public order (ordre public), the 
following points must be considered. First, the concept was an imprecise and elusive one. Its 
boundaries could not be precisely defined. Secondly, the concept included what was 
necessary for the protection of the general welfare or for the interests of the collectivity as a 
whole. Thirdly, the concept must remain a function of time, place and circumstances. As to 
the third point, the Court indicated, Hong Kong had a new constitutional order after China’s 
resumption of the exercise of sovereignty. Its retuning to China was cited in the Preamble of 
the Basic Law as “fulfilling the long –cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people for 
the recovery of Hong Kong”. In these circumstances, the Court thought, the legitimate 
societal interests in protecting the national flag and the legitimate community interests in the 
protection of the regional flag were interests which fell within the concept of public order 
(ordre public). Furthermore, the court pointed out, the national flag was the unique symbol of 
the one country, the P.R. China, and the regional flag was the unique symbol of the HKSAR 
as an inalienable part of the P.R. China under the principle of “one country, two systems”. In 
the Court’s view, these legitimate interests formed part of the general welfare and the 
interests of the collectivity as a whole mentioned above. 
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However, the court clarified that although these legitimate interests were within public order 
(ordre public), it did not conclude the question. It held that one must further examine whether 
the restriction on the guaranteed right to freedom of expression was necessary for the 
protection of such legitimate interests within public order (ordre public). Notably, in 
considering the question of necessity, the Court showed its respect for the view of the 
HKSAR’s legislature who enacted the impugned ordinances. Moreover, in the Court’s view, 
in applying the test of necessity, the question whether the restriction was proportionate to the 
aims sought to be achieved thereby must also be considered. Having regard to these elements, 
the Court believed that the test of necessity was satisfied and the limited restriction was 
proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved. The Court proclaimed, 
 
“Hong Kong is at the early stage of the new order following resumption of the exercise of 
sovereignty by the People’s Republic of China. The implementation of the principle of ‘one 
country, two systems’ is a matter of fundamental importance, as is the reinforcement of 
national unity and territorial integrity. Protection of the national flag and the regional flag 
from desecration, having regard to their unique symbolism, will play an important part in the 
attainment of these goals. In these circumstances, there are strong grounds for concluding 
that the criminalisation of flag desecration is a justifiable restriction on the guaranteed right 
to the freedom of expression.”TPF602FPT 
 
Ostensibly, the central issue of the case was how to strike a balance between the individual’s 
freedom of expression and the public and national interest in the protection of the national 
and regional flags. However, the hidden question faced by the CFA was how to deal with the 
impugned National Flag and Emblem Ordinance, which incorporated the same national law 
into the HKSAR legal system. Art.18 of the Basic Law provided that no national law should 
be applied to Hong Kong except for those listed in Annex III to the Basic Law. The laws 
listed therein should be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region. 
National Flag and Emblem laws of China were added to the list; accordingly the HKSAR 
legislature enacted the Ordinance to implement them. The difficult question in the case 
therefore was whether the courts in Hong Kong had jurisdiction to review and invalidate this 
type of ordinances which reproduced the relevant national laws. The Court chose to be 
cautious. It seemed deliberately to avoid this sensitive question; rather, it addressed itself to 
the balance issue. However, it must be pointed out that in fact the Court had reviewed the 
said ordinances by upholding their constitutionality. This may be a strategy of the Court to 
avoid irritating the mainland China again by its activism after the Ng Ka Ling case. The 
Court’s retreat disappointed many commentators. It was thought that the CFA’s conclusion 
undermined its own assertion that the freedom of expression lay at the heart of Hong Kong’s 
way of life and the courts’ exhortation about giving a generous interpretation to this 
constitutional guarantee which included the right to express ideas which the majority and the 
government may find offensive.TPF603 FPT However, there are also scholars praising the Court’s 
decision as a “wiser option” for it serves the interests of safeguarding its long-term autonomy 
and independence.TPF 604 FPT It seems to me the remarks of Professor Albert Chen are quite 
convincing. He observes, “given the fact that even the American Supreme Court was divided 
five to four on the issue of whether the criminalisation of flag desecration was 
unconstitutional, the CFA’s decision in Ng Kung Siu is defensible jurisprudentially, and is 
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certainly consistent with the political reality of Hong Kong under ‘one country, two 
systems’”.TPF605FPT 
 
While in Ng Kung Siu the CFA directly explored the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
expression and its legitimate limits, in Albert ChengTPF606 FPT the Court clarified and developed 
traditional common law regarding defence of fair comment in an attempt to provide a better 
safeguard for the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech. Albert Cheng involved 
the question of malice in defamation law in relation to the defence of fair comment, which 
had not been well developed in common law jurisprudence and usually the concept of malice 
in defence of qualified privilege was borrowed to apply in analyzing the defence of fair 
comment. The court was determined to develop the common law jurisprudence in this area, 
for it believed that the public interest in freedom to make comments was of particular 
importance in the social and political fields and it was right that the courts when considering 
and developing the common law should adopt a generous approach, rather than a narrow one, 
so that the right of fair comment on matters of public interest was maintained in its full 
vigour.TPF607FPT 
 
Based on these considerations and an entire investigation of the relevant common law, the 
Court came to a conclusion that a comment which fell within the objective limits of the 
defence of fair comment would lose its immunity only by proof that the defendant did not 
genuinely hold the view he expressed. “Honesty of belief is the touchstone. Actuation by 
spite, animosity, intent to injure, intent to arouse controversy or other motivation, whatever it 
may be, even if it is the dominant or sole motive, does not of itself defeat the defence”TPF608FPT 
because “liberty to make such comments, genuinely held, on matters of public interest lies at 
the heart of the defence of fair comment. That is the very object for which the defence exists. 
Commentators, of all shades of opinion, are entitled to ‘have their own agenda’. Politicians, 
social reformers, busybodies, those with political or other ambitions and those with none, all 
can grind their axes. The defence of fair comment envisages that everyone is at liberty to 
conduct social and political campaigns by expressing his own views, subject always… to the 
objective safeguards which mark the limits of the defence.”TPF609FPT The Court provided a clear 
distinction between the notion of malice in the defences of fair comment and that of qualified 
privilege. Regarding fair comment, in the Court’s view, the defence was defeated by proof 
that the defendant did not genuinely believe the opinion he expressed; regarding qualified 
privilege, the defence was defeated by proof that the defendant used the occasion for some 
purpose other than that for which the occasion was privileged.TPF610FPT 
 
The CFA’s decision in Albert Cheng indicates its innovative aspect in developing common 
law jurisprudence when fundamental rights protection is involved. It adopted a generous 
approach and developed the right to a fuller measure than what the common law had 
generally been perceived to give.TPF611FPT It demonstrates that Hong Kong courts could make some 
unique contribution to the contemporary world of jurisprudence, rather than just being 
unidirectionally persuaded by foreign and international relevant judicial materials. As 
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Professor Chen believed, “Cheng is a landmark freedom-of-speech case and is likely to have 
an impact on other jurisdictions in the common-law world.”TPF612 FPT Moreover, it is worthy of 
noting that the main judgment in the Cheng case was delivered by Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead, a member of the British House of Lords in its judicial capacity, who served as a 
non-permanent judge for the CFA in this case. The fact proves the valuable aspect of the 
diversity of the composition of the CFA, which has the effect of enhancing the quality of the 
performance of the Court and the production of its adjudication. That would benefit the 
protection and promotion of human rights in Hong Kong. 
 
7 The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination 
 
The principle of equality and non-discrimination is a primary principle of human rights.TPF613FPT It 
is enshrined in numerous international human rights instruments and is widely embodied in 
the constitutions of countries around the world. Hong Kong is no exception. It is 
constitutionally guaranteed by art.25 of the Basic Law. Further, the right is protected by the 
Bill of Rights contained in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,TPF614FPT which implements in 
accordance with art.39 of the Basic Law the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong 
Kong. In applying these laws, the CFA has further developed the jurisprudence of equal 
rights and non-discrimination. The following two cases may show its contribution in this 
regard. 
 
The first one is Secretary for Justice v. Chan Wah and Tse Kwan Sang.TPF615FPT It was discussed 
briefly above when we investigated the Court’s open-minded attitude in dealing with human 
rights disputes. In the previous discussion, we focused on the amicus curiae issue. Now we 
will concentrate on the Court’s jurisprudence on the right to equality and non-discrimination. 
The litigation concerned local village elections in Hong Kong’s New Territories. What were 
challenged in the case were the electoral arrangements for the position of village 
representative, which excluded the non-indigenous villagers from voting as a voter and 
standing as a candidate. The indigenous villagersTPF616 FPT in New Territories enjoyed a special 
treatment by law both during the British rule and after Hong Kong’s return to China. Art.40 
of the Basic Law provides that “The lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigenous 
inhabitants of the ‘New Territories’ shall be protected by the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.” That appears to be the reason that the challenged electoral 
arrangements were made. The main questions that the Court needed to answer were as 
follows: whether the electoral arrangements in question violate the non-indigenous villagers’ 
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs which was guaranteed by the Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights;TPF617FPT whether they constituted discrimination; whether art.40 of the Basic Law 
could justify the arrangements. As for the first and third questions, the CFA held that the 
impugned electoral rules imposed unreasonable restrictions on Chan’s and Tse’s right to take 
part in public affairs through freely chosen representatives. It also held that art.40 of the 
Basic Law did not give indigenous villagers the political rights to vote and to stand as 
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candidates in elections for village representatives to the exclusion of others. Here, however, it 
is the Court’s analysis on the second question, the discrimination issue, on which we will 
focus. 
 
Under the election arrangements, non-indigenous women married to indigenous villagers had 
the right to vote. But non-indigenous men married to indigenous villagers were excluded 
from voting. This was alleged to be discrimination against men. The Court affirmed that in 
determining whether a particular arrangement involved sex discrimination the “but for” test 
established in a British case should be adopted. The test was enunciated by Lord Goff in that 
case as follows. “There is discrimination under the statute if there is less favourable treatment 
on the ground of sex, in other words if the relevant girl or girls would have received the same 
treatment as the boys but for their sex. The intention or motive of the defendant to 
discriminate, though it may be relevant so far as remedies are concerned….is not a necessary 
condition of liability; it is perfectly possible to envisage cases where the defendant had no 
such motive, and yet did in fact discriminate on the ground of sex.” TPF618FPT Applying this test, the 
Court concluded that there was indeed unlawful discrimination, because “[b]ut for his sex, 
the non-indigenous man (married to an indigenous villager) would have received the same 
treatment, that is the right to vote, as the non-indigenous woman (married to indigenous 
villager).”TPF619FPT 
 
The Court’s decision led to the Hong Kong Government’s reform of the village election 
system, which introduced legislation providing for a dual system in which each village would 
elect two villager representatives, one serving only the indigenous inhabitants, and the other 
all the villagers. This demonstrates that the Court can effectively influence government’s 
public policy making so as to ensure fundamental rights are fully respected and not being 
infringed. 
 
In Chan Wah, the discrimination issue was in relation to a political right of being equally 
represented, which primarily involved public life and political sphere. Another case, 
Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo,TPF620FPT which was decided by the CFA in July 2007, 
concerned mainly an issue of private and non-political nature. The question of the case was 
whether a provision of the Crimes Ordinance, which criminalised homosexual buggery 
committed otherwise than in private, was unconstitutional on the ground that it was 
discriminatory and infringed the constitutional right to equality. 
 
The Court pointed out that the guarantee of equality before the law did not invariably require 
exact equality. Differences in legal treatment, it acknowledged, might be justified for good 
reason. It enunciated “the justification test”. 
 
“In order for differential treatment to be justified, it must be shown that: (1) The difference in 
treatment must pursue a legitimate aim. For any aim to be legitimate, a genuine need for 
such difference must be established. (2) The difference in treatment must be rationally 
connected to the legitimate aim. (3) The difference in treatment must be no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the legitimate aim.” TPF621FPT 
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The Court affirmed that the burden was on the Government to satisfy the court that the 
justification test was satisfied. It also stressed that where one was concerned with differential 
treatment based on grounds such as race, sex or sexual orientation, the court would scrutinise 
with intensity whether the difference in treatment was justified. In the Court’s opinion, where 
the difference in treatment satisfied the justification test, it then should be regarded as not 
constituting discrimination and not infringing the constitutional right to equality. 
 
The Court recognised that the impugned provision of the Crimes Ordinance indeed gave rise 
to differential treatment on the ground of sexual orientation, and thus justification was 
required. Counsel for the government argued that there was a genuine need for the 
differential treatment because the offence in the provision was a specific form of the common 
law offence of committing an act outraging public decency, when turning it into the statute, 
the legislature should be taken to have considered that there was a genuine need for such a 
specific offence as part of the package to reform the law relating to homosexual conduct. The 
Court held that although the Legislature was entitled to decide whether it was necessary to 
enact a specific criminal offence to protect the community against sexual conduct in public 
which outrages public, in legislating for such a specific offence, it should not do so in a 
discriminatory way. It was claimed that the courts had the duty of enforcing the constitutional 
guarantee of equality before the law and of ensuring protection against discriminatory law, 
especially when a minority in the community was concerned. The Court pointed out that 
unlike the common law offence of committing an act outraging public decency covering all 
persons, whatever their sexual orientation, the challenged provision of the Crimes Ordinance 
only criminalised homosexual buggery otherwise than in private but did not criminalise 
heterosexuals for the same or comparable conduct when there was no genuine need for the 
differential treatment. Thus the matter failed at the first stage of the justification test, 
therefore the Court concluded that the impugned provision was a discriminatory law and 
unconstitutional. 
 
The significance of the case lies in the fact that Hong Kong is mainly a Chinese community. 
Traditionally, Chinese community tends to hold a conservative moral view to sex, especially 
to the homosexual issue, which would usually be thought to be abnormal and disgusting. In 
such a community, homosexual persons are vulnerable to discrimination. The Court’s 
decision shows its commitment to safeguard the principle of equality before law and its 




The principle of “one country, two systems” makes Hong Kong not only a special 
administrative region but also a special human rights region in China. Here, extensive 
fundamental rights and freedoms are entrenched and constitutionalised. Most importantly, 
they are judicially enforceable and the courts in the Region are committed to safeguarding 
them. The CFA contributes considerably in this regard. Although, perhaps due to its short 
history and highest appellate level, the CFA has so far dealt merely with a very few 
significant cases in each important fundamental right we have surveyed, there is no doubt that 
its decisions are of great significance because through them the Court has established some 
important principles, approaches, tests and guidance which are of high authority not only to 
the lower courts’ future handling of human rights cases but also to the executive’s daily 
behaviour of governance involving human rights issues. In terms of protecting human rights, 
the CFA can be called a liberal court indeed. It adopts a generous approach for the 
interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of the fundamental rights. At the same time, it 
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requires the restrictions on human rights should be narrowly interpreted and rigorously 
examined. It encourages the courts to refer to the authorities of international tribunals or of 
other jurisdictions to deal with human rights disputes. Although this approach lacks express 
endorsement from either the Basic Law or other statutes, it would facilitate the improvement 
of the level and quality of human right protection in Hong Kong by absorbing the advanced 
knowledge and practices in other jurisdictions. To achieve a high quality of dealing with 
rights disputes, the CFA allows human rights organisations to provide the services of counsel 
as amicus curiae, assisting the courts by expounding the law impartially. It also asserts that 
the conventional approaches for judicial review (in the administrative law sense), such as the 
Wednesbury test, should adapt to a human rights context. 
 
The CFA has addressed certain typical fundamental rights concerning free expression, 
demonstration and equality in several leading cases. The CFA shows its concerns and 
commitments to safeguarding the constitutional individual rights in its decisions on these 
cases. However, it must be noted that although the judges of the Court are undoubtedly 
proponents of human rights, they are by no means absolutists in this regard. On the contrary, 
they acknowledge that there may be necessary restrictions on individual rights. In these cases, 
the essential question for the Court is where the proper balance between individual rights and 
community interests should be struck. Some points of the Court’s decisions on these cases 
may be controversial, but the Court’s sincerity of attempting to seek a fair and impartial 
answer seems to be not questionable. Rather than merely calling it the guarantor of human 
rights in Hong Kong, it seems to me that seeing the CFA as a guarantor both for the 
individual rights and for the community interests might be more appropriate. That would suit 
the constitutional role of the CFA as an impartial arbiter and interpreter of the Basic Law. 
Anyway, “a good society is one where individual rights flourish and where their protection 
and promotion constitute a public good”,TPF622FPT the CFA has been playing significant pare in 
Hong Kong’s individual rights flourishing by providing them with quality and excellent 
judicial protection and promotion, that seems to be one important reason why the unelected 
CFA is surprisingly more popular, acceptable, authoritative and legitimate than the other two 
branches of the Hong Kong government in the local people’s eyes. 
 
The central government has shown a tolerant attitude to the flourish of a distinct human rights 
regime in Hong Kong, for most rights disputes there usually do not, in Beijing’s eye, 
constitute a direct and serious threat to the foundation of China’s constitutional and political 
order, although sometimes they do make the Central Government embarrassed (the Falun 
gong case is a good example), the CFA therefore has the space to play a positive and active 
role in Hong Kong’s human rights protection and make some valuable contributions as to the 
jurisprudence innovation in this respect. It may even produce some constructive influence, 
directly or indirectly, on mainland China’s progress towards the recognition of human rights 








                                                 
TP
622
PT Charles Dlamini, “The Protection of Individual Rights and Minority Rights”, in Bertus De Villiers, Frank 
Delmartino and André Alen (ed.), Institutional Development in Divided Societies (HSPC Press, 1998), p55. 
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Judicial Politics: At Regional Level and Beyond 
 
 
“The genuine constitutional security of Hong Kong’s autonomy relies on a significant reform 
of China’s political and constitutional system. Hong Kong can certainly play a role in 
promoting such a reform by demonstrating to the Chinese people on the mainland the 
incomparable value of the rule of law in the Hong Kong system.”TP F623FPT 
 





A supreme court, especially one with the function of constitutional review, cannot be simply 
perceived as a purely judicial institution which is isolated from and has nothing to do with 
politics. In fact it typically plays a unique role in the political life of a polity, interacting 
dynamically with politics. This chapter will discuss the relationships and interactions between 
the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) of HKSAR and the relevant political life, both at the 
regional (Hong Kong) level and at the central (Beijing) level. Certain ideas of the western 
scholars and the constitutional practices of EU and UK we have investigated in the former 
chapters will be referred to. 
 
The following issues will be focused on. The first one concerns the Court’s relationship with 
the government and the Legislative Council (LegCo) in Hong Kong. Given the lack of trust 
and cooperation between the executive and the legislature after Hong Kong’s reversion to 
China, special emphasis will be placed on the impact of the executive-legislature conflict on 
the Court, and the Court’s possible reaction to and influence on their relationship. Secondly, 
the Court’s role in forming or changing Hong Kong’s public policies will be explored. 
Thirdly, Hong Kong is facing the problem of constitutional reform, that is, how to 
democratise in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law. What part the Court would 
play in this process will be discussed. Fourthly, the Central Government’s attitude to the 
Court and the Court’s possible influence on the politics and the rule of law in mainland China 
will be investigated. I attempt to demonstrate that the Court could play a significant part in 
Hong Kong’s internal politics, and it may also make some contributions to legal reform and 
the transition to constitutionalism and the rule of law in mainland China as well. Given its 
great potential influence in this regard, it will be argued that the Court should adopt a modest 
attitude, rather than a robust one, to deal with politically sensitive questions so that a 
cooperative relationship could be built between the judiciary and other regional governmental 
branches, and between the Court and the central authorities in mainland China. 
 
2 The Relationship with the Regional Government and the Legislature 
 
During his visit to Hong Kong in July 2008, Xi Jinping, the Vice-President of China, held a 
meeting with the Region’s principal Executive, Legislative and Judiciary officials, urging 
                                                 
TP
623
PT Bing Ling, “The Proper Law for the Conflict between the Basic Law and Other Legislative Acts of the 
National People’s Congress”, In Yash Ghai, Chen Wenmin and Fu Hualing (ed.) Hong Kong’s Constitutional 
Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation, (Hong Kong University Press, 2000), p170 
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“solidarity and sincere cooperation within the governance team” as well as “mutual 
understanding and support amongst the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary” of 
HKSAR. TPF624FPT Soon the remarks attracted criticism from Hong Kong society, which accused Mr. 
Xi of misunderstanding the relationship between the Judiciary and the other governmental 
branches of HKSAR. The Hong Kong Bar Association issued a statement to clarify that the 
independence of Hong Kong judiciary is firmly guaranteed by the Basic Law, which is to 
keep the judiciary separate and independent from the Executive and the Legislature and shall 
not be regarded as a part of the “governance team” as Xi identified.TPF625FPT In this section, we will 
examine what the possible interactions between the independent judiciary, particularly the 
CFA, and the other governmental branches in Hong Kong under the executive-led order and 
the unsatisfactory relationship between the Executive and the Legislature. 
 
According to the design of the drafters of the Basic Law, the primary characteristic of the 
political system of the HKSAR is neither the separation of powers represented by the United 
States nor the parliamentary supremacy practised by the United Kingdom. Rather, it was 
devised to be an executive-led system,TPF 626 FPT which is inherited from the previous British 
colonial rule. Actually, the so called executive-led system means the-Chief-Executive-led 
system. It must be emphasised that, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, under the Hong Kong’s 
new constitutional order, the Chief Executive (CE) is not only the head of the HKSAR 
government TPF 627 FPT but also the head of the Special Administrative Region and reprsents the 
Region.TPF628FPT He is accountable both to the Central Government and the HKSAR.TPF629FPT In other 
words, we cannot regard the post of the CE as only the head of the executive branch which is 
in parallel with the LegCo and the Court. On the contrary, within HKSAR’s political 
structure, the post of the CE sits at the top of the pyramid of the regional institutions, ranking 
formally above not only the other executive authorities, but also the Legislature and the 
CFA. TPF630FPT In this sense, it is somewhat like the role of the previous Hong Kong Governor, 
although with some reduction of its power and being selected locally. 
 
Perhaps because of the special constitutional status of the CE, which connects the Central 
Government and the HKSAR closely, the Basic Law stipulates that he should be appointed 
by the Central Government after having been locally selected in Hong Kong by election.TPF631F PT 
                                                 
TP
624
PT “Xi Jinping ask Hong Kong officials to govern ‘sensibly, reasonably, cooperatively and efficiently’”, 
ChinaNews.Com (8 July 2008), http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ga/zqmd/news/2008/07-08/1305089.shtml 
accessed on 13 November 2008 
TP
625
PT Hong Kong Bar Association, “Press Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association” (9 July 2008), 
http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/press-release/20080709.pdf accessed on 11 November 2008 
TP
626
PT Christine Loh, Civic Exchange, Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council (Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p327; Also see the speech of Wu Bangguo, the President of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the PRC, at a symposia commemorating the 10 years’ 
application of the Hong Kong Basic Law held on 6 June 2007, released by the Xinhua net, the official news net 
of the Chinese Government, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-06/06/content_6205144.htm (visited on 
23 April 2008) 
TP
627
PT Art.60 of the Basic Law 
TP
628
PT Art.43 of the Basic Law 
TP
629
PT Art.43 of the Basic Law  
TP
630
PT Art.43 of the Basic Law 
TP
631
PT Art.45(1) of the Basic Law. So far the Chief Executive is elected by a broadly representative Election 
Committee in Hong Kong before the Central Government’s appointment; since 2017 he/she may be elected 
through universal suffrage before being appointed by the Central Government. See The Basic Law, Annex I and 
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods 
for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the 
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating 
to Universal Suffrage (29 December 2007) 
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The Basic Law also equips the CE with extensive important powers to ensure he be able to 
discharge his duties smoothly. These powers include leading the government of HKSAR, 
deciding on governmental policies and issuing executive orders, nominating the principal 
officials and reporting it to the Central Government for appointments, signing bills and 
promulgating laws, appointing or removing judges of the courts at all levels in accordance 
with legal procedures, implementing the directives issued by the Central Government, 
conducting external affairs as authorised by the Central Authorities, etc. TPF632FPT The Basic Law 
further provides that the CE may return a bill passed by the LegCo on the ground of 
incompatibility with the overall interests of the Region.TPF633FPT He even has the power to dissolve 
the LegCo in certain circumstances.TPF634FPT 
 
The implications of the executive-led system to the Court can be appreciated from at least 
three aspects. Firstly, the CE’s responsibility to implement the Basic Law, provided by art.48 
(2) of the Basic Law, may compete with the Court’s power of interpreting the Basic Law. As 
we discussed in Chapter 4, in some extreme circumstances, the CE may rely on art.48 (2) to 
appeal to the Central Government for a reinterpretation of the Basic Law so as to reverse the 
Court’s interpretation which he dislikes. The CE chose to do so when dealing with the crisis 
following the CFA’s decision on Ng Ka Ling in 1999 and effectively made the NPCSC alter 
the interpretation of the Court on art.22 (4) and art.24 (2) (3) of the Basic Law. As earlier 
discussed, although the CE’s action was based on his consideration of the public interest of 
Hong Kong and effectively avoided the possible sudden flooding of 1.6 million mainland 
immigrants into Hong Kong, it was strongly criticised by some commentators for they 
thought that it damaged the independence of the Court. I have attempted to defend the CE’s 
action in Chapter 4, there seems to be another point which might further justify it. As we 
know, the CE has power to return a bill to the Legislature for reconsideration if he thinks the 
bill violates the overall interest of Hong Kong.TP F635FPT Arguably, this might add some justification 
to the CE’s seeking assistance from the Central Government to change the Court’s 
interpretation of the relevant Basic Law provision if he thinks it damages the overall interest 
of Hong Kong because the Court’s interpretation could be conceived as an indirect law or bill 
which has a similar legal force or legal effect. The argument may seem artificial. But the 
point is that the Court actually has the power of law-making, especially after it gains the 
jurisdiction of constitutional review through the power of interpreting the Basic Law, and it 
seems, at least arguably, legitimate that this kind of law-making power should also be subject 
to the check and balance of the CE’s power under the executive-led system, given that the 
law-making power of the Legislature would be. However, it must be stressed again that in 
order to uphold the authority of the CFA and the independence of the judiciary, only in very 
rare extreme cases the CE should interfere by wielding the weapon of art.48 (2). In normal 
cases he should be self-constrained and respect court decisions. This has indeed been 
frequently promised by the HKSAR government.TPF636FPT 
 
                                                 
TP
632
PT Art.48 of the Basic Law 
TP
633
PT Art.49 of the Basic Law 
TP
634
PT Art.50 of the Basic Law 
TP
635
PT The reconsideration must be made within three months. See art.49 of the Basic Law. 
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636
PT “Government Statement on FAC’s Report”, on the official website of the Constitutional and Mainland 
Affairs Bureau, at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/press/press_11.htm (visited on 24 April 2008). Also see “Hong 
Kong Government would not seek interpretation from the Central Government easily”, at 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ga/zxgagc/news/2007/04-04/907911.shtml (visited on 24 April 2008). Strangely, 
these promises were made by the Hong Kong government officials rather than the Chief Executive himself or 
his representative. As the CE is not only the head of Hong Kong government but also the head of the whole 
region, government officials are incompetent to make promise setting boundaries for the CE’s future action.  
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Another implication of the executive-led political system to the Court would stem from art.48 
(3) of the Basic Law, which requires the CE to implement the directives issued by the Central 
Government in respect of the relevant matters provided for in the Basic Law. Potentially the 
provision may produce a dilemma for the CE when a directive of the Central Government is 
in conflict with a decision of the CFA. In fact the Central Government may deliberately adopt 
this strategy to disregard a ruling of the CFA such as the judgment in Ng Ka Ling, although 
this might be politically unwise and risky due to its appearance of much toughness and 
disrespect to the authority of Hong Kong judiciary. However, if the Central Government 
really issues such a directive one day, the CE would have to make a choice between carrying 
it out and on the other hand respecting the Court’s judgment. In such a situation, because of 
his constitutional status the CE would be more likely to implement the Central Government’s 
order rather than the Court’s words. Fortunately so far this has not happened in practice and it 
seems there is little possibility that it would happen in the near future given that the NPCSC 
could instead use its interpretation power to rectify the Court’s opinion. Nonetheless, we 
cannot discount it, for the option is actually an effective constitutional weapon of the Central 
Government and cannot be removed from its arsenal. Whether to use it or not is fully at the 
Central Government’s discretion. If it were deployed to reverse a Court decision, great 
damage would be inflicted on the Court’s authority. 
 
Thirdly, the CE may use his power of appointing judges to influence the political stance of 
the CFA. As the American experience has shown, when a vacancy occurs on the Supreme 
Court, the President can attempt to use his power of nomination strategically in order to bring 
the Court in line with his own policy preferences.TPF637FPT That is why when Barack Obama had 
been elected to be the President of the USA there was great expectation that he would use his 
chance of appointing federal judges to reverse the judiciary’s shift to the right under President 
George W. Bush.TPF 638 FPT Even when there is not a vacancy, in very extreme cases, the US 
president may employ the Court-packing strategy to submit the Court. The famous example is 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing of 1937 which sought to enlarge the number of 
judges in the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen in an attempt to ensure the Court’s support 
of his New Deal measures.TPF639FPT Although the bill did not actually become law, it placed great 
pressure on the Court and eventually made it give up its conservative stance on the 
president’s social and economic reforms. As a result, one of the hardest obstacles of FDR’s 
New Deal policy was removed. In Hong Kong, the CE has power to appoint all judges.TPF640FPT It 
is reasonable to suppose that he may follow American presidents’ practice to mould the Court 
in his image by staffing the Court with jurists who read the Basic Law his way. However, that 
does not mean he could do it arbitrarily. Actually there are considerable constraints on the 
CE’s power of appointing judges. As for the procedural aspect, his appointments would be 
based on the recommendation of an independent commission, which is composed of local 
judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sectors,TPF641FPT although 
he might have discretion in deciding whether to accept the commissions’ nomination. As far 
as the appointment of the judges of the CFA is concerned, the legislative endorsement is 
necessary.TPF 642 FPT The appointment must also be reported to the NPCSC for record.TPF 643 FPT 
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PT Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments 
from Washington to Clinton ( Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999) 
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PT Andy Sullivan, “Obama Likely to Push Courts Away From Right”, ABC News (14 November 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=6251682 accessed on 4 February 2009 
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Additionally, the CE may not interfere with the way judges carry out their functions, but 
through his power to pardon and commuteTPF644FPT he can interfere a little with judicial activity 
after the event. However, so far no pardon has been made by a CE yet. 
 
Having discussed the possible impacts of the executive-led political system on the CFA, we 
may easily get an impression that the CFA is just passively subject to the influence of the 
government, particularly the CE. However, that is not the case. Actually the CFA can 
produce a significant counter-force in the executive-led system. On the one hand, it might 
contribute to strengthening the executive’s dominant role in the system by consistently 
supporting the government’s policies and the related legislation when they are challenged by 
judicial review. Such endorsement may enhance a policy’s legitimacy considerably and make 
it much easier to be accepted by and implemented in the society. As a result the authority of 
the executive could be safeguarded and strengthened. In other words, when the Court 
cooperates with the executive, it adds its own authority into the executive’s authority and 
consolidates the executive-led system. On the other hand, of course, the Court may also 
weaken the dominant role of the executive branch by expanding its own power through 
constitutional review and acting as an activist court. However, under such a circumstance, the 
government’s tolerance and obedience to the court constitutional review power might in fact 
enhance the legitimacy of the government and its policies, because that would be an evidence 
showing that the government and its governance is under the laws and the constitution, not 
above them. That is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law and constitutionalism. TPF645FPT 
 
From the actual performance of the CFA since its establishment, especially after its 
frustration by the NPCSC’s interpretation in 1999, it may be concluded that the Court has 
“steered a middle course between judicial activism and judicial restraint”.TPF646FPT This is of great 
significance not only to the executive-led feature of the system but also to the independence 
of the Court itself. As we know, the former CE, Mr. Tung Chee-Hwa, suffered a serious 
governance crisis during his terms and encountered strong opposition from various sectors of 
the community, making the authority of the government decline dramatically.TPF647FPT In such a 
circumstance, it might be reasonable to suppose that the cases of disobedience would grow 
and the numbers of judicial review against government would increase accordingly. If the 
Court chose to be too active in scrutinising and formulating public policies, the government 
would face much more difficulty and the Central Government desired executive-led system 
would be threatened much more seriously. Consequently, the possibility of the interference 
from the Central Government to correct the situation would enhance and the independence of 
the CFA would be under threat. In fact, the NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law in 1999 
to reverse the Court’s decision in the Ng Ka Ling case serves as a good example. However, 
after that the Court seems to have adopted a cautious and moderate stance, especially when 
dealing with cases involving Central Government elements or having local domestic law and 
order implications,TPF648 FPT in an attempt, perhaps, to avoid direct confrontation with the local 
executive branch or provocation to the central authorities. From its restraint, both the 






PT The Basic Law, art.48(12) 
TP
645




PT Albert H. Y. Chen, “Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong”, (2006) 15 Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal, p680. 
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PT Ming Sing, “The Problem of Legitimacy for the Post-Handover Hong Kong Government”, (2001) 24 
International Law Journal of Public Administration, pp847-867 
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(2007) 36 Common Law World Review 
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authority of the government and the independence of the Court probably have benefited. As 
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, the Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong, indicated, “Hong Kong’s 
experience shows that the practice of judicial review has not been an obstacle to the operation 
of government, to the contrary, it enhances the people’s confidence in the government. 
Neither before nor after reunification, were there governance problems caused directly by the 
practice of judicial review.”TPF649FPT 
 
The “executive-led system” is an official version of construing the political structure devised 
by the Basic Law. But there is no mention of the exact wording “executive-led” in the Basic 
Law itself at all. Some scholars think that the correct description of the feature of the political 
system in Hong Kong, which is primarily defined by the executive-legislative relationship, is 
a system of mutual cooperation and checks and balances.TPF650FPT Indeed, the Basic Law places 
significant constraints on the power of the CE and the government by improving the role of 
the legislature. For example, it provides that the government of HKSAR must abide by the 
law and be accountable to the LegCo: it shall implement laws passed by the Council and 
already in force, present regular policy addresses to the Council, answer questions raised by 
members of the Council and obtain approval from the Council for taxation and public 
expenditure.TPF651FPT As for the CE, when a bill which has been returned by him is passed by the 
LegCo again by not less than a two-thirds majority of all the members, he must make a 
choice between signing it and dissolving the LegCo.TPF652FPT If he chooses the latter and the new 
elected LegCo again passes the bill by not less than a two-thirds majority, he must sign it or 
resign.TPF653FPT Further the Basic Law grants the LegCo the power to initiate investigation on the 
CE’s serious breach of law or dereliction of duty, and to initiate impeachment.TPF654FPT 
 
Most significantly, perhaps, unlike the governors during the British rule, the CE does not 
have the power to appoint the members of LegCo any more, and he does not serve as the 
president of the LegCo. Actually all the legislators come from elections, although a 
significant part of them are still elected indirectly. TPF655FPT Just as Professor Yash Ghai has pointed 
out, the Basic Law seems to have inherent contradictions in its design of the political system 
of HKSAR. TPF 656 FPT On the one hand, the power of the executive authorities and the Central 
Government reflects authoritarianism; on the other hand the provisions of the LegCo 
represent democratic politics. The directly elected legislators obtain a mandate from their 
constituencies and usually have more popularity and legitimacy than the officials of the 
executive authorities who are appointed. Moreover, the CE is not elected through universal 
suffrage and cannot be a member of a political party.TPF657FPT If he nominates members from a 
political party for being appointed by the Central Government as Hong Kong’s principal 
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officials, they must follow the CE’s policy preference, rather than their own parties’ 
assertions. Thus so far the legislature is the main arena for the parties to compete for political 
power. There is a lack of institutional connections between the legislature and the 
government in terms of personnel. In other words, the government is institutionally isolated 
from political parties. Consequently, it is hard for the government to acquire consistent and 
solid support from the legislature.TPF658FPT This is seen as the main reason for the strain in the 
executive-legislative relationship after the reunification.TPF659FPT Although this situation might also 
happen in a separation of powers system, it could be eased by mature party politics for no 
matter how weak a government is, it always has its own supporters in the legislature who 
belong to the same party as that of the head of the government. Therefore, some believe a 
resolution of this problem in Hong Kong should be a promotion of the development of party 
politics in the region, allowing political parties to compete not only for the legislative seats 
but also the executive posts.TPF660FPT In other words, the CE and his principal officials could be 
members of political parties, thus hopefully, they would be able to get stable support from 
their “comrades” in the legislature, or at least attract less attack. 
 
What we are concerned with here is the impact of the lack of cooperation between the 
legislature and the government on the Court and the possible influence of the Court on that 
relationship. Firstly, there were signs indicating that legislators tended to use judicial review 
as a technique to oppose the government’s policies and bills. In order to please voters or get 
noticed by the public, legislators prefer to adopt strategies such as criticising government 
policies strongly in the media, questioning officials sharply, and voting against government’s 
bills in a high profile. If an opposed bill is passed by the majority of the legislature, the 
minority may choose to continue their objection by wielding the weapon of judicial review. 
By so doing, they extend the battlefield beyond the legislature to the courts and get a 
possibility to reverse their failure in the former. Even though they may fail again, they could 
at least get massive media coverage in the process, which is critical to their political careers. 
  
Take the controversial adoption of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance 
Ordinance 2006 for example. The pro-democracy legislators opposed firmly the Hong Kong 
government’s bill of the Ordinance and proposed about 200 amendments to it. But all their 
amendments were rejected by the president of the LegCo on the ground that there were 
longstanding rules in the legislature barring members from introducing amendments to 
government-sponsored bills if the amendments would affect government revenues or 
spending.TPF661FPT Then the opposition legislators walked out of the chamber in protest and the 
remaining legislators passed the bill by a vote of 32 to 0. Soon after, Leung Kwok-hung, one 
of the legislators strongly opposing the bill, filed a legal challenge to the legislature’s rules 
on which the president’s decision was based. Five months later, Leung’s case was struck 
down by the High Court, which acknowledged that Hong Kong has an executive-led 
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government and confirmed the constitutionality of the legislature’s rules.TPF662FPT Although this 
case had no chance of going to the CFA, it did reflect the fact that judicial review may be 
used by politicians as a significant means to achieve their political ends. In other words, 
there appears to be increasing possibility that the courts, including the CFA, are dragged into 
the political process. 
 
The number of judicial review applications in Hong Kong has reached a level of around 150 
a year in recent years.TPF 663 FPT Many challenging issues, primarily involving the proper 
interpretation of the Basic Law, the construction of statutes and common law principles, are 
submitted to the courts for decision through judicial review.TPF 664 FPT The Chief Justice, Mr. 
Andrew Li Kok-nang, has thus pointed out, “it is important to recognise that judicial review 
is an established and vital feature of our legal system… It is not an exaggeration to say that 
the phenomenon of judicial review has redefined the legal landscape… the availability and 
use of judicial review has had a significant impact on the conduct of the business of 
government and has exercised a considerable influence on public debate on many issues… 
Court decisions in many judicial review cases have important repercussions for various 
political, economic and social problems which confront our society.” TPF 665 FPT However, as 
indicated in Chapter 4, the Chief Justice clearly understands that there should be a boundary 
between the role of courts and the function of the political process. He has also implied that 
he has a concern about the abuse of judicial review by litigants, especially, perhaps, by 
politicians.TPF666FPT (The phenomenon that politicians use judicial review to block government’s 
policies will be further illuminated by our discussion of the LINK REIT case in the following 
section.) 
 
The comments made by Mrs. Rita Fan on Leung’s challenge to the legislature’s rule may 
additionally demonstrate the courts’ impact on political arena. First, she complained, “If any 
Legco member has a problem with the rules of procedure, he or she has the right to bring it 
to Legco’s Committee on Rules of Procedure. There are channels in place, but Mr. Leung 
did not utilise the channels and went straight to court.”TPF667FPT hat means the president of the 
LegCo preferred the disputes arose in the legislative process to be handled within the 
legislature, rather than being appealed directly to courts, implying that the courts as 
outsiders might complicate the situation and should be the last resort. That might be a 
reasonable stance, for either the principle of separation of powers or the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty (or congressional supremacy) tends to justify limitations on 
judicial intervention with the legislative process, especially where the courts have no 
abstract judicial review power. However, Fan also indicated that she would respect any 
judgment made by the court.TPF 668 FPT This shows political leaders’ willingness to subject 
themselves to the authority of courts, despite their dislike of their intervention. Therefore the 
potential intervention from the courts could be an important factor that politicians have to 
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take into account in the political process. The start-up of the NPCSC’s interpretation process 
of art.53(2) of the Basic Law, which concerns the term of a successor of a resigned CE, is a 
good example. It will be discussed later. 
 
It deserves noting that the government’s initiation of the legislative process of the 
Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance was actually driven by a 
decision of the CFA in Koo Sze Yiu.TPF669FPT In that case the CFA confirmed the lower courts’ 
declarations of the unconstitutionality of s.33 of the Telecommunication Ordinance and the 
Executive Order which had served as the legal foundation of interception of communications 
and other covert surveillance in Hong Kong. However, to afford an opportunity for the 
enactment of corrective legislation, the Court granted six months suspension of the 
declaration of unconstitutionality so as to postpone its coming into operation. As a response, 
the government drafted the controversial bill and attempted to enact it within the six months 
period provided by the Court. This example is a further demonstration of the Court’s impact 
on Hong Kong’s political process, for it shows that courts can sometimes set the legislative 
agenda for the government and trigger the legislative process. This may diminish to some 
extent the so-called executive-led feature of Hong Kong’s political system. 
 
Interestingly, another point in Koo Sze Yiu could further show that courts can be a critical 
element to the executive-led system. One of the major goals of the plaintiffs in that case was 
to employ constitutional judicial reviewTPF670FPT to make the CE bring the proposed scheme of 
Interception of Communications Ordinance into operation.TPF671FPT This Ordinance was passed by 
the Legislature days prior to reunification. Unlike the repugnant s.33 of the 
Telecommunication Ordinance granting “the Governor, or any public officer authorised in 
that behalf by the Governor” may order an interception, the Interception of Communications 
Ordinance prohibited any interception of communication by post or telecommunications 
save where such interception was authorised by the order of a High Court judge. However, 
s.1(2) of the Ordinance provided that it “shall come into operation on a day to be appointed 
by the Governor by notice in the Gazette”.TPF672FPT But neither the Governor prior to the handover 
nor either CE since has appointed such a day. The plaintiffs, one of them was a legislator, 
then challenged the constitutionality of the CE’s omission. But the courts gave no support to 
them on this issue as in the judges’ view s.1(2) did not impose a duty on the CE to bring the 
Ordinance into force at any particular time, although it did impose a continuing obligation 
on the CE to consider whether to bring it into force.TPF673FPT 
 
Another important case that demonstrates courts’ considerable influence on the institutional 
relationship in Hong Kong is Cheng Kar-shun,TPF674FPT a case recently decided by the High Court, 
in which the power of a select committee of the LegCo to order witnesses to attend before it 
to give evidence and to produce documents was challenged on the grounds of 
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unconstitutionality and ultra vires. As for the constitutional challenge, the court exercised its 
jurisdiction without hesitation. It interpreted the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and 
held that the challenged power of the select committee was constitutional. As far as the issue 
of ultra vires is concerned, however, the court became much cautious. It stated that “the 
courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region do not, as a rule, interfere with the 
internal working of the legislature. Exceptionally, where questions of whether the 
Legislative Council, in going about its business, has acted in contravention of the provisions 
in the Basic Law arise, the courts do have jurisdiction to intervene. But the jurisdiction must 
be exercised with great restraint, having regard to the different constitutional roles assigned 
under the Basic Law to different arms of the government.”TPF 675 FPT Finally, it rejected the 
applicants’ argument of ultra vires too. Thus, the court found in favour of the legislators. 
This case shows the judiciary’s respect for the legislature and the principle of separation of 
functions among the three governmental branches on the one hand, and its determination of 
its duty and jurisdiction as to constitutional interpretation and constitutional review, on the 
other hand. 
 
From these examples, it can be argued that in the context of the competition, rather than 
cooperation, between the legislature, especially the opposition legislators, and the 
government, the courts, ultimately the CFA, may play an important part in their relationship 
and interactions. To seek courts’ intervention could be an optional strategy for legislators to 
attempt to reverse the situation when they feel that they may be unable to win a political 
battle in the legislature chamber. The government has to compete with them for the support 
from the courts. Thus courts would become an extension of the two branches’ battlefield, 
and the courts’ attitudes could change the balance between them. 
  
However, this would raise the legitimacy question. As a constitutional arbiter, the CFA has 
the last word, at the regional level, on matters involving constitutionality. Due to its non-
elective nature, the democratic legitimacy of its decision-making power in constitutional 
issues depends largely on the extent to which it subjects itself to the checks and balances 
from other democratically established institutions, primarily the legislative and executive 
branches. Here I do not mean to challenge the independence and finality of the Court’s 
action. What I mean is that the democratic institutions should maintain a power which can 
be deployed to remedy the Court’s law-making in the constitutional area when necessary. 
Certainly this power can only be used in extreme circumstances. However, despite the 
rareness of being exercised, the very existence of such a power in democratically elected 
bodies could legitimate, to some extent, the constitutional review power of the Court for 
under that check the Court actually is not as far beyond the democratic control as it might 
appear to be. Take the US constitutional judicial review practice for example, although the 
Supreme Court has great power to interpret the Constitution, handle constitutional disputes 
and produce high authoritative interpretation of statutes, it is still under the last control of 
democracy indeed, for the democratic government may opt initiating the process of 
amending the Constitution, although very difficult, or introducing and passing legislation 
that overturns or modifies judicial law-making, as a last resort to achieve checks and 
balances over the Court.TPF676FPT Similarly, in Hong Kong the local legislative power can be used 
as a remedy to courts’ interpretation of statutes. Notably, however, as we discussed in 
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Chapter 4, as far as the courts’ constitutional interpretations are concerned, the story is 
different. Under Hong Kong’s constitutional order, the substantive power of amending the 
Basic Law does not lie in the Hong Kong legislature; instead, it is vested in the National 
People’s Congress.TPF677FPT Although the HKSAR does have power to propose a bill for amending 
the Basic Law, there are considerable procedural restrictions on it, making its exercise 
extremely difficulty.TPF678FPT The CFA therefore in a sense occupies a position supreme not only 
in Hong Kong’s legal system, but also in its political structure. Under this circumstance, the 
check and balance over the Court’s role can only come from the central government’s 
intervention through its final power of interpreting or amending the Basic Law, rather than 
from a counter power within the local political structure in Hong Kong. 
 
3 Impact on Public Policies 
 
This section attempts to explain the Court’s political role further by exploring its impact on 
public policies entailed from its rulings on challenges to Hong Kong governments’ schemes 
which involve public concern or interest. The Court’s decision or even just the proceeding of 
such litigation itself could have the effect of thwarting, deferring or promoting a government 
policy. In other words, the Court may exercise a function of divesting, derogating, granting 
or consolidating the legitimacy of a public policy, not to mention its role in substantively 
(re)formulating public policies. My argument is based on the following discussion of two 
influential cases heard by the CFA. Both concern the government’s arrangements 
responding to certain financial problems. 
 
The first one is Secretary for Justice v. Lau Kwok Fai BernardTPF679FPT, in which the Court had to 
determine the constitutionality of two Ordinances purporting to implement the 
Government’s policy of reducing the pay of public officers. At the time being Hong Kong 
was hit by the South East Asian financial crisis and had encountered economic recession. As 
a result, the Government faced a serious fiscal deficit. In order to tackle the problem, 
austerity measures were adopted by the Government, of which adjusting the pay of public 
officers was a part. Due to the lack of an express provision authorising the Government to 
reduce pay in the contractual arrangements between it and the vast majority of serving civil 
servants, seeking the enactment of legislation to implement the pay reduction policy was 
eventually adopted by the Government in an attempt to avoid legal uncertainty.TPF680FPTMoreover, 
to ensure its constitutionality, the adjustments proposed did not make the actual reduction of 
the pay of public officers employed before handover below their salary on 30 June 1997, so 
that, according to the Government, the requirement of art.100 of the Basic Law would be 
satisfied. However, the enacted legislation, namely, the Public Officer Pay Adjustment 
Ordinance, Cap.574 and the Public Pay Adjustments (2004/2005) Ordinance, Cap.580, were 
still challenged by two public officers through judicial review on the ground that the 
Ordinances breached art.100 and 103 of the Basic Law. 
 
                                                 
TP
677
PT The Basic Law art.160(1) 
TP
678
PT The Basic Law art.160(2) 
TP
679




PT Civil Service Bureau, “2003 Civil Service Pay Adjustment”, Brief for the Legislative Council, 25 February 
2003, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN011818.pdf accessed on 10 
October 2008 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 139 - 
Art.100 of the Basic Law provides, “ Public servants serving in all Hong Kong government 
departments, including the police department, before the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, may all remain in employment and retain their seniority with 
pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than 
before.(emphasis added)” Art.103 further provides, “Hong Kong’s previous system of 
recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public 
service, including special bodies for their appointment, pay and conditions of service, shall 
be maintained, except for any provisions for privileged treatment of foreign nationals.” 
 
The two public officers claimed that the Government was prevented by art.100 from 
introducing legislation to reduce the pay of the public officers appointed before 1 July 1997, 
even if the reduction did not take the level of pay below that prevailing immediately prior to 
1 July 1997. As for art.103, it was argued that the legislation failed to conduct a Pay Trend 
Survey and thus constituted a breach of art.103 because such a survey, in their eyes, had 
become an established part of the system employed for assessing adjustments to public 
service pay and this “system” should be adhered to by the Government in accordance with 
art.103. The public officers lost their case in the first instance but gained the support from 
the Court of Appeal. The Government appealed to the CFA. 
 
The Court’s stance would have great implications for the Government’s efforts of solving 
the deficit problem, which could impede the trend of economic recovery and even trigger 
financial crisis if there was continuing deterioration.TPF681FPT To cut expenditure was an important 
part of the Hong Kong Government’s three-pronged approach for tackling the fiscal 
deficit.TPF682FPT The handling of the civil service pay adjustment was a key factor which would 
have significant impact on the Government’s target to reduce operating expenditure in 2006-
07 by $20 billion.TPF683FPT If the Government failed to get endorsement from the Court in the case, 
it would be put in a very difficult situation. As Mr. Joseph W P Wong, the then Secretary for 
the Civil Service, had acknowledged earlier, “If the pay reduction decision could not in the 
end be implemented, the public at large might be under the impression that civil servants are 
only concerned with their personal interests and are unwilling to share the burden with the 
community. Another possible consequence is that the Government will be unable to 
ameliorate the fiscal deficit. Such an outcome would be detrimental to the interests of both 
the civil service and the community at large.”TPF684FPT Against this background, how the Court 
would decide attracted great attention. 
 
Eventually the Court found in favour of the Government, unanimously confirming the 
constitutionality of the challenged Ordinances. First of all, it upheld, without hesitation, the 
legislative power to alter contracts of service. It ruled, “The plenary legislative powers 
enjoyed by the Legislative Council since 1 July 1997, subject to the Basic Law, are 
relevantly no less extensive than those that existed before that date. These powers clearly 
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extend to the alteration of a term in public officers’ contracts of service and a reduction in 
their pay, subject, of course, to the provisions of the Basic Law. Likewise, there is now no 
firmer basis for implying a contractual term against introducing legislation to reduce pay 
than there was before 1 July 1997. If anything, the separation of powers, notably the 
separation of the legislative from the Executive power, effected by the Basic Law might 
make the case for making such an implication, if anything, even weaker.”TPF685 FPT As far as 
art.100 was concerned, the Court stressed that a purposive construction must be given. It 
pointed out that to ensure continuation of employment was the principal object of art.100 
and “the article does not seek to prohibit or inhibit changes to pay, allowances, benefits or 
conditions of service of public officers appointed before 1 July 1997, except to the extent 
that such changes are less favourable than those entitlements before that date.”TPF686FPT The article, 
the Court indicated, was designed to preserve the continuity of Hong Kong’s previous 
system of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the 
public service. It was emphasised, “It is the continuity of that system that is preserved. 
Preservation of that system does not entail preservation of all the elements of which the 
system consists. Some elements may change and be modified or replaced without affecting 
the continuity of the system as a whole.” TPF 687 FPT Therefore, for the same reason, art.103, 
according to the Court, did not require that a Pay Trend Survey must be conducted every 
time that public service pay was to be adjusted. The Government won. 
 
Another case is the Link REIT Case,TPF688 FPT which also involves the Government’s financial 
policy to reduce the fiscal deficit caused by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the 
ensuing prolonged economic recession. The respondent Housing Authority (the Authority) is 
a statutory corporation whose core function is the provision of public rental housing for low 
income families. Apart from that, the Authority also sold flats to eligible families at 
discounted prices under the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme (TPS). Significant income was gained by the Authority from these sales. After 
being hit by the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong property prices tumbled by over 60%.TPF689FPT 
Responding to that, the Government conducted a comprehensive review of its housing, 
planning and lands policy with a view to restoring the public’s confidence in the property 
market and decided to withdraw gradually Government’s involvement in the property 
market.TPF690FPT In line with this general policy direction, HOS and TPS were to be ceased. The 
cessation, however, would lead to financial difficulties for the Authority, probably making 
its cash balance decrease from $28 billion in April 2003 to minus $5.5 billion in March 
2006. TPF691 FPT This threatened its capacity of discharging its core function, that is, to provide 
subsidised rental accommodation to low-income families which are unable to afford private 
rental housing. As a remedy, the Government required the Authority to divest its retail and 
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car-parking facilities (RC). The move was seen as consistent with the Government’s policy 
commitment to the “free market” and “small government”.TPF692FPT 
 
The plan of divestment was approved by the Executive Council on 15 July 2000. According 
to it, the Government would first set up a new company, Link Properties Limited, and then 
divest 100 percent of its ownership by way of listing a real estate investment fund (“Link 
REIT”) through an initial public offer (IPO) to both institutional and retail investors; and 
also that the Authority would inject the RC assets into the Link, which would own and 
manage the facilities. It took the Authority two years to complete the necessary 
administrative and legal arrangements. On the 25Pth P November 2004, Link REIT published its 
Global Offering Circular inviting applications for units. The offering was most successful 
and over-subscribed heavily. The listing of Link REIT was originally planned on the 16PthP 
December 2004. Expenses of over $100 million had been spent on the Global Offering 
exercise. Had it been completed, the Authority would have received from Link REIT about 
$30 billions as consideration for the RC. However it was aborted by two public housing 
residents through judicial review. 
 
Some public housing tenants and shop-owners raised their worry about the negative impact 
on their life that would be caused by the divestment to a few legislators in September 
2004. TPF693FPT In November 2004, 100 tenants sought support from pro-democracy legislators to 
help safeguard their interests.TPF 694 FPT Inside the legislative chamber, the opposing legislators 
could only seek to pass non-binding motions to urge the Authority to postpone the Link 
REIT listing until consensus was reached with commercial tenants.TPF 695 FPT In the end, the 
opponents resorted to judicial review in order to abort the listing. On the 8PthP December 2004, 
just eight days before dealing in the units would commence, two public housing residents, 
Lo Siu-lan and Mak Ki-chiu, filed for judicial review, challenging the Authority’s legal 
power to divest the assets in the way proposed. It is widely believed that the applicants were 
encouraged and financially backed by a legislator, Mr. Albert Cheng,TPF696FPT who was accused 
by the Government of abusing of process and using courts for political ends. TPF697FPT 
 
Taking into account the tight schedule of the divestment arrangement, the Court of First 
Instance promptly heard the case and delivered a judgment in favour of the Authority on the 
15 Pth P December 2004, one day before the planned listing of Link REIT on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.TPF698FPT The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal. As a result, the deadline 
for listing had to be extended to the 20 Pth P December. In the light of the urgency, the Court of 
Appeal decided, in response to the Authority’s application, abridging the time for appealing 
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and heard it on the 16Pth P December. On the same day a decision was made by the court.TPF699FPT 
The appeal was dismissed. But it is not the time for the Authority to laugh for the story did 
not end here. The applicants were determined to take it all the way to final appeal. The 
Authority sought an order to abridge the time for the applicants to seek leave to appeal to the 
CFA. It was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Then the Authority applied to the Appeal 
Committee of the CFA for such an order. The Committee ruled that it did not have the 
statutory power to abridge the time for the applicants to appeal to the CFA.TPF700FPT This made the 
Authority decide not to proceed with the scheduled listing of Link REIT on the 20Pth P 
December 2004 and the Global Offering lapsed.TPF701FPT 
 
Finally the appeal was adjudicated by the CFA on 5Pth P and 6PthP of July 2005. The Court 
determinedTPF702FPT that the divestment was intra vires the Authority as a statutory corporation. 
The Chief Justice ruled that, according to the Housing Ordinance, the Authority plainly had 
the power to sell the retail and carpark facilities to the Link REIT given the sale was 
consistent with its object laid down in s.4(1) of the Ordinance, which was to secure the 
provision of housing and ancillary amenities for such kinds or classes of persons as the 
Authority may, subject to the Chief Executive’s approval, determine. The Chief Justice 
pointed out, it was significant that the statutory object did not use the phrase “to provide”; 
instead the phrase “to secure the provision of” was used. In his view, to secure the provision 
of the facilities did not mean that the Authority had to itself be the direct provider. He held, 
“The Authority secures the provision of the facilities so long as the facilities are available, 
although they are provided not by the Authority but by Link REIT, a third party over whom 
the Authority has no control.”TPF703FPT Therefore the sale was within the Authority’s capacity. The 
Chief Justice’s opinion was agreed by all other judges. The Authority won and the legal 
uncertainty was finally removed. Consequently, the Link REIT was successfully listed in 
late November 2005.TPF704FPT 
 
The two cases involve apparently matters of public interest and politics. They may reflect a 
phenomenon of “the politicisation of judicial review”, that is, according to Anthony B L 
Cheng and Max W L Wong, “the purpose of initiating judicial review is not merely to 
review an administrative decision, but also to embarrass the government on particular policy 
issues, or to delay the policy decision. Sometimes, legal challenges are used to force the 
government to go back to the negotiation table.”TPF705FPT However, if the challenged policy passes 
the examination and gets an endorsement from the courts, its legitimacy and acceptability 
would increase significantly, so will the efficiency of its implementation. When dealing with 
the above cases, the Court was clearly aware of the sensitiveness of the issues and the 
possible great social, economic and political repercussion that would be caused by its rulings. 
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The judges were cautious. Although the Court’s decisions actually served to support the 
Government’s policies, ensured the smooth implementation of the relevant public policies 
and therefore safeguarded the Government’s authority, the judges seemed to deliberately 
avoid giving an impression of involving political consideration. They attempted to appear to 
focus themselves purely on the statutory construction or basic law interpretation. As Justice 
Bokhary in the case of Lo Siu Lan stressed, “the question presented to the Court in this 
appeal is a pure question of legal capacity to be decided as a matter of statutory 
interpretation”.TPF706FPT The Court’s cautiousness might also be found in its division of work in 
the public officers’ salary reduction case. It is worth noting that the ruling was fully made by 
Sir Anthony Mason, a non-permanent judge from another common law jurisdiction. 
Curiously, the Chief Justice and three permanent judges unanimously agreed with Sir 
Anthony Mason without giving any further opinion. The reason for their silence might lie in 
the fact that the Government’s plan for the adjustment of the pay and conditions of judges 
and judicial officers was still under consultation with the Chief Justice.TPF707FPT The fate of the 
present scheme of reducing the pay of public officers would certainly have some impact on 
the following reform of the mechanism of judges and judicial officers pay. The Court was in 
a sensitive situation. In order to appear neutral and fair, letting a non-permanent judge from 
foreign country having high reputation to handle this case seemed to be a wise option for the 
Court. Although, as mentioned above, the Court took effort to bend itself to pure legal 
analysis when dealing with public policy issues, it did show its willingness to consider all 
the relevant matters, rather than pure legal elements, and make a balance among them. The 
attitude was further implied by the Chief Justice’s statement when refusing to abridge the 
applicants’ time for appeal in Lo Siu Lan. He stressed, “it must be observed that even if the 
Court had power to abridge time, in exercising such a power, it would need to have regard to 
all relevant considerations. These include Hong Kong’s reputation as an international 
financial centre, the interests of investors who had subscribed for units in the Link Real 
Estate Investment Trust and the interests of the Authority. At the same time, justice must be 
done and must be seen to be done and the Court would have to ensure that all parties have a 
proper opportunity of presenting their cases.”TPF708FPT 
 
To sum up, from our discussion of the pay reduction case and the Link REIT case, we can 
see the courts’ engagement in public policy affairs could have two potentialities. First, while 
it may be used by some minority or disadvantaged groups in a society to protect their 
interest from encroachment by the government in the name of public good, it could also be 
employed by certain politicians as their “Archimedes’ lever” to move the EarthTPF709FPT as they 
may effectively get the result of setting policy agenda for the government, forcing the 
government to give up, change or adjust a policy, or blocking or suspending a public 
policy’s implementation through launching a judicial review proceeding. Secondly, courts’ 
endorsement of a government’s policy may enhance its acceptability and legitimacy, and 
thus ease its implementation in the society. Actually, the two cases indicated that the judges 
tended to be supportive of the government in some important and influential policy issues by 
using pure legal reasoning so as to hide their political consideration. 
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4 The Court’s Role in Democratic Development 
 
4.1 Constitutional Reform 
 
Since reunification, democratic development has been a main theme of Hong Kong’s 
political life. It is mainly reflected in constitutional reform, by which it is meant how to 
amend the methods provided by the Basic Law for the selection of the Chief Executive (CE) 
and the formation of the Legislative Council (LegCo) after 2007. Although the Basic Law 
stipulates that the ultimate aim is to elect both the CE and all the members of the LegCo by 
universal suffrage,TPF 710 FPT it offers neither timetable nor roadmap for achieving that aim. It 
merely requires the reform should be subject to the “actual situation” in the HKSAR and the 
principle of “gradual and orderly progress”.TPF711FPT However it does allow amendments to the 
selection and formation methods subsequent to the year of 2007 if there is a need and the 
required procedures are followed.TPF712FPT 
 
Before 2007, Hong Kong had three experiences of selection of the CE. The first one was 
held in 1996, in which Mr. Tung Chee-hwa was elected from four eligible candidates by a 
400-member Selection Committee as the first CE of HKSAR.TPF713FPT The 400 members were 
representatives from the following four sectors: industrial, commercial and financial sectors 
(100), the professions (100), Labour, grass-roots, religious and other sectors (100), and 
former political figures, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress, and 
representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (100).TPF714FPT For the election of the second CE in 2002, an 
Election Committee of 800 members, which had been in place for the election of 6 members 
of LegiCo in 2000, was used.TPF715FPT They had been returned from four sectors slightly different 
from the former 400-member Selection Committee. Each sector had returned 200 
members.TPF716FPT They were: (1) industrial, commercial and financial sectors, (2) the professions, 
(3)labour, social services, religious and other sectors, (4)members of the Legislative Council, 
representatives of district-based organisations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s 
Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.TPF 717 FPTHowever, there was no actual 
election held this time because Mr. Tung secured 714 nominations during the nomination 
stage, thereby making it impossible for any other candidate to receive the minimum 100 
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nominations in order to proceed with an election.TPF718 FPT Tung moved on uncontested to his 
second term as CE. In 2005, Mr. Tung unexpectedly resigned. Mr. Donald Tsang eventually 
was selected by the Election Committee, which was the same one as that elected Mr. Tung 
for his second term, to be the new CE to complete the remainder of Tung’s term, which was 
due to expire in 2007. But there was a big controversy about how long the term should be. It 
will be discussed later. Again this time saw no actual election, for Mr. Tsang gained the 
support of 710 Election Committee members during the nomination stage and the election 
process was not triggered.TPF719FPT 
 
As far as the election of the LegCo is concerned, three elections, apart from the election of 
the Provisional Legislative Council of the HKSAR in 1996, were held before 2007. In the 
first post-colonial LegCo election that took place in May 1998, only twenty legislators were 
returned from geographical constituencies through direct elections, while thirty were 
returned by functional constituenciesTPF720FPT and ten by an 800-member Election Committee.TPF721FPT 
The first term of office of the LegCo was 2 years and after that it is 4 years.TPF722FPT So the second 
election was held in 2000. This time the number of legislators elected by the Election 
Committee was reduced to six while the number of directly elected legislators was increased 
to 24. TPF723 FPT In the 2004 election the six Election Committee seats were replaced by those 
returned by universal suffrage and the LegCo was composed of thirty directly elected 
members based on five geographical constituencies and thirty from a variety of functional 
constituencies concerned predominantly with business and professional interests.TPF724FPT These 
elections indicate a stable development of democracy in Hong Kong, rather than an idealist 
sudden leap. They seem to conform to the Basic Law’s requirement that Hong Kong’s 
democratisation must be in line with “the actual situation” in the HKSAR and “the principle 
of gradual and orderly progress”.TPF725FPT 
 
Hong Kong’s post-colonial democratic development can be pictured by exploring the debate 
over how to achieve the goal of universal suffrage in elections of both CE and LegCo. The 
debate was heated up by the constitutional reform of the two procedures after 2007. The 
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controversy over the constitutional reform focuses primarily on the following issues. The 
first one is the question of “when”, that is, what is the precise year for adopting universal 
suffrage or the pace of democratisation in Hong Kong. The pro-democrats seek full 
democratisation as early as possible while the conservatives and pro-Beijing figures prefer to 
a much delayed timetable.TPF726FPT The Basic Law provides merely the election methods prior to 
2007 and states that the ultimate end of the democratic development is universal suffrage, 
without pointing to a precise year. Therefore, in theory, even if it were achieved in 2047, the 
last year of exercising the policy of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong promised by 
the Basic Law and thus the last year of the effect of the Basic Law (strictly speaking),TPF727FPT that 
would still be constitutional, despite the fact that it might be politically unacceptable in 
reality for that would make the Central Government be seen as insincere to its promise of 
democracy for Hong Kong. However, the Basic Law does leave space for the democratic 
development subsequent to 2007 by providing that if there is a need to amend the two 
methods, it would be allowed provided that the procedural requirements are satisfied.TPF728FPT So 
the pro-democrats struggled for achieving universal suffrage in 2007’s selection of CE and 
2008’s election of LegCo. But their enthusiastic dream was ended by a Decision of the 
NPCSC, TPF 729 FPT which denied the universal suffrage being exercised in 2007 and 2008 by 
claiming that it would not conform to the “actual situation” in Hong Kong and the principle 
of “gradual and orderly progress”. But it permitted that appropriate amendments could be 
made to the two election methods. The decision was condemned by the pro-democrats for its 
delaying democratisation. They protested and urged universal suffrage be fully realised by 
2012.TPF 730 FPT The pro-democrats in the LegCo vetoed the proposal of the Hong Kong 
Government on the constitutional reform in 2007 and 2008, which was based on the 
NPCSC’ Decision and proposed to double the number of the Election Committee of 
selecting the CE to 1,600 and expand the LegCo to 70 members, from 60. TPF731FPT One primary 
reason of their opposition was the government’s proposal did not contain the timetable for 
achieving universal suffrage which they were fighting for.TPF732FPT As a result the election of the 
CE in 2007 and the formation of the Legislative Council in 2008 would continue to use the 
existing methods without any progress. Ironically the pro-democrats’ action seems to have 
led to an undemocratic result this time because if the Government’s proposal were adopted, 
the democratic element of the elections in 2007 and 2008 would at least increase to a large 
extent. Now due to their refusal, the previous less democratic methods would have to be 
used in the two years’ elections, making Hong Kong’s democratisation stay at the original 
position. The status quo was maintained. No progress at all. Even worse, their efforts for 
universal suffrage by 2012 were again frustrated by a Decision of the NPCSC.TPF733FPT However, 
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this time a timetable was set, allowing universal suffrage for selecting the CE by 2017 and 
all legislators by 2020.TPF 734 FPT Moreover, the Decision also provided that appropriate 
amendments conforming to the principle of gradual and orderly progress could be made to 
the two electoral methods for 2012.TPF735FPT These amendments will lay a solid foundation for 
attaining universal suffrage for the CE in 2017 and for the LegCo in 2020. 
 
Although the question of “when” has got its answer, there still remains the question of 
“how”, that is, the substantive arrangements of the universal suffrage, need to be addressed. 
Three issues are primarily concerned. First of all, the composition and size of the 
Nomination Committee for nominating the candidates of the CE and the method of 
nomination have been heatedly debated.TPF 736 FPT Secondly, in terms of forming LegCo by 
universal suffrage, the primary issue is how to deal with functional constituency seats, which 
constitute half of the Legislative Council at present. Two types of opinion dominate so far. 
One is to replace functional constituency seats with district-based seats returned through 
direct election while another advocates retaining functional constituency seats but changing 
the electoral methods.TPF 737 FPT hirdly, many people are concerned about the development of 
political parties in Hong Kong, being of the view that the present restriction, which requires 
the CE should not belong to a political party, needs to be reformed, and to the contrary, 
political parties should be encouraged to send members to be the candidates for the CE 
election.TPF738FPT 
 
4.2 The Courts’ Impact 
 
As it has been shown above, the primary feature of the process of the constitutional 
developments in Hong Kong is the lack of consensus among various political forces and 
different interest groups on the issues such as pace, Nomination Committee, functional 
constituencies, and party politics. Politicians and interest groups are using every possible 
means to try to influence the forming of the government’s final proposals, in an attempt to 
get proposals which would best suit their own political ideal or needs and desires. If they 
cannot achieve their ends or reach a compromise through the political process, they may 
choose to appeal to the courts. For example, Shan Zhongxie, the vice-president of the Hong 
Kong Democracy Party, once criticised sharply a proposal of electing the CE by universal 
suffrage put forward by Tan Huizhu, a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress, 
warning that if the proposal was adopted by the government, it would be challenged by a 
judicial review.TPF739FPT Tan’s proposal asserted that CE candidates must obtain nominations from 
at least nine Hong Kong deputies to the NPC. Mr. Shan claimed that it would violate the 
Basic Law for it would form a screening mechanism which was incompatible with the spirit 
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of universal suffrage provided by the Basic Law. However, Shan’s real concern was that the 
screening mechanism might effectively prevent the pro-democrats from being nominated. 
Inevitably such political concerns would continue to emerge in the constitutional reform 
process. If the political process lacks the ability to resolve them, courts will become their 
choice. Even if the issues could be resolved by politics, politicians might also put them 
before the courts as a strategy for bargaining. Therefore what role the Court should play 
when disputes concerning constitutional development come to it deserves discussion. 
 
In mature constitutional democracies, courts with constitutional review power play a 
significant part in the political process. Much literature has explored the unique political role 
of the US Supreme Court. For example, as indicated in Chapter 3, many theoretical 
explanations for courts’ legitimate role, such as Sunstein’s judicial minimalism, Ely’s 
representation reinforcing approach and Friedman’s dialogue account, have indeed based on 
enquiries on the US Supreme Court’s role in politics. As for the Western Europe, 
constitutional courts are conceived as a third legislative chamber.TPF740FPT Their review activities 
have effectively changed the behavior of the first and second Chambers, which tend to cater 
for the taste of the constitutional courts.TPF741FPT As Martin Shaprio and Alec Stone point out, 
“European constitutional courts have created situations in which legislators feel obliged to 
enter into constitutional discourse, both an internal discourse and a discourse with the court, 
to make and to take seriously constitutional arguments, and to cast and recast statutory 
language in the light of potential constitutional objections.”TPF742FPT In transitional democracies, 
as it has been shown by the cases of post-communism countries in east Europe and Russia, 
constitutional review could also contribute considerably to realising constitutional 
democracy in the transitional period, by helping society and public bodies to adapt to new 
social and public changes and to soften negative consequences of this transition and of 
various politically sensitive questions.TPF743FPT However in these new democracies, constitutional 
courts act usually in an extremely cautious way. Their performance, active or constrained, 
depends largely upon their calculation of the risk and benefit for the establishment of their 
authority, namely, public support or legitimacy in the long-run. TPF744FPT 
 
Hong Kong is also in a period of transitional democracy. During that period, through 
constitutional reforms, the ultimate aim of universal suffrage would be achieved in a gradual 
and orderly way. From the above democracies’ experience, it might be reasonable to expect 
that Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, could have some significant impact on the 
progress with its constitutional review power. But it must be noted that the courts in Hong 
Kong exercise only concrete constitutional review and have no jurisdiction of abstract 
review or giving advisory opinions. That means they can only address particular political 
constitutional issues in actual disputes; unlike the constitutional courts in most European 
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countries, such as France, Russia and Germany,TPF745 FPT Hong Kong courts cannot give legal 
opinions to the legislature or government on the constitutionality of a specific issue without 
actual litigation. However, although the influence of the courts in Hong Kong on the 
development of constitutional democracy may not be as obvious as that of their counterparts 
in Europe, they do have an important part to play in the process. Even though no actual 
litigation comes to them, their presence itself may serve to deter the occurrence of 
unconstitutionality. Take the NPCSC’s interpretation of art.53 (2) of the Basic Law for 
example. In 2005 the CE Mr. Tung Chee Hwa resigned and a new CE had to be elected 
within six months. It was said that at first the Central Government had no plan to interpret 
the Basic Law at all for it naturally thought that the term of office of the new CE selected 
through a by-election shall be the remainder of that of the previous CE. However, divergent 
views arose on this in Hong Kong society. One view supported the remainder of the term of 
office of the previous CE, and the other was for a five-year term for the new CE.TPF746FPT Standing 
with the Central Government, the Hong Kong government drafted an amendment to the 
Chief Executive Election Ordinance, prescribing that the term of office of the succeeding CE 
should expire upon the expiry of the term of office of the succeeded CE. However, some 
members of the LegCo and individuals publicly threatened that they would raise judicial 
review of the draft amendment.TPF747FPT In fact, the court received an application from a member 
of the LegCo for such judicial review on April 4, 2005. In order to avoid the delay of the 
election the possible judicial review might cause, eventually referral was made by Hong 
Kong Government and the NPCSC interpreted the Basic Law provision to clarify that the 
term would be the remainder of that of the previous CE.TPF748FPT Although the interpretation was 
still of controversy, it did have the effect of removing the legal uncertainty and 
strengthening the constitutional foundation of the by-election of the CE. Consequently, the 
legislator withdrew his application for judicial review from the court. TPF 749 FPT This example 
demonstrates courts’ deterrent impact on political actors’ behaviors. Although no judicial 
proceeding has been actually started, the possibility of courts’ engagement itself may 
substantially change the political process. Therefore when analyzing Hong Kong’s 
constitutional reform, the courts’ role cannot be overlooked. 
 
4.3 The Justiciability of Political Questions 
 
However, the capacity of courts to engage in political questions, which, to some extent, 
determines courts’ influence on Hong Kong’s constitutional reform, will be limited by the 
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idea of justiciability, by which it is meant, in terms of constitutional reform, whether the 
proposals, reports and decisions of the government concerning the constitutional 
developments are subject to constitutional judicial review. Some commentators may hold the 
view that Hong Kong courts should be strictly constrained by the doctrine of 
nonjusticiability of political questions. Actually, Professor Yash Ghai has put his doubts on 
the justiciability of all the provisions of the Basic Law, pointing out that some articles (e.g. 
requiring the Hong Kong government to keep a low tax policy, to create an environment 
conducive to investments, or whether a bill presented by the Chief Executive to the 
Legislative Council is sufficiently “important” to justify him or her dissolving the 
Legislative Council if it rejects it, etc.) may be unsuitable for judicial interpretation or 
intervention.TPF750 FPT Professor Albert Chen also argues that certain political issues should be 
excluded from Hong Kong courts’ constitutional jurisdiction based on the American courts’ 
“political question” doctrine.TPF751FPTHis view is shared by Yap Po Jen, who asserts that not all 
constitutional affairs falling within the limits of Hong Kong’s autonomy are automatically 
justiciable and where they are inappropriate for judicial resolution and they would be more 
effectively addressed by political branches, the courts should allow the political process to 
take its course. TPF752FPT 
 
The political question doctrine was created and developed by American courts following the 
English common law tradition of judicial self-restraint.TPF 753 FPT According to it, courts may 
decline to decide certain kinds of controversies because they are more appropriately within 
the purview of the political branches of government. The doctrine seems to be a logical 
result from the principle of separation of powers established by the US constitution. It 
implies that some constitutional questions fall outside the purview of the judiciary. However, 
it is still for courts to determine whether an issue at stake is indeed a political one and should 
be addressed by political process. In other words, “the courts still determine which branch 
decides the question, so there is an initial evaluation by the judiciary even when the political 
question doctrine applies. To that extent, the judiciary is still saying ‘what the law is.’ But 
the questions become ‘political’ in the sense that, after that determination, their resolution is 
left to the political branches”.TPF754FPT The implication of this for the Hong Kong situation is that, 
although political question doctrine may be deployed to reduce the courts’ possible influence 
in democratic development, the courts’ initial evaluation would still make them play a part 
in the constitutional reform if there are disputes presented to them. The initial evaluation 
itself could, arguably, be viewed as a kind of judicial intervention. Its result could be 
appealed to superior courts, and ultimately to the CFA. That means the judicial process 
could be strategically used to delay a constitutional reform even when the controversial issue 
is apparently a pure political question. 
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Moreover, however, as Tushnet has demonstrated, even in America the “political question” 
doctrine is gradually fading out.TPF755FPT It is asserted that “a matter is ‘clearly political’ cannot 
negate its existence as a ‘legal matter’. Every matter is a ‘legal matter’, in the sense that the 
law takes a position on whether it is permitted or forbidden.”TPF 756 FPT In some modern 
democracies there seems a tendency of replacing the “political question” claim with the 
claim of “subjection of parliamentary organs to the principle of the constitution”,TPF 757 FPT of 
which the final interpretative power is claimed to be exclusively possessed by the courts. In 
other words, the political question doctrine is increasingly facing a challenge from the rise of 
judicial supremacy, a trend, exemplified primarily by America, that the Supreme Court has 
embraced the view that it alone among the three branches of government has the power and 
competency to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional provisions.TPF 758 FPT 
Actually, a similar tendency emerges in Hong Kong. Leung Kwok Hung’s challenge to 
legislature’s rule of procedure in the interception caseTPF759FPT we discussed earlier may serve as a 
good example of the signs of judicial supremacy in Hong Kong. More importantly, the Basic 
Law does not explicitly exclude Hong Kong courts from dealing with “sensitive political 
questions”, except for the exclusion of acts of state such as foreign and defence affairs from 
their jurisdiction.TPF760FPT On the contrary, it does authorise Hong Kong courts to interpret all the 
provisions of the Basic Law, not only those which are within the limits of the autonomy of 
the Region but also those involving matters beyond the Region’s autonomy, given specific 
requirements are satisfied in the latter circumstance.TPF761 FPT If only part of the Basic Law is 
justiciable, as argued by Professor Ghai, the courts’ constitutional interpretation power 
would be diminished considerably given the further fact that they can only carry out 
concrete constitutional review. That would result in an absurd situation in which a portion of 
the Basic Law would not be subject to any interpretation of the courts while the Basic Law 
explicitly grants Hong Kong courts the power of interpreting all its provisions except for 
those Excluded Provisions which should be referred to the NPCSC for interpretation before 
making their final judgments which are not appeallable due to their involvement of the 
Central Government’s responsibilities or the relationship between the Central Authorities 
and the region.TPF762FPT Therefore, it may be safely argued that Hong Kong courts, based on their 
interpretation power, have jurisdiction to review any matters, other than acts of state, 
involving the application and the appreciation of the provisions of the Basic Law given that 
there is no need to refer them to the NPCSC for interpretation. Political questions certainly 
fall within their jurisdiction as long as the questions do not concern foreign and defence 
affairs and affairs beyond Hong Kong’s autonomy. 
 
Indeed the CFA does tend to assert courts’ power over all the disputes involving 
interpretation of any provision of the Basic Law. In other words, the CFA seems to embrace 
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the view that all the provisions of the Basic Law are justiciable. As advanced by the Chief 
Justice in Ng Ka Ling, 
 
They [the courts of the HKSAR] undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to examine whether 
legislation enacted by the legislature of the Region or acts of the executive authorities of the 
Region are consistent with the Basic Law and, if found to be inconsistent, to hold them to be 
invalid. The exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter of obligation, not of discretion so that if 
inconsistency is established, the court is bound to hold that a law or executive act in invalid 
at least to the extent of the inconsistency. [Stress added] TPF763FPT 
 
The CFA emphasised that it was the final authority in Hong Kong to judge the 
constitutionality of the legislative and executive actions according to the provisions of the 
Basic Law. Notably, the Court even strongly declared that the judiciary would not exercise 
any discretion to subject its commitment of constitutional review to political branches. This 
stance thus may reduce the space for arguing that courts’ constitutional jurisdiction could be 
subject to political question doctrine. According to it, when a dispute over the 
constitutionality of a political question appropriately comes to the courts, the courts must 
answer it by providing their interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law, rather 
than merely give up their jurisdiction with the excuse of political question doctrine. To 
exercise their jurisdiction to deal with controversies over the construction of the Basic Law 
provisions regulating a specific political matter, in the CFA’s view, is actually Hong Kong 
courts’ obligation, not a matter of discretion. They just have no power to give up that 
jurisdiction simply because of the fact that the Basic Law authorises them to be the 
authoritative interpreter of all its provisions (including the Excluded Provisions so long as 
their judgments are not final).TPF764FPT They must discharge that duty loyally and to be a guardian 
of the application of the Basic Law in Hong Kong. As far as constitutional development is 
concerned, it may be anticipated from the CFA’s above statement that the government’s acts 
or even the legislature’s decisions concerning the constitutional reform matters would be 
under the scrutiny of the courts for their constitutionality if they are appealed to the courts. 
This approach seems to conform to Hong Kong’s new development of constitutionalism and 
its traditionally treasured rule of law. 
 
4.4 The Virtue of Modesty 
 
However, the exercise of jurisdiction over political issues of course has its shortcomings. As 
Dr. Suzie Navot indicated in her analysis of Israeli cases, if a Supreme Court is occasionally 
regarded as the body that grants final “confirmation” to political decisions, this would 
provide an incentive for the filing of appeals on almost every decision of political bodies.TPF765FPT 
Consequently, the expected function of the political process would be diminished due to its 
loss of finality and certainty about issues previously within its prerogative. Accordingly, the 
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constitutional balance of powers would be undermined by the rise of judicial supremacy.TPF766FPT 
Therefore, judicial modesty should be called for so that both guaranteeing courts’ 
constitutional jurisdiction over political issues and ensuring the realisation of the functional 
efficiency of the political process could be achieved. Judicial modesty requires courts not to 
replace the function of the political organs when scrutinising a political question at issue; 
rather, the courts’ role should primarily focus on the examination of the legality and 
constitutionality of the involved political issue with a appropriate restraint, the substantive 
decision of the political question should still be left to the political process to determine. 
This would satisfy not only the requirement of the rule of law and constitutionalism, but also 
the principle of separation of powers. Some might say that is indeed all judges could do and 
what they always claim to do. However, we cannot ignore the fact that lawmaking – within 
certain limits – is an inevitable and legitimate element of the judge’s role.TPF767 FPT As far as 
constitutional interpretation is concerned, as a former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court famously remarked, “the constitution is what the judges say it is.”TPF 768 FPT A court 
employing a radical interpretative approach may easily lead to intrusion to the political 
branches’ territory, especially when constitutional questions are dealt with. So it seems not 
superfluous to reiterate here what judges always claim when defining their roles, that is, not 
to invade the Executive and Legislature’s space. The point is that what has been said should 
be really kept in practice. 
 
To achieve judicial modesty in this area some jurists’ theories we examined in Chapter 3, 
such as Bickel’s suggestion of “passive virtues”, Sunstein’s “judicial minimalism”, and 
Ely’s representation reinforcement approach, may be helpful and worth borrowing ideas 
from. But I am not advocating here that to use these theories to justify limiting courts 
constitutional jurisdiction. My point is, however, first, as indicated above, Hong Kong courts 
do have constitutional jurisdiction over all political questions, nevertheless, secondly, for the 
public good they should be encouraged to adopt a self-restraint approach when reviewing 
such a political question, focusing solely on constitutionality and legality of the relevant 
issue as they always claim. In other words, whether to be self-restrained depends entirely on 
the courts themselves. It is not their obligation; it is at their discretion. 
 
In fact the CFA has retreated from its initial stance in Ng Ka Ling. It has shown a change of 
attitude from activism to more restraint in dealing with politically sensitive questions since 
its frustration generated by the NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law in 1999,TPF769FPT which 
served to reverse the CFA’s activist opinion on constitutional questions in Ng Ka ling. 
According to Chen’s assessment,TPF770 FPT after that, the CFA embraced self-restraint in cases 
involving the relationship between the respective powers of Basic Law interpretation of the 
NPCSC and the Hong Kong courts by accepting unconditionally the “free-standing” power 
of the NPCSC to promulgate interpretation of the Basic Law irrespective of whether the 
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CFA has requested an interpretation; At the same time, to Chen, the Court has steered a 
middle course between judicial activism and judicial restraint, neither radically liberal nor 
conservative, in adjudicating the rights of the Hong Kong people. In Po-Jen Yap’s 
opinion,TPF771FPT since Ng Ka Ling, the CFA has become “cognisant” of the repercussions of its 
decisions and now adopted a pragmatically view toward its adjudicatory role and is keenly 
conscious of the consequence of its actions. As a result, Yap points out, where decisions 
implicate the validity of NPCSC decisions or PRC laws implemented under the Basic Law, 
the court would always defer to the central government as the judiciary is fully “cognisant”, 
after Ng Ka Ling, that the central government does not tolerate bold judicial activism on 
matters concerning Beijing’s sovereignty over the Region; where disputes concern alleged 
human rights violations that have no PRC implications but have law and order implications 
in Hong Kong, the Court is generally conservative and tends to be supportive of other 
governmental branches measures, so as to afford the legislature or the executive much 
latitude in preserving peace and stability; in right-infringement controversies with neither 
NPCSC nor domestic law and order implications, the Court intervenes aggressively. Chen 
and Yap’s analysis shows a similarity, that is, for the CFA, whether to be active or restraint, 
aggressive or modest, it depends, to a large extent, on the nature of the issues being 
addressed. It is apparent that the CFA would consciously exercise self-restraint when the 
issues in hand are politically sensitive, especially those involving Central Government 
elements. It seems that the more politically sensitive an issue is the more self-restrained the 
Court would choose to be. As Mr. Justice Andrew Li, the Chief Justice of the CFA, 
recognises, 
 
“Court decisions in many judicial review cases have important repercussions for various 
political, economic and social problems which confront our society. But I must reiterate that 
judicial review proceedings cannot provide a panacea for these problems. The constitutional 
role of the courts is only to determine the limits of legality by reference to the relevant 
constitutional and statutory provisions and the applicable common law principles. The 
courts are only concerned with what is legally valid, and what is not, in accordance with 
legal norms and principles. 
 
Within the limits of legality, the practical solutions to the complex and difficult political, 
economic and social problems faced by society must be discussed and found through the 
proper operation of the political system. Citizens have to look to the political process to 
deliver appropriate workable solutions to these problems.”TPF772FPT 
 
Therefore it might be anticipated that if a political dispute concerning Hong Kong’s 
constitutional development goes to the courts, they would not hesitate to exercise 
jurisdiction over it. But their examination would be on the legality and constitutionality of 
the involved question and would be in a self-restrained way, showing respect to the authority 
of the Legislature and the autonomy of decision making of the Executive. However, it must 
be noted that if the case finally goes to the CFA, the CFA should refer the interpretation 
issue to the NPCSC in accordance with the requirement provided by art.158 of the Basic 
Law, for the constitutional development issues are obviously matters beyond the autonomy 
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of Hong Kong itself and relating to the relationship between the Region and the Central 
Government. 
 
5 Interaction with Mainland China’s Political Life 
 
5.1 Influences from the Central Government 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, China is a state where politics takes precedence over almost 
everything. The Communist Party and its government dominate political life. Centralism, 
collectivism and authoritarianism are seen by many in China, especially politicians, 
sometimes even Chinese democrats, as necessary for governing such a huge country.TPF773 FPT 
Democracy and the rule of law are still underdeveloped but significant progress has been 
made since the “reforming and opening-up” policy was adopted since 1978. TPF774FPT As to the 
judiciary, courts have no jurisdiction of judicial review; the provisions of the Constitution 
are not justiciable; the view that law should serve politics and that the judiciary is the 
instrument for governing is still commonly shared by judges.TPF775FPT However, to build a socialist 
country with the rule of law has been written in the Constitution as the country’s goal.TPF776FPT 
Considerable judicial reforms have been carried out.TPF777FPT Anyway, China has started on its 
way to transfer to modern democracy and constitutionalism.TPF778FPT On the contrary, however, in 
Hong Kong although direct democracy has not been fully achieved yet, the actual level and 
quality of democracy which has been realised, as well as the democratic political culture, 
seem to be higher and more successful, at least until now, than that in the mainland China.TPF779FPT 
More importantly, the rule of law has been the main feature and advantage of the Region. 
Since reunification, Hong Kong has also been developing into a constitutionalism polityTPF780FPT 
                                                 
TP
773
PT Baogang He, The Democratization of China, (Routledge, 1996), p245; Tianjian Shi, “China: Democratic 
Values Supporting an Authoritarian System”, in Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan and Doh 
Chull Shin (eds), How East Asians View Democracy (Columbia University Press, 2008), pp209-235 
TP
774
PT Henry Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People be Free?”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 3, 
July 2007, at 38-50; Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependency, and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in People’s Republic of China”, in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu 
(ed), China’s Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition ( Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), at 191-228; Jamie 
P. Horsley (2006), “The Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress”, available at 
http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0603horsley.pdf accessed on 5 November 2008 
TP
775
PT Balme, Stephanie (2005) “The Judicialisation of Politics and the Politicisation of the Judiciary in China 
(1978-2005),” Global Jurist Frontiers: Vol. 5, Iss. 1, Article 1, 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol5/iss1/art1 accessed on 5 November 2008 
TP
776




PT Wang Liming, “The Achievements and Prospect of Court Reforms in China”, Frontiers of Law in China, 
Volume 1, Number 1, January 2006, at 1-13; Zou Keyuan, “Towards the Rule of Law: An Overview of China’s 
Legal Reform”, in Guangwu Wang and John Wong (eds), China: Two Decades of Reform and Change (World 
Scientific, 1999), at 41-66 
TP
778
PT Henry Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People be Free?”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 3, 
July 2007, at 38-50; Lin Feng, “Modern Constitutionalism in China”, in Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds), The 
Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Springer Netherlands, 2007), at 633-646 
TP
779
PT Martin C. M. Lee, “The Hong Kong Example”, Journal of Democracy 9.4(1998), at 4-8; Sony Lo, “The 
Political Cultures of Hong Kong and Mainland China: Democratization, Patrimonialism, and Pluralism in the 




PT Albert H.Y. Chen, “The Theory, Constitution and Practice of Autonomy: The Case of Hong Kong”, in Jorge 
Costa Oliveira and Paulo Cardinal (eds.) One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders – Perspectives of 
Evolution: Essays on Macau’s Autonomy after the Resumption of Sovereignty by China (Springer, 2009), p765. 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF 
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 
UNDER CHINA’S “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” PRINCIPLE 
Wanli Wang 
- 156 - 
as a result of the enforcement of the Basic Law and the accompanying practice of 
constitutional judicial review. 
 
The politics in mainland China could have great impact on Hong Kong courts’ work, 
especially that of the CFA, despite China’s promise of a high degree of autonomy for the 
Region and the independence of its courts. As already mentioned, in 1999 the NPCSC, an 
important political institution of the Central Government, did not hesitate to exercise its 
constitutional interpretation power to reverse the CFA’s interpretation of the Basic Law 
provisions in Ng Ka Ling. The immediate result was that the CFA’s constitutional opinion in 
the case was effectively reversed; but more importantly, after that the CFA became very 
cautious, or even compliant, when dealing with issues involving mainland China, trying not 
to provoke the Central Government and doing its best to avoid direct confrontation with the 
Central Authorities.TPF781FPT The CFA’s change of attitude perhaps reasonably implies that to be 
self-restrained or even conservative toward sensitive political issues concerning the Central 
Government on Hong Kong courts’ own initiative is better and safer for the Region’s 
autonomy and judicial independency than to be aggressive and incur the intervention from 
the political institution of the mainland China. Another example we mentioned earlier is the 
NPCSC’s interpretation of the term of the Chief Executive in 2005, which served to stop the 
possible constitutional judicial review of this issue. Again it effectively made the litigant 
withdraw his application from the court. 
 
However we must not get a wrong impression that the Central Government, particularly the 
NPCSC, tends to interfere rashly with Hong Kong courts’ decisions. In fact, except for these 
two examples, there is no other intervention from the NPCSC so far. Contrarily it tends to be 
cautious and tolerant about the Court’s performance perhaps because of the constitutional 
constraint and careful political risk evaluation. Actually, since its resumption of exercising 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, in most circumstances, the Central Government has acted with 
restraint.TPF782FPT In recent years, it decided to “leave well enough alone, adopting a mostly hands-
off attitude regarding the Hong Kong legal system”. TPF783FPT As Professor Chen demonstrates, “a 
practice or unwritten norm seems to have been developed whereby the central government 
exercises utmost self-restraint so as to minimise its intervention and to maximise the SAR’s 
autonomy.” TPF 784 FPT The incentive of China’s self-control might lie in its caring about its 
international image and its worry about the political risk that would be provoked by its 
frequent interventions, that is, the furious protest from Hong Kong people and sharp 
criticism from international community. 
 
It must also be pointed out that although the interference of the Central Government is 
primarily based on its political consideration, it always tries to improve its actions’ 
legitimacy by attaching much importance to the legality and constitutionality of the concrete 
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measures of the interference. This can be indicated by the procedural improvement of 
NPCSC’s interpretations of the Basic Law and relevant Decisions, as well as their wording. 
All of these interpretations and decisions have been well dressed in an account of legality 
and constitutionality. This strategy may have an effect of reducing Hong Kong people’s 
resistance, for the more legal and constitutional the measures of the intervention appear to be, 
the better the political effect or simply the acceptance of the people, might be. Therefore the 
Central Authorities do have the incentive both to self-restrain from arbitrary intervention and 
to abide by the constitution and law when exercising its interfering power. 
 
As we know from Chapter 2, the essential concerns of China’s Central Government are 
always the unification of the country and the unchallengeability of its sovereignty. Thus its 
attitude toward Hong Kong courts could largely depend on the courts’ performance and role 
in this regard. If Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, could play a positive role in 
improving the integration of the country under its “one country, two systems” constitutional 
arrangement, just like the contribution of European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its 
counterparts in European member states to the evolution of the European polity, the Central 
Government and the Communist Party might be more likely to respect and support the 
Court’s job and less likely to intervene politically. As we discussed in Chapter 1 and 4, the 
ECJ develops and maintains a uniform legal order for the EU, which is primarily 
characterised by the supremacy and direct effect of EU law and mainly realised through the 
preliminary reference procedure. A coordination or dialogue relation has been established 
between the ECJ and the courts of the member states. This ensures the sufficient caseloads 
of the ECJ, which are willingly provided by the member states’ courts, and enhances the 
efficient enforcement of the ECJ’s decisions in member states. In other words, the courts of 
member states have been effectively turned into the courts of the EU. All in all, the 
integration of Europe, to a large extent, is achieved by the efforts of the courts, both the ECJ 
and the courts of the member states. However, Hong Kong has a different story. Hong Kong 
courts, including the CFA, merely view themselves as the courts for Hong Kong, serving 
solely the realisation of the autonomy and the rule of law for the Region. They are not yet 
conscious of defining themselves as not only the courts for Hong Kong but also the courts 
for the whole country, as the EU member states’ courts re-define their role in the process of 
EU integration. According to the design of the “one country, two systems” policy, which is 
embodied by the Basic Law, the institutional connection between the HKSAR and mainland 
China is primarily ensured through the post of the Chief Executive of HKSAR. Perhaps we 
may say that the integration of Europe to some extent is promoted and maintained by courts, 
while the unification between Hong Kong and mainland China, in terms of institution 
arrangement, is mainly achieved by the executive branch. However, Hong Kong courts, 
especially the CFA, like their counterparts in Europe, do have the possibility of contributing 
to the unification of the country while at the same time safeguarding the autonomy of the 
Region. They can deliver constitutional opinions in favour of the integration of the country; 
they can exercise self-restraint and show respect when dealing with issues concerning the 
authority of the Central Government; especially, they can, in accordance with the provision 
of art.158 of the Basic Law and through the CFA, identify and refer questions beyond the 
autonomy of the Region to the NPCSC for interpretation without reluctance and resistance 
by artificially distinguishing the issues as irrelevant for referral, like it did in Ng Ka Ling, so 
that the NPCSC could have sufficient caseload and opportunities to make more concrete and 
practical constitutional standards of pro-integration for the relationship between Hong Kong 
and mainland China. If a dialogue or co-operative relationship is established between the 
Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, and the NPCSC, it might be beneficial not only to 
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the unification of the country but also the autonomy of the Region, for in so doing the 
concern of the Central Government would be largely achieved by an institutionally 
accommodative way and as a result its interference, which could be politically risky to it 
because of the accompanying conflict, would seem to be obviously costly and thus 
unnecessary any more. On the contrary, if Hong Kong courts, especially the CFA, choose to 
disregard the authority of the NPCSC, just like some constitutional courts of the member 
states of EU did to the decisions of the ECJTPF785FPT and the CFA itself did in Ng Ka Ling, the risk 
of attack from the Central Authorities would increase considerably. 
 
Although the Central Government’s attitude toward the work of Hong Kong courts might, as 
discussed above, largely depend on the courts’ attitude and actual role in strengthening the 
unification of the country, that is the “one country” aspect of the “one country, two system” 
slogan, in general it seems that the Central Government may even prefer to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary in Hong Kong. Its underlying evaluation is that ensuring 
courts’ insulation from political influence could make it not so easy for the local hostile 
political forces to use courts blocking policies favoured by the Central Government. Imagine 
that Hong Kong courts could easily be forced to defer to the local political forces, there is a 
possibility that the pro-democrats, who are still unacceptable to the Central Government by 
now, might influence or even dominate the courts in some political disputes. That is 
certainly a danger which should in the eyes of the Central Government be avoided. Due to 
the constitutional constraint to the Central Authorities and the ideology and belief firmly 
held by the CFA as a common law supreme court, it is unrealistic for the Central 
Government to attempt to make the Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, always side 
with it or to interfere as it wishes to ensure the CFA’s deference. So it is reasonable for the 
Central Government to adopt a strategy of respecting or even safeguarding the independence 
and neutrality of the Hong Kong courts so that the immunisation of the courts from local 
political forces, specifically the pro-democrats, could be ensured. 
 
5.2 The Positive Impact of Hong Kong’s Experience on Mainland China 
 
We must also bear in mind that Hong Kong courts are not just negatively subject to the 
influence from the Central Government. To the contrary, they could have positive impact on 
the transitional process of the rule of law and constitutionalism in mainland China as well. 
China is modernising not only economically but also politically, although the latter seems 
lagging behind the former. Hong Kong could be valuable for China in this regard. It could 
provide China a successful model, from which China could learn a lot, of how to realise the 
rule of law in a Chinese society which has a long history of rule of man. With the 
development of closer exchange and interaction between Hong Kong legal institutions 
(including the judiciary) and their counterparts in mainland China after reunification, there 
are signs that show Hong Kong does contribute to the progress of the rule of law in China. 
Firstly, three arrangements for mutual legal assistance have been signed between Hong 
Kong and the mainland so far, including mutual service of judicial documents in civil and 
commercial proceedings, TPF 786 FPT mutual enforcement of arbitral awards,TPF 787 FPT and reciprocal 
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Mainland and Hong Kong Courts, signed in Shenzhen on 14 January 1999, 
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recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.TPF 788 FPT These 
arrangements have considerable impact on the legal system in mainland China, especially 
the last one, in which Hong Kong’s concerns have made the mainland reform its traditional 
practice. One of the main concerns of Hong Kong in the negotiation of the arrangement is 
the “finality” of the judgments of the courts’ in mainland China. In common law legal theory, 
the finality in adjudication is viewed as a condition of the rule of law. TPF789FPT However China has 
an adjudication supervision system which is designed to correct “wrongly decided” final 
adjudications. China’s Civil Procedure law provides that a decided case may be retried if the 
relevant courts, procuratorates or litigants find or consider there is definite error in the legal 
effective judgment or written order.TPF790FPT This procedure is seen in the mainland China as a 
good means to prevent unjust judicial decisions and thereby guarantee justice. But it had 
been a primary obstacle of coming to an arrangement between Hong Kong and mainland 
China on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, for the Hong Kong side feared that the adjudication supervision procedure would 
make the judgments of the courts in mainland China lack finality, which was thought 
essential to the rule of law. After several years’ negotiations, the mainland China agreed to 
limit the judgments that could be reciprocally recognised and enforced to a specific scope 
which was smaller than that of the actual enforceable judgments of all the courts in mainland 
China so that Hong Kong’s concern about finality might be satisfied.TPF791 FPT In recent years, 
China has also adopted measures to reform the adjudication supervision system by 
restricting the conditions for initiating the retrial procedure, in an attempt to strike a balance 
between ensuring the correctness of the judgments and guaranteeing their finality.TPF792FPT This 
example proves that the Hong Kong element could be an incentive for mainland China to 
reform and improve its legal practice. 
 
The NPCSC’s efforts to improve its practice of interpreting the Basic Law can further 
demonstrate Hong Kong’s positive influence on the progress of rule of law in China. As we 
discussed in Chapter 2, unlike the practice in common law system, in China interpreting the 
law and the constitution is the power of the NPCSCTPF 793 FPT and traditionally the judiciary 
primarily performs a mechanical role in adjudicating cases without the power of interpreting 
law in such a way as the common law judiciary does. TPF794FPT However, the NPCSC authorises the 
People’s Supreme Court to deliver judicial interpretation of law to guide other courts’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
TP
787
PT Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong 
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http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf accessed on 6 June 2008 
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PT Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by 
the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to Choice of Court 
Agreements between Parties Concerned, signed in Hong Kong on 14 July 2006, 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandrej20060719e.pdf accessed on 6 June 2008. 
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PT Supra note 64, art.2. 
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Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned’”, Chinese 
Download Centre for Thesis, http://www.studa.net/minfa/080307/09303963.html accessed on 9 June 2008, p7-8 
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PT The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, art.67(1)(4). 
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PT Wang Chenguang, “Law-making functions of the Chinese courts: Judicial activism in a country of rapid 
social changes”, Frontiers of Law in China, Volume 1, Number 4, (December 2006), at524-549 
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application of law. TPF795FPT In practice, although the NPCSC has the interpretation power, it had 
never exercised it since 1979 when the NPC and NPCSC restarted enacting laws.TPF796FPT The 
interpretation of the Nationality Law for Hong Kong in 1996 was the first interpretation 
made by the NPCSC. Since then it has delivered several interpretations and most of them 
concern Hong Kong or Macao matters. The most historic and controversial one perhaps is its 
response to the CFA’s interpretation of the Basic Law in Ng Ka Ling in 1999. The NPCSC’s 
interpretation reversed the CFA’s opinion. This was the first time that the NPCSC exercised 
its constitutional power to interpret the Basic Law since the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region. It is therefore of great significance in the history of “one 
country, two systems” practice and the contemporary legal history of China. After that, 
Hong Kong’s concern indeed has made the NPCSC enhance the quality of its interpretation 
of the Basic Law both in terms of procedure and substantial contents. As we know, due to its 
lack of experience in interpreting statute and its accustomed style of legislating, the 
NPCSC’s procedure for interpreting was not transparent and the content of its interpretation 
was simple, without detailed explanation of reasons. Therefore there are doubts on its 
legitimacy among many Hong Kong people, particularly among its legal professions, 
scholars and political elites.TPF797FPT They worry that the NPCSC’s interpretative power would be 
deployed by the Central Government to suit political exigencies and erode Hong Kong’s 
autonomy. TPF798FPT They complain that the way the NPCSC goes about interpretation provides 
little basis for predictability.TPF 799 FPT They are also unhappy with the fact that the NPCSC’s 
interpretations are not fully tested at the ballot box, and its pronouncements, once issued, 
cannot be questioned or reviewed.TPF800FPT There are some mainland scholars who have shown 
their doubt about the efficiency and fairness of this system as well. They argue that the 
NPCSC, as a non-judicial organ, might not be able to interpret laws according to the needs 
of complicated and ever-changing realities, especially when it holds a meeting only once 
every two months. TPF801FPT A suggestion of judicialising the interpretative power of the NPCSC 
under art.158 of the Basic Law has been put forward by Professor Yash GhaiTPF802FPT as follows: 
The NPCSC will not interpret the Basic Law on its own initiative; no new provisions can be 
added to the interpretation of the Basic Law; and the NPCSC can not bypass art.159 to 
amend the Basic Law; a committee should be established under the NPCSC to advise the 
NPCSC in interpreting the Basic Law, and that committee should hear the arguments of the 
litigating parties; The NPCSC should analyze the law and give its reasoning when giving the 
interpretation. There are other scholars holding a similar opinion. They suggest developing 
the NPCSC’s Basic Law Committee into a quasi-judicial institution responsible for 
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Interpreting Law, http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=1906 accessed on 9 June 2008. 
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PT During the Cultural Revolution, China’s legal system was totally destroyed and there was no law at all.  
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PT Albert H. Y. Chen, “Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong”, (2006) 15 Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal, at 627, 631-632 
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The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law, (Hong Kong University Press 1999), at 213. 
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http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/CR/ghai_0426.html accessed on 10 November 2008 
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Development in Hong Kong”, Hong Kong Journal (01 January 2008), at 
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exercising the interpretative power through improvements including allowing submissions 
or even oral arguments from interested parties, the open publication of the Committee’s final 
detailed recommendations to the NPCSC, with the reasoning behind those recommendations 
fully spelled out, and the disclosure of any dissenting views.TPF803FPT These views are echoed by a 
few mainland scholars who argue that the NPCSC’ power to interpret the Constitution 
should be passive, on an ad hoc basis and in a judicial manner.TPF804FPTIt is believed that more 
well-reasoned and persuasive interpretations from the NPCSC would significantly enhance 
the degree of public acceptance of the NPCSC’s interventions.TPF805FPT These suggestions reflect 
the opinions of quite a few Hong Kong people. Although it is unrealistic that they will be all 
adopted by the Central Government, they do provide an impetus for NPCSC’s improvement 
of its interpretation practice. When making the two interpretations of the Basic Law after 
1999, the NPCSC paid much attention to its procedural aspect. In order to ensure the 
legitimacy of its interpretation and enhance its acceptance in Hong Kong, the NPCSC took 
into account Hong Kong people’s concerns and developed a constitutional custom in the two 
interpretations, that is, to send senior officials to listen to the opinions of the representatives 
from various sectors of Hong Kong community prior to finalising its interpretation drafts;TPF806FPT 
after the interpretations were delivered, the same officials were sent again to Hong Kong to 
explain them to those representatives. Moreover, measures have also been taken to 
strengthen the work of the Basic Law Committee of the NPCSC, which is responsible for 
giving opinions on the interpretation issues. It seems that these developments pushed by 
Hong Kong issues, although far from satisfactory, could serve to improve the quality of the 
NPCSC’s interpretations and guarantee the interests of Hong Kong to some extent. They 
represent the progress of the rule of law in mainland China as well. Some optimists’ believe 
that the Basic Law Committee has the potential to set a broader example for the future of 
constitutionalism on the mainland.TPF807FPT If it is permitted to be reformed, they think, it may 
boost the gradually increasing momentum to establish a constitutional committee of the NPC 
as a more legitimate instrument for interpreting the PRC Constitution itself.TPF808FPT 
 
In recent years, Chinese legal scholars have been calling for “judicialising the Constitution” 
and pushing the development of constitutionalism in China.TPF809FPT They advocate that the courts 
should enjoy the power of interpreting the constitution and employing the provisions of the 
constitution to resolve concrete legal issues, just as the common practice of constitutional 
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judicial review in some western countries, such as USA and Germany.TPF810FPT In practice, the 
courts in mainland China have tentatively cited an article of the Constitution concerning the 
constitutional right of education to handle a dispute.TPF811FPT The rule of law and constitutionalism 
seem more acceptable than multiparty politics to the Chinese Communist Party. This has 
been indicated in an amendment of China’s Constitution, which claims that “The People’s 
Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a 
socialist country of law”. TPF812FPT Therefore, to establish a constitutional adjudication system to 
achieve the rule of law and human rights protection is more likely to be China’s option in its 
political reform than the institutionalisation of political pluralism. For this process, the 
western models, particularly the American and European practices, are quite attractive to 
many Chinese legal scholars.TPF 813 FPT Although the western models could be productive and 
helpful to China’s transition, they also produce their own limits due to the different legal 
traditions, political cultures and realities. However, Hong Kong’s experience could be much 
more valuable to mainland China. They both are Chinese communities enjoying the same 
cultural identity in a traditional sense. Although they practise different social systems, they 
both are under one unified constitutional order. The exchange, cooperation, connections and 
integration between them have been improving considerably since the reunification. The 
practice of constitutional judicial review in Hong Kong has become increasingly mature. As 
the Chief Justice points out, judicial review has become an established and vital feature of 
Hong Kong’s legal system.TPF814FPT It seems that China could achieve much better results with 




Our examination of the role of Hong Kong courts, particularly the role of the CFA, in 
politics shows a picture of interactions between the Hong Kong judiciary and the political 
institutions as well as other political forces both within the Region and beyond it. At the local 
level, the dominant role of the Chief Executive defined by the so called “executive-led” 
system could potentially have a negative impact on the Court’s authority and independence. 
At the same time, the Court’s behaviour could have the effect of strengthening the executive-
led order or weakening it. It depends on what stance the Court holds, liberal or conservative, 
active or restrained. In Hong Kong’s political reality, cooperation between the executive and 
the legislature is lacking and the conflicts between them are constant. They may compete for 
the Court’s support. Thus the Court could be their extended battlefield. The Court’s stance is 
therefore an important factor in Hong Kong’s political balance. 
 
More specifically, the Court’s role in scrutinising public policies is of great significance not 
only to the protection of individual rights, but also to the efficiency and legitimacy of the 
government. Individuals or politicians may use judicial review as a strategy to delay or block 
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a governmental scheme so as to safeguard their interest or change the political bargaining 
condition with the government. The Court’s endorsement of such a public policy will save 
the government’s face, maintain its authority and ensure an effective enforcement of the 
policy by enhancing considerably the public acceptance of it. The possibility of courts’ 
intervention has altered government’s way of decision-making. It becomes more cautious 
and attaches much importance to legal risk assessment in the whole process of policy making. 
 
It was argued that Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over politically sensitive issues 
concerning Hong Kong’s constitutional development process on the ground that the Basic 
Law has granted them the power to interpret all the provisions of the Basic Law rather than 
just a portion of it. Therefore the courts could play a significant part in Hong Kong’s 
transitional democracy. Although they can only exercise concrete constitutional review, their 
presence itself could have the effect of changing the behaviour of the political actors. When 
making decisions, the political forces, political institutions and politicians will evaluate the 
risk of constitutional judicial review, take into account the possible opinions of the courts in 
the possible judicial review litigations, and adapt their actions and strategies accordingly. 
When exercising their intervention in this regard, the courts had better avoid taking an 
extremely radical view of their interpretative duty; rather, appropriate caution and restraint 
are necessary for the judges to deal with possible disputes concerning constitutional 
development issues. The substantive content of the issues should certainly be left to the 
political branches to address. The courts should also be encouraged to exercise its 
jurisdiction over political questions in a modest or even restrained way. Actually the CFA 
has adopted a more humble attitude toward political sensitive issues since its aggressive 
performance in Ng Ka Ling. 
 
The interactions between Hong Kong and mainland China in this area have also been 
examined. In theory the Central Government could easily deploy the final interpretation 
power of the NPCSC to change Hong Kong courts’ constitutional decisions just as it did to 
Ng Ka Ling. But in reality, the NPCSC tends to be cautious and tolerant to Hong Kong 
courts’ performance perhaps due to its careful assessment of the huge political cost that 
would be brought about by its rash intervention. Given the constitutional constraint and the 
political risk of its own interference, the Central Government may prefer to support and even 
safeguard the independence and neutrality of the judiciary in Hong Kong because it would 
worry that Hong Kong local political forces, especially the pro-democrats, could influence 
and dominate the courts. If Hong Kong courts, particularly the CFA, could play a significant 
part in improving the integration and safeguarding of the sovereignty of the country, just as 
the ECJ and its counterparts in EU member states have been doing in the evolution of EU, 
perhaps the Central Government would be more likely to constrain its intervention. Hong 
Kong courts and legal professions might contribute significantly to mainland China’s 
transitional rule of law and constitutionalism. The increasing exchange and cooperation 
between them may make the mainland learn a lot from the experience of Hong Kong’s 
mature and advanced practice of the rule of law. Actually, China’s reform of adjudication 
supervision system and improvement of NPCSC’s procedure of interpreting the Basic Law 
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…the ultimate key to Hong Kong’s success is still the strict adherence to the rule of law. This 
is not just holding on firmly to the core values and high standards, but also means a 
readiness to meet the new challenges of the modern day, to be responsive to the needs 
created by the new constitutional, economic and social order, as well as to be alert to the 
change of the legal landscape of the world.TPF815FPT 
 
– Wong Yan Lung 
 
 
9:00am, 6Pth P April 2009, Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre. 
 
The Opening Ceremony of the 16Pth P Commonwealth Law Conference was taking place where 
delegates from three dozen Commonwealth countries were present. 
 
The Honourable Mr. Justice Andrew Kwok-nang Li, Chief Justice of the CFA of the HKSAR 
delivered a speech to open the Conference.TPF816FPT He pointed out, “this is the first time when the 
Commonwealth Law Conference is held in a non-Commonwealth jurisdiction”, the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, in which the 
common law system has continued to be maintained and to thrive under China’s sovereignty. 
The convening of this conference in Hong Kong, to the Chief Justice, “represent[ed] a 
recognition of the successful implementation of the principle of ‘one country, two systems’”. 
 
Hong Kong had previously hosted the Commonwealth Law Conference in the colonial era in 
1983, when China and Britain had just begun negotiations over Hong Kong’s future. 
Participants at that time could hardly foreseen that in a quarter of a century later, this very 
same conference would be held again in Hong Kong – no longer a British colony nor a 
Commonwealth member but a special administrative region of China, where the judiciary is 
headed by a Chief Justice of Hong Kong’s own Court of Final Appeal and the common law 
principles still apply. 
 
As we have seen, the Judiciary of Hong Kong in general, represented mainly by the CFA, 
operates properly and efficiently under China’s “one country, two systems” arrangement. It 
plays a significant role in upholding the rule of law, safeguarding the individual rights, 
providing the public with satisfactory judicial service, so as to build up the confidence of 
international investors in Hong Kong and thus facilitate the region’s continuous prosperity 
and stability, as well as maintain the region’s sense of identity, way of life and value systems 
which set Hong Kong from those prevailing in the mainland China. At the same time, the 
courts face many new challenges, primarily arising from Hong Kong’s new constitutional 
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order and political environment. The CFA’s constitutional status and dilemma, that is, a 
supreme court of common law jurisdiction within a communist regime with civil law model 
and a vulnerable sub-state court of a region within an enormously powerful “Chinese 
empire” TPF 817 FPT, are indeed indicative of the complexity and sensitivity of the Central-SAR 
relationship under China’s “one country, two systems” settlement. The CFA is also an 
institutional reflection of the plurality and of the dialectic nature of that settlement. It 
manifests the contradiction, interaction, dialogue and mutual influence between the parallel 
systems which coexist in a common constitutional framework. 
 
Like other “one polity, multi legal orders” in the world such as constitutional practices in the 
EU and UK, the uniqueness of Hong Kong’s legal system, in which the CFA is the apex, is 
entrenched by a constitutional document and immune from the encroachment from the 
parallel system or the Centre of the polity. To a large extent it is self-sufficient in terms of 
norms provision and disputes adjudication. However, it is by no means an isolated island; 
rather, it is an open system. It grows steadily by constantly absorbing nutrition from the 
outside legal world and adapts, directly or indirectly, to the constraints imposed by the 
external spheres (either other local governmental branches or the mainland China institutions). 
It contributes to the legal and constitutional development in other jurisdictions as well. In 
other words, we cannot ignore the interplay between the Hong Kong legal system and that of 
the common law world, between it and the mainland China’s legal order, between it and 
international jurisprudence. The CFA’s invitation of overseas judges to sit on its panel, 
highlighting the importance of referring to comparative materials in human rights issues, 
avoiding direct confrontation with the central authorities, and providing helpful lessons for 
the mainland China’s legal reform and human rights protection, could serve as good 
examples for such dynamic reciprocal influence. Moreover, although the judiciary as the core 
institution of a legal system enjoys a high degree of independence, it does not mean an 
absolute insulation from other governmental branches and social, economic, and political 
forces; there exist sort of interaction and dialogue between them. Again, the CFA’s role in 
Hong Kong’s legislature-executive relationship, public policy bargains and political games 
are a demonstration of these mutual influences. 
 
The year 2009 witnessed the CFA’s twelfth birthday. To Chinese people, one’s twelfth 
birthday or that of the multiples of twelve has special meaning, as in China’s tradition the 
astrological signs of twelve animals represent a twelve year cycle that is aligned with the sun 
and the moon. Hong Kong’s CFA was born in 1997 – the year of Oxen: this, according to 
Chinese belief, implies it would be diligent, tame, and honest just like a farm cattle. Is that 
actually the character shown by the CFA in its short history of existence? In fact, our 
investigation reveals that the CFA’s twelve-year history has indeed been a running-in period 
in which the Court takes shape of its “personality” by constantly adapting its behaviour so as 
to conform to its constitutional status and fit its new constitutional setting and political order. 
The Court tried to establish constitutional precedents with courage, adjusted its constitutional 
performance with wisdom, and insisted on the core constitutional principles without fear; it 
has grown from a learning toddler into a skilful adult and changed from an impulsive idealist 
into a staid realist. 
 
As a Chinese proverb says, “Newborn calves are not afraid of tigers.” That is exactly the 
portrayal of the Court’s bold decision in Ng Ka Ling in January 1999, two years after the 
Court was founded. The decision unequivocally asserted the constitutional jurisdiction of the 
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courts of Hong Kong over legislative actions of the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee and is seen by many as a defying of the authority of China’s “highest 
organ of state power”TPF818FPT. It is indeed a reflection of the CFA’s overreach and activism at its 
early age, when its behavioural pattern was not yet formed and was still taking shape. At the 
same time, there was much space for the Court to make creative constitutional rules through 
interpreting the Basic Law, as the mini-constitution for Hong Kong only just came into force 
and its provisions were still virgin – that is, not touched by the courts at all. This factor may 
also, apart from its immaturity, be an important element for us to understand the CFA’s 
robust and aggressive attitude in the migrant children case. After being taught a lesson by the 
tiger (through political pressures and a NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law), the Court 
seemed to have realised the huge unbalance between itself and the powerful Central 
Government authorities and been aware of its own vulnerability under that asymmetrical 
relationship. It calmed down soon from its initial impetuousness and became very cautious 
when dealing with issues involving elements of the mainland China, trying strategically to 
avoid provoking the Central Government. However, its retreat does not necessarily mean a 
sacrifice of its independence; it is indeed a tactic attempting to ensure and safeguard its 
independence by minimising Beijing’s chance or excuse of intervention. In fact, the Court 
still showed its persistence, in the Fa Lun Gong caseTPF819FPT for instance, on human rights issues 
which would embarrass Beijing. In the calming down period, the Court also began to realise 
the limits of judicial constitutional review and the importance of political process in seeking 
solutions to social and economic problems. The Court had been growing from a dreamer to a 
realist. In recent years, it seems that the CFA’s life has become normal or even boring due to 
the lack of significant constitutional disputes. This may be a result of the fact that many 
provisions of the Basic Law that are apt to be cited before courts have indeed been interpreted 
by the courts themselves thus avoiding possible dispute. Accordingly, the needs for the CFA 
to perform creative constitutional rule-making shrink considerably. However, we cannot 
conclude that the importance of the Court’s constitutional role has decreased, because on the 
one hand, the presence of the Court itself can be an effective deterrent or supportive element 
for other actors’ constitutional behaviour and, on the other hand, there will inevitably be new 
constitutional controversies arising in the future sooner or later, which would need to be 
decided by the Court. When Hong Kong’s constitutional reform is carried out in the 
following years, political disputes could be translated into or dressed up as constitutional and 
legal issues. The courts might therefore be dragged into a political battle field; when this 
happens, the CFA’s operations would become “interesting” again. However, as a supposed 
Chinese curse says, “May you live in interesting times”,TPF820FPT being interesting can sometimes 
actually be a bad thing rather than a blessing perhaps due to the accompanying uncertainty 
and risks. 
 
According to our investigation of the constitutional part that the CFA has been playing, we 
find that a more appropriate constitutional role could be achieved by properly dealing with 
three relationships. 
 
The first one is the relationship between the CFA and Central Government authorities. Given 
its vulnerability resulting from the massive asymmetry between the two systems, it is realistic 
for the Court to be modest and restrained when handling issues concerning the Central-SAR 
relationship and sovereign interest. Although literally and formally the CFA is merely a Hong 
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PT In fact, the Chinese language origin of the phrase has not been found. It may be a version of Chinese proverb 
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Kong internal court watching over Hong Kong’s autonomy and interest, substantially it is 
also a national court which should care for national concerns as well. Therefore it is desirable 
for the CFA to serve sides, acting as an impartial adjudicator above the two parties and being 
without bias when handling cases involving important constitutional questions. In so doing, 
the acceptability of the Court to both sides will be improved greatly. Especially it could ease 
Beijing’s worry on the possible challenges over China’s sovereign interests, which are always 
of high sensitivity and great concern to China and would very likely lead to Central 
Government authorities’ intervention when being ignored by the CFA. Playing safe by the 
Court is less likely to attract interference from Beijing, the most dangerous factor threatening 
Hong Kong’s judicial independence. Consequently, Hong Kong’s autonomy would benefit in 
the long run. Moreover, apart from the pragmatic consideration, to be a neutral constitutional 
court taking care of both regional and national interests is determined by the very nature of 
the CFA as an impartial judicial institution with the function of neutral adjudication and a 
primary interpreter of the Basic Law which is not only a constitutional law for Hong Kong 
but also an ordinary national statute. This is also a natural requirement of the “one country, 
two systems” principle, which aims precisely at a harmonious balance between regional 
autonomy and national concerns. In this respect, the CFA could obtain some inspirations 
from the experience of European courts (ECJ and EU member state courts) in promoting the 
evolution of a uniform legal order with pluralist features. The Court may try to make some 
positive contributions in facilitating the harmonious coexistence of and interaction between 
the two legal systems so as to strengthen and consolidate the “one country” constitutional 
order which serves as the precondition and basis of the “two systems” principle. As a result, 
the relieved Central Government authorities would be more willing to respect the Court’s 
independence and Hong Kong’s autonomy. 
 
The second relationship that needs to be considered cautiously by the Court concerns how to 
get along with other Hong Kong governmental branches, primarily the executive and the 
legislature. The Court’s active involvement in constitutional review has given rise to a worry 
on the emergence of “judicial supremacy”, which would be in confrontation with the official 
principle of “executive-led-ness” and the new trend of legislative dominance and therefore 
lead to some changes to Hong Kong’s political order and balance. The causes of the judicial 
supremacy lay firstly in the phenomenon that in Hong Kong almost every social, economic, 
and political issue can be submitted to the courts for a final decision. As a result, the 
importance of political process in providing solutions and seeking consensus may be diluted. 
Moreover, from a structural perspective, Hong Kong’s institutions, both the executive and the 
legislature, lack the means to remedy the Court’s constitutional rule making. It is very 
difficult for them to correct a court’s constitutional decision by amending the Basic Law, for 
the amending power is solely possessed by the NPC and the initiating procedure is extremely 
restrictive. As a result, the Central Government may step in to rebalance the relationship 
among the three branches, by interpreting or amending the Basic Law or by political 
pressures. To avoid such intervention, the Court should be humble when dealing with internal 
affairs as well. It is desirable for the Court to show its mutual respect to its brethren of other 
institutions while scrutinising legislation and policies made by them and avoid overarching 
and overstepping. This can also ease the discomfort of those who question the Court’s 
democratic legitimacy. Here the CFA may learn something from the UK courts’ practice in 
reviewing human rights issues, that is, courts only have competence to declare a UK Act’s 
incompatibility with certain constitutional rights, but no power to invalidate the law found 
inconsistent. It is left for the government and parliament to decide whether and how to amend 
or repeal that law. However, the CFA has instead adopted a US style of judicial constitutional 
review. For this the CFA does not only examines the constitutionality of a law, but also 
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strikes it down when found unconstitutional, sometimes the Court even amends the law under 
review directly by deleting words. Arguably, that could be seen as a trespass on the 
legislature’s territory and therefore should not be encouraged. Under Hong Kong’s political 
reality, it seems more appropriate for the Court, a replacement of the Privy Council in 
London, to follow the UK model of judicial review of Acts enacted by Westminster rather 
than to adopt the US practice. Put simply, in my opinion, when exercising constitutional 
review, the courts of Hong Kong can declare whether an Ordinance is constitutional or 
unconstitutional, but ought not to strike down or amend that Ordinance, for that is the duty of 
the Legislative Council. What the courts can do is just a negatively disapplying of those 
provisions in an Ordinance found unconstitutional. This conforms to “the different 
constitutional roles assigned under the Basic Law to different governmental arms” TPF821FPT. 
 
Last but certainly not least, the Court should strike a balance between civil liberties and 
public order or community interests. This has indeed been implied by the requirement of 
appropriate handling of the former two relationships. Notably, issues involving fundamental 
rights and individual freedoms have comprised a large portion of the Court’s constitutional 
review cases. The Court’s relationship with other internal governmental branches or with the 
Central Government can in fact be seen to a large extent in its way of dealing with these cases. 
A good balance struck by the Court in these rights disputes would facilitate the harmony 
between the Court itself and other institutions, either internal within the HKSAR or national 
within the PRC. Otherwise, if the Court leans too much towards individual freedoms and 
neglects the collective good or national concerns, it could be a cause of tension with other 
actors. Therefore, the Court should be an impartial guarantor of both liberty and collect good. 
However, it should be pointed out that, at first glance, human rights issues may be a major 
conflict between the Central Government and Hong Kong because of the very different 
values and views between the two sides. However human rights issues are not as sensitive as 
Beijing’s concern over the unity of the country, for the former does not challenge China’s 
basic structure. Thus Hong Kong can be permitted to have a human rights regime distinct 
from that of the mainland China. Human rights protection and promotion might be a potential 
area that the CFA could contribute to the constitutional development in the mainland China 
with interactions between the two sides broadening and deepening increasingly and provide 
that the Court holds a friendly fashion and respectful attitude towards the Central 
Government in Beijing. 
 
These relationships reflect the CFA’s dilemma and indicate its actual constitutional role. The 
Court’s practice and experience in this regard constitute an integral part of the application of 
the “one country, two systems” ideal. A successful experiment on that ideal in Hong Kong 
and Macao may offer some useful experience facilitating China’s reunification with Taiwan. 
Although Taiwan has expressed its reluctance to accept the exact Hong Kong model, the 
spirit of the “one country, two systems” settlement is still valuable for seeking a more 
acceptable solution to the final reunification of the country. It might also provide some clues 
and insights for China to tackle its other territoriality problems such as those in Xingjiang and 
Tibet, as the essential part of those problems concerns precisely the constitutional 
relationship between regional autonomy and national sovereignty. For that, the Hong Kong 
practice has been a successful one so far. Although our discussion of the CFA’s constitutional 
role seems to have no direct link to the broader territoriality problems of China, it is the 
elements, environment, structure, condition, climate, and relationships which define, shape, 
delimit and determine the Court’s actual role and performance that matter while China’s 
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central-regional arrangement in other areas is under consideration. Indeed, the CFA is a 
mirror reflecting the complexity and sensitiveness of China’s central-local relationship. It can 
provide lessons for China to improve its constitutional order in relation to state structure. 
 
Since the handover in 1997 and the application of the Basic Law, the HKSAR has evolved 
into a constitutional polity, characterised essentially by the allocation of power by 
constitution (the Basic Law), constitutionally guaranteed individual rights, governance 
according to law, and politics regulated by the constitution and law. In the course of the 
constitutional journey, courts, especially the CFA, have been playing a critical part. At 
present, with the realisation of universal suffrage in the near future, Hong Kong’s 
constitutionalism is developing into a new stage of constitutional democracy. Predictably, the 
Court will have much more important roles to play in that stage, contributing continuously 
and more substantially to the stability and prosperity of the region. Moreover, China is on the 
way to gradually transforming to constitutionalism, democracy, and rule of law. The 
experience of Hong Kong in general, with issues concerning the CFA’s in particular as 
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